POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

Edited for the Academy of Political Science by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University

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Volume LXXVII June 1962 Number 2

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

CONTRACTING FOR DEFENSE: PRIVATE FIRMS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST *

ONE of the most challenging and costly imperatives of the Cold War is the need for constant innovation in weapons systems. Given the advanced state of defense technology, such innovation requires systematic research and development, which in turn call for sophisticated technical capacity, refined managerial skills, and flexible financial arrangements. Accordingly, the government has had to devise new standards in its contractual relationships with business firms. Essentially, the government now assumes the financial risk involved in innovation. Free competition no longer characterizes the process of bidding for government contracts. While private firms have thus been freed from the restraints of the open market, they have acquired new public responsibilities. They are no longer merely suppliers to the government, but participants in the administration of public functions. The capacity of private firms to promote the public interest in the absence of market forces poses serious conceptual and administrative problems.

* This paper was delivered in preliminary form at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September, 1960. The authors are grateful to John M. Gaus, Don K. Price, Sanford A. Lakoff, and Richard T. Vann of Harvard University and to John W. Whelan of the Georgetown University Law Center, who read an earlier draft of the paper, and to Erika Schwenn for capable research assistance. They also wish to thank the following members of the APSA convention panel for their helpful comments: Lawrence J. Henderson, Roger Lewis, Henry Reining, Jr., and Elmer B. Staats.

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Government and the Contractor: Historical

Contracting for goods and services in this country is of course as old as the United States itself. Close federal concern for the method of letting contracts goes back at least to 1809, when Congress directed that "all purchases and contracts for supplies and services . . . be made either by open purchase or by previously advertising for proposals respecting the same." A later Attorney General's opinion limited open purchases to "situations of public exigency," and from 1829 the standard procedure for government contracting was one of open advertising for bids and its concomitant, a firm fixed price. This rule was more explicitly recognized in 1860, when Congressional legislation stipulated open advertising with but two exceptions: personal services and public exigencies necessitating immediate performance.

Peacetime defense procurement practices until after World War II were largely confined to competitive bidding.[1] During World War I there were substantial deviations, especially in the form of cost-plus-percentage of cost contracts, since declared illegal, in which efficiency was undermined by the fact that the contractor's profit was in direct proportion to the amount he managed to spend.

Deviation on a large scale from traditional contractual regulations came with World War II. The floodgates were opened by the first War Powers Act of 1941, which released agencies connected with the war effort from existing legal provisions regarding contracts. The widespread use of negotiated contracts with various forms of cost reimbursement dates from this time.

At the end of the Second World War, government contracting procedures needed overhauling. Wartime practices under negotiation had led to a number of abuses, many of which had been corrected by *ad hoc* legislation and special internal regulations. But it would have been difficult to return to the previously standard peacetime practice of advertising and fixed-price contracts. The rapid advance of military technology made it clear that there would have to be much contracting in the future for research and development,

[1] See John Perry Miller, *Pricing of Military Procurements* (New Haven, 1949), chap. III, for significant exceptions and for criticisms of the procedure. Dickson Reck, *Government Purchasing and Competition* (Berkeley, 1954), discusses parallel problems in purchasing civilian goods and services.

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an area in which specification of the end product and advance estimation of costs are difficult. Yet open bidding on fixed-price contracts clearly requires both.

In the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, Congress attempted to frame a law to fit the new situation. It recognized the necessity for a large amount of negotiated (rather than advertised) contracts, but attempted to limit their use to seventeen more or less clearly defined situations which made advertised, competitive contracts cumbersome, expensive, or impossible. The Act thus gave the military departments fairly wide authority to contract without advertising—and the law contained little in the way of specifics to guard against abuses.[2] President Truman signed the Act in 1948 and at the same time wrote to the Secretary of Defense:

> This bill grants unprecedented freedom from specific procurement restrictions during peacetime. . . . To the degree that restrictions have been diminished, therefore, responsibility upon the Defense Establishment has been increased. There is danger that the natural desire for flexibility and speed in procurement will lead to excessive placement of contracts by negotiation and undue reliance on large concerns, and this must not occur.

The Armed Services Committee commented in a recent report that "The President's admonition . . . proved to be something of a prophecy." [3]

In the past ten years, the need for flexibility and the pressures of uncertainty and complexity have further loosened contractual procedures. Private firms, unhampered by Civil Service regulations, can pay the going market rate for needed technical and managerial skills, charge them as a cost on con-

[2] The Armed Services Procurement Act (10 USC 2301 *et seq.*) extends to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration as well as to the military departments. The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Title III, 41 USC 251 *et seq.*) permits the General Services Administration to delegate to nondefense agencies authority to negotiate which is almost as extensive as that open to the Armed Services. The military departments, however, remain by far the largest users of negotiated contracts. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 also permits negotiated contracts.

[3] House Armed Services Committee, *Report Pursuant to Section 4, Public Law 86–89* (Washington, 1960), p. 11. On the same page appears the full text of the letter cited above. The Department of Defense's "Procurement Presentation" gives a full discussion of the statutes. See Joint Economic Committee, Hearings on *Impact of Defense Procurement* (Washington, 1960), pp. 306–313.

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tracts, and present the military departments with a technical and managerial package. The ultimate development has been for the military departments to let contracts for the design and production of entire weapons systems to prime contractors who are then responsible for the supervision, coordination and integration of the work of large numbers of firms on design and production of components for the system.

New Contracting Methods: General Implications

The position of the contractor under recently developed contractual methods can perhaps best be appreciated through a comparison of more traditional forms with the new. The advertised fixed-price contract lies at one extreme; the negotiated cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract at the other.

The traditional firm fixed-price contract with open advertising is an attempt to bring full market forces into play. In order to use this system, the government must have a fairly exact idea of its requirements, and the items involved must be sufficiently standardized to enable a large number of firms to compete. In open advertising, the government lays down rigid specifications regarding the nature of the item it wishes to procure. With this information in hand, prospective suppliers submit bids which are publicly opened. The contract is automatically awarded to the qualified bidder who promises to meet the exact requirements for the lowest price.

Participating bidders are in open price competition. Their incentive is clear: to meet the government's requirements at the lowest possible cost. The lower their estimate of cost prior to bidding, the greater is the possibility of securing the contract. Once the contract has been awarded, the contractor's profit is greatest if he holds actual costs as far below his previous estimate as possible. The risk lies squarely on the contractor. He will reap its full rewards or (if his actual costs are higher than his estimates) suffer its full penalties.

By comparison with this classic concept of contracting, the newer forms are all deviations from the market mechanism. Contracts involving research, development and prototype production must by their very nature be handled differently from the procurement of routine items. It is impossible to secure firm bids in advance from which the winner could be chosen. The contractor is expected to find the solution to a problem and clearly the costs of doing so can only be roughly

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estimated in advance. The government thus agrees to reimburse the contractor for the costs he incurs (subject to certain exclusions), and selects the contractor by negotiation on the basis of technical and managerial facilities and know-how, rather than price. In addition, the government has had to provide a great part of the capital equipment involved in these efforts, since otherwise (so the argument runs) companies could not be induced to commit themselves to large-scale contracts with highly specialized equipment.[4]

As the pace of technological change has quickened in the military with the increasing dominance of advanced aircraft and missiles, a larger and larger share of procurement dollars has been spent on negotiated cost-reimbursement contracts. In fiscal 1952, 12.7 per cent of defense procurement dollars were tied up in cost-reimbursement contracts; by fiscal 1960, the proportion had risen to 42.6 per cent. In that year, the total value of military contracts was $22.9 billion, over 86 per cent of which was negotiated. The disposition of a substantial fraction of our national income, therefore, is now the result of negotiation between the military departments and the contractor.[5]

Weapons-System Contracting

The mechanics of negotiated cost-reimbursement contracting will become somewhat clearer if we look at concrete examples. Negotiated cost-reimbursement contracting offers largely the same problems whatever the nature of the task or the amount of money involved. These problems appear in sharpest relief in weapons-system contracting in its single-manager form. Under this mode of organization, conceived by the Air Force, a single prime contractor is charged with

[4] As an example, at the end of 1958 the Boeing Airplane Company had $239 million in plant and other facilities owned by the government; the company's own assets were $201 million. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on *Weapons System Management and Team System Concept in Government Contracting* (Washington, 1959), p. 195. For many other companies, the government-owned fraction of capital assets runs even higher. Cf. House Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings Pursuant to Section 4, PL 86-89* (Washington, 1960), p. 604, for statistics on some Air Force contractors, a number with more than ninety per cent of their facilities government-owned.

[5] For the statistics cited, see DOD "Procurement Presentation," in *Impact of Defense Procurement*, pp. 320–321, and Joint Economic Committee, *Progress Made by the Department of Defense in Reducing the Impact of Military Procurement on the Economy* (Washington, 1961), pp. 19, 29.

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the responsibility of developing and producing a complete weapons system including all components or subsystems, with the help of a widespread network of subcontractors.

A weapons system has its beginnings in the formulation of general operating requirements by the Air Force, which then invites firms to submit designs and proposals. In the case of the B-70, currently in development, the Air Force invited six companies to submit designs in 1954. Late in 1957 North American Aviation won an intensive two-year competition after independent evaluations by the Air Research and Development Command, the Air Materiel Command, and the Strategic Air Command. As weapons-system prime contractor, North American was awarded a CPFF Phase I contract authorizing it to proceed with further design work and construction of mockups. Under normal circumstances this is followed by a Phase II contract (also usually CPFF) for completion of engineering and construction of prototypes and, finally, a Phase III contract for production.

What were the Air Force's principal considerations in awarding the prime contract to NAA? According to the company's President, James T. Atwood,

> The primary factor in these determinations certainly is the design itself—the technical analysis, design and all the data that go toward the solution of the problem. . . . Other factors are considered, of course, general engineering capabilities and management capabilities are viewed, and production capabilities and certain program costs insofar as they can be determined in estimates, are considered.[6]

Complete estimates of costs are of course submitted. It is on these estimates that the fixed fee is based; in the case of the B-70, this was 6.5 per cent.

As prime contractor, North American received responsibility for the letting of subcontracts, subject to Air Force approval. For example, let us trace the negotiation of the subcontract for the B-70's auxiliary gyro platform subsystem. North American began by compiling a list of qualified bidders, using "recommendations from our own organization, listings in trade directories, suggestions from the various Air

[6] *Weapons System Management*, pp. 61–63. Those interested in examining weapons-system contracting in greater detail should consult M. J. Peck and F. M. Scherer, *The Weapons Acquisition Process: An Economic Analysis* (Boston, 1962), which became available after this paper was written.

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Force development laboratories, and direct requests from suppliers who wanted to be considered." [7] North American produced a list of thirteen qualified bidders which was approved by the Air Force.

North American sent invitations to bid to the listed firms and held a bidders' conference. Meanwhile, North American personnel toured the bidders' plants and made on-site evaluations. Subsequently, ten of the thirteen bidders submitted proposals, including a division of North American itself. North American, with Air Force approval, decided in favor of Sperry Gyroscope. An essentially similar process was used in the case of the other first-tier subcontractors. In addition, General Electric is developing the B-70 engine as an associate contractor. It holds a contract directly from the Air Force and reports to the government, except for certain aspects of technical coordination on which it has liaison with North American. All these contracts are on a CPFF basis.

North American maintains a resident representative in each of the subcontractor plants, charged with coordination and supervision. Subcontractors must furnish North American with regular reports comparing actual accomplishments with a predetermined timetable. They also submit monthly progress and cost reports which are checked against the technical and cost estimates laid out in the subcontract. As prime contractor, North American essentially takes the place that would otherwise be occupied by Air Force procurement personnel. Seventy per cent of the work on the B-70 is planned to be carried on by the subcontractors; thirty per cent will remain with North American itself, and even this is the result of competition with other possible subcontractors.

Each subcontractor enters into contracts with a second tier of subcontractors. These may be on a CPFF or a fixed-price basis, depending on the end item to be obtained. It is normally at this level that small businesses will begin to get some portion of the work. North American, with due regard to government regulations, takes steps to insure that small firms will be considered. First, all its subcontracts of $500,000 or more require the supplier to establish a small business subcontracting program as described in the Armed Services Procurement Regulations. Second, each subcontract of $100,000 or more requires that the subcontractor furnish North American with a quarterly report of all related small business con-

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

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tracting. Third, each subcontractor agrees to insert similar provisions in its own subcontracts of $100,000 or more. Fourth, all subcontracts exceeding $100,000 that appear to offer subcontracting opportunities are reported by North American to the appropriate regional office of the Small Business Administration and to the small business specialist of the appropriate military department.[8]

The entire subcontracting system, then, is based on continual administration and checking from top to bottom. Costs and economy are secondary considerations; technical efficiency and coordination hold prime importance. As each tier performs its managerial function, so do the fixed fees pyramid one on top of the other. Assuming a six per cent fixed fee to the prime contractor, and a similar fee to two levels of subcontractors, a second tier subcontract for $100,000 will involve payment of over $18,000 in fixed fees. The government thus procures management as well as hardware at all levels.

The single-manager concept of weapons-system contracting gives a particularly good example of multi-tiered contracting with major administrative responsibilities borne by private business. But there are many others as well. The associate weapons-system manager concept is an important modification. Here a number of prime contracts are let, with one of the primes as an integrator, the government retaining somewhat more managerial control. In the case of the Atlas missile, for instance, two Air Force units together with a hired consultant, Space Technology Laboratories, are system managers. North American Aviation, General Electric, Burroughs, American Bosch Arma Corporation and Convair are all prime contractors, with Convair holding responsibilities as integrator.[9] Somewhere between this system and the single-manager arrangement lies the Polaris Missile Program. Here the Special Projects Office of the Navy's Bureau of Naval Weapons is weapons-system manager. M.I.T. holds a prime contract for the development of the guidance system. The Lockheed Missiles and Space Division holds a prime contract as missile-system manager and has numerous subcontractors.[10]

These cases all illustrate government contracting in its var-

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 98–99.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 306.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

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ious modern weapons-system forms, tying hundreds of firms together through various tiers to produce a single end item. The use of such complex contracting methods has created a set of problems of the utmost importance for public policy.

Problems of the New Contracting Methods

The new contracting methods create problems because they involve new concepts of the roles of government and business. Under our traditional contracting system, business firms are government suppliers whose responsibilities and performance are regulated by the competition and risk that characterize the market mechanism of the private economy. Government, for its part, plays a relatively passive role limited to assuring equitable competition for its business. Recently, however, there has emerged a mixture of the functions formerly considered "governmental" and "private" to the point where the old distinctions are inappropriate.

The result has been a number of problem areas in which old tools of control and old concepts prove ineffective in the modern context. Costs and performance are hard to regulate in the absence of the market discipline of competitive contracting; the requirements of the system have led to a concentration of business in a small number of hands, a situation which seems unavoidable under current practices; and the need for productive capacity has tied the hands of the Defense Department in terms of the sources of supply available to it and in terms of its ability to terminate its relationship with a contractor.

1. Costs

Negotiated CPFF contracts offer a marked contrast to the advertised fixed-price variety. First, while competition is not precluded, the number of competing firms is limited to those that receive government invitations to bid. Second, competition concentrates on proffered designs, technical and managerial competence, and the like, rather than estimated costs. Third, the assumption of the contract by the successful firm involves no element of risk; the government undertakes to reimburse costs. The contractor as a result is left with no market incentive to hold costs down; such incentives as there are to hold down the level of costs are purely administrative.

By contrast to the market-imposed controls of advertised

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fixed-price contracting, negotiated CPFF contracts are the result of a bargaining process in which government and business are at opposite ends. Here business firms have decided advantages. They will have an incentive to negotiate for high target costs and will be in a favorable position to do so; their personnel is more knowledgeable and better acquainted with cost determinants. The government's position is bound to be weaker in a situation where experience with thousands of components is needed. The advantages of the business firms in negotiation have been confirmed by numerous cases in which audits have revealed that negotiated fixed-price contracts have been overpriced. For instance, in a recent case before the Tax Court, it emerged that Boeing had initially submitted a bid on a contract of $540 million. After negotiation with the Air Force, the price was reduced to $500 million. The FBI later turned up internal cost estimates made at the time by Boeing of only $460 million.[11]

In an attempt to provide contractors with an inducement to hold costs down, the government has devised modified forms of contract. Cost-plus-incentive-fee and fixed-price incentive contracts permit the contractor to share in any cost reduction which takes place relative to negotiated target costs. (Contracts of this sort can normally be used only after research, development, and early prototype production.) In one frequent form, any savings on target costs go eighty per cent to the contracting military department and twenty per cent to the contractor. Incentive contracts, however, provide incentive for the contractor in two directions: to hold actual costs below target costs, but also to keep target costs as high as possible.

The effective operation of any of these contracting methods depends on the bargaining or "adversary" system which the contracting method assumes. The buyer must be an aloof and impartial decision-maker. Yet Defense contracting officials must now work hand-in-glove with their opposite numbers in the contractors' establishments. To a large extent, the standing of government personnel within their departments (and the standing of the military department itself, for that matter) depends on cooperation from the contractor. The result, as one might predict, is frequently a live-and-let-live situation when crucial decisions arise. This attitude can

[11] *Hearings Pursuant to Section 4, PL 86–89*, p. 325.

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be especially damaging to cost control when emphasis is placed on time of delivery, while little attention is paid to cost. If the contractor is permitted to buy shorter delivery time with increased costs, and the reasonableness of these costs is not too closely scrutinized, the opportunities for inefficiency are multiplied.

2. Concentration

The number of firms which can participate as prime contractors has tended to be rather limited. Some of the reasons are obvious: few firms have the management, technical personnel, and industrial capacity to build complex and costly hardware and to manage sizeable contracts involving many subcontractors. Large firms have frequently done essential background research and development using their own funds or under other government contracts, and already hold government financed facilities. As the contract comes closer to the all-inclusive weapons-system concept, without provision for associate contractors, the number of firms which can possibly compete for the contract becomes smaller.

But also important is the fact that there are pressures in the contracting situation which tend to limit the number of firms which can participate in the process. As one small businessman phrased it:

> All other things being equal, the average military procurement officer would rather give a contract to a big firm because he thinks it is safer and he takes less personal risk. If the contract doesn't work out, he always has the excuse that the big firm is well-known and well-established and should have performed better.[12]

The result of these pressures has been to concentrate defense business in the hands of a relatively few large corporations. For example, in calendar year 1958, twenty-five corporations accounted for almost fifty-five per cent of DOD prime contract awards of more than $10,000.[13] Furthermore, the concentration of contracts has tended to increase over time. During fiscal 1951, the 100 largest contractors received

[12] Robert L. Rod, Chairman of Acoustica Associates, Inc., quoted in *Time*, July 18, 1960, p. 74.

[13] Computed from Joint Economic Committee, *Background Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply* (Washington, 1960), p. 99.

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61.2 per cent of DOD business. This percentage had increased to 73.8, by fiscal 1959.[14]

From the point of view of certain segments of the business community, this problem of the concentration of contracts and the limitation on potential bidders for defense contracts is quite serious. The "play-it-safe" motivation in choosing contractors is not one about which much can be done; it is inherent in the situation (and indeed finds an exact counterpart in private business, according to many analysts of the corporation). But the weapons-system method of procurement ties up military spending in such large bundles that most otherwise suitable business firms are automatically disqualified as prime contractors because of their size. This is not only a problem for the potential contractor, of course, but one for the government as well, since limitation of competition is bound to lead to higher prices. [15]

3. Maintenance of Capacity

The limited number of large firms qualified to bid for prime contracts in the field of weapons systems has placed the government in a peculiar position. The market incentives for cost and good performance are of course weak, due to the necessity of using negotiated contracts. Nonetheless, there is another incentive which might normally operate. In the words of a Boeing Airplane Company representative, "a reputation for high costs is damaging to any contractor seeking to remain in the defense contracting industry." [16]

Given the special nature of defense contracting, however, the threat of loss of business has considerably less meaning than it would in the context of the purchase of common use items from normal commercial suppliers and manufacturers. Many observers feel that defense officials are almost compelled to keep the large contractors in business in order to maintain the country's defense research and production capa-

[14] *Impact of Defense Procurement*, p. 109.

[15] Some critics have suggested on both technological and economic grounds that lead-times would be shorter and costs lower if less contracting were done on a unified weapons-system basis, with more competition on components at the research and development level, the winner to be determined after prototypes have been produced by several different companies. The point is too complex for full exposition here, but see Burton H. Klein, "A Radical Proposal for R and D," *Fortune*, May, 1958, pp. 112–113, 218 ff., and Klein *et al.*, *Military Research and Development Policies* (Santa Monica, 1958).

[16] *Weapons System Management*, p. 206.

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bilities and the defense establishment's investment in these facilities. Indeed, the Armed Services Procurement Act specifically provides that contracts may be negotiated without competitive bidding to maintain production facilities or "to maintain active engineering, research, and development." [17] In recent fiscal years, this provision has been used as the explicit justification for more than one billion dollars' worth of negotiated contracts. Considerations of this sort undoubtedly play a role in many other contracts. As an illustration, the Robertson Committee found that "the need for maintaining the industrial base by spreading the work" was one reason why design competitions were used in only thirty per cent of the design contractor selections by the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics from 1947 to 1957.[18]

The necessity of maintaining research and production facilities conflicts with an important underlying assumption of contracting. The assumption is that if a contractor does not perform to standard, his services need not be used in the future and the goods in question can be bought elsewhere from better qualified suppliers. Given the necessity for the facilities, however, and the fact that they have increasingly fewer alternative civilian uses, the freedom of the government to buy or not to buy from a given contractor is often fictitious. This inflexible situation is frequently compounded by political pressures from the geographical areas in which the large contractors are located.

4. Private Benefit vs. the Public Interest

The problems discussed so far are at their most severe in the areas where private benefit and public interest conflict. Such public goals as cost control, the insurance of competition, and protection for small business all come into conflict with the profit motive.

A good instance of the general problem caused by the quasi-governmental character of many of the defense contractors is the case of Space Technology Laboratories, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, which was technical director of the Air Force's ballistic missile program.

17 Armed Services Procurement Act, 10 USC 2304 (a) (16).

18 U.S. Department of Defense, *Maximum Improvement in Air Weapons Systems in Minimum Time: Summary of Actions*, February 8, 1957, p. A-6.

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STL was barred from manufacturing activities related to its role as technical director, since these activities would have involved clear conflict of interest with its managerial responsibilities. Nevertheless, its status as a profit-making organization caused conflict between its public responsibility as technical director and its private interests, and because of conflict of interest with other firms involved, militated against its full effectiveness as coordinator of the missile program. The General Accounting Office in May, 1960, recommended that STL be absorbed within the Air Force on a number of grounds, most particularly the two we have pointed out. The GAO commented that, "As STL's know-how grows through continued systems engineering and technical direction, it would appear that the financial incentive to withdraw from the program would become increasingly dependent on the capability acquired by STL." The government could only hope that the possibilities for increased profit would not cause STL to leave the program. In addition, its effectiveness as coordinator was hamstrung by its profit-making nature, said the GAO. "The likelihood that the know-how being developed may be used by [STL] to compete for production in related fields and in future programs is a deterrent to full cooperation by the participating contractors." Manufacturers have "a natural reluctance" to make information that might lead to important patents [19] available to a potential competitor.

Many prime contractors for weapons systems seem to be in a position where similar problems would arise, and there is some evidence that they do. On the question of "make or buy"—to subcontract or not to subcontract—there seem to have been clear cases of conflict between the profit motive and "public responsibility" in instances where the guidelines were not at all clear.[20] The prime contractor's private interests (be they profit or merely the desire for a quiet life) may lead him to rely on a relatively small number of subcontractors, without encouraging the fullest possible competition. As Representative Curtis recently phrased it, "one of

[19] Comptroller General of the United States, *Initial Report on Review of the Ballistic Missile Program of the Department of the Air Force* (Washington, May 1960), pp. 27, 37, 39.

[20] Senate Small Business Committee, Report on *Small Business Participation in Defense Subcontracting* (Washington, 1959), p. 12. This particular problem was avoided with STL because it was not allowed to manufacture.

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the things that the Small Business Committee is concerned about is this mother sow process where one big prime gets its favorite little piglets and that is a closed family party that keeps going on." [21] In addition, small subcontractors have complained that the large primes are "proselyting the engineering and design know-how of the subcontractors, who after obtaining all the engineering and manufacturing know-how needed, proceed to build the products in their own shops." [22]

To some, the solution for this conflict between private and public interest is quite clear: the management function should be returned to the Defense Department. In particular, the GAO made this recommendation with respect to Space Technology Laboratories.[23] Similar recommendations were made with respect to weapons systems from a small business point of view:

> The only way . . . to genuinely increase small business participation in [weapons-system procurement] which is increasingly becoming the preponderant defense activity, is by eliminating the single-manager concept and giving the coordinating responsibility and contracting authority back to the Defense Department where it really belongs.[24]

The question of returning greater managerial responsibility to the military departments may be purely academic as long as the salary differential between public and private employment remains as large as it is. In the absence of marked salary differentials, there would still be problems: for many purposes, private organizations can act more flexibly than those bound by Civil Service procedures. But under present arrangements, government contributes to salary differentials through the funds it provides to contractors. Current pro-

21 *Impact of Defense Procurement*, p. 356.

22 Carl G. Hokanson, President of C. G. Hokanson, Inc., in Senate Small Business Committee, Hearings on *Small Business Participation in Defense Subcontracting* (Washington, 1959), p. 30. Cf. also testimony of David G. Perry, *ibid.*, pp. 106–107, for more remarks in a similar vein.

23 The Air Force's solution to this problem has been to create a new nonprofit corporation, Aerospace Corporation, to take over STL's role as technical director of the missile program. The solution takes care of two difficulties: Aerospace's nonprofit status will minimize conflict of public objectives with private profit motivation, and its nongovernmental status will avoid Civil Service restrictions on personnel and their pay scales. The history of the controversy can be found in House Committee on Government Operations, Third Report, *Air Force Ballistic Missile Management: Formation of Aerospace Corporation* (Washington, 1961).

24 Sidney M. Kaplan, President of Systems, Inc., in Hearings on *Small Business Participation* . . . , p. 98.

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posals for making Civil Service salaries at executive levels competitive with those paid for comparable private jobs might enable the military departments to assume a greater portion of managerial functions. Nonetheless, such functions will continue to be shared by government and business to a certain extent because private firms enjoy a greater degree of flexibility than public agencies.

This brings us back to our thesis that public and private functions have become intertwined. Business is no longer merely a supplier but a participant in the management and administration of a public function.[25] Negotiation and cost reimbursement have channeled public money into the private sector without the use of the market mechanism. Business, like government, must then become subject to noneconomic checks to avoid abuses. If they are to shoulder public responsibilities, private firms must ultimately become accustomed to close supervision with the resulting investigations, audits and other paraphernalia that accompany the spending of taxpayers' money. Finally, large firms administering subcontracts find themselves with administrative responsibilities toward their subcontractors similar to those the government holds toward them, and of allocating contractual funds with regard to such public policy goals as the sponsorship of small business, the relief of unemployment, "Buy-American," and nondiscrimination in hiring.

It is certainly tempting to read elements of federalism into this emerging system. This is particularly true if we think of the so-called "new federalism" of the last twenty-five years, under which federal grants have softened the traditionally emphasized legal distinctions of federalism in favor of federal-state cooperation in matters of broad public policy. Business retains its "autonomy" in the sphere of its purely commercial transactions, subject, of course, to existing regulations, just as the states have "autonomy" subject to the Constitution. But over-all business performance (investment

[25] This point has been granted by some high military officials. "*Industry has to take over some of the responsibilities of government* in getting better prices and better procedures for evaluating their subcontractors." Philip B. Taylor, Asst. Sec'y. of the Air Force for Material, in *Hearings Pursuant to Section 4, PL 86-89*, p. 375. "Some of these contractors by the very magnitude of the procurement we are involved in *are in reality agents of the Government.*" E. Perkins McGuire, Asst. Sec'y. of Defense (Supply and Logistics), in *Impact of Defense Procurement*, p. 146. (Italics in both cases are ours.)

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patterns and so on) is affected by the availability of federal funds, just as state functions are affected by federal grants. In the contractual area itself, the business firm is subject to audits and administrative control but still retains a wide sphere of independence in the allocation of funds (for instance, salaries), again presenting a situation analogous to that of the states. Finally, efforts to allocate funds to small business and to labor surplus areas present a problem quite similar to the question of "fiscal need" (diversion of grant funds to resource-poor states) in federal finance.

To be sure, there is great danger in pushing the federal analogy too far. One could with greater safety speak in terms of a partnership, or of the industrial "public-mindedness" so cherished by the American business creed. Nevertheless, the term federalism brings at least one important item to mind—the fact that tax money is being spent on a decentralized basis and that the spenders, both "grantor" and "grantee," are subject to public accountability. But the involvement of private firms as opposed to institutions like state governments presents a distinct complication. Business is still not government; it is by nature oriented toward its private interests.

A major problem of our defense establishment, then, is to find effective contracting methods to enable private business to cooperate in public administration without conflict with its private interests. The tools and skills of administration must be further developed to ensure controls which will approximate the results of the market mechanism.

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CASTRO AND SOCIAL CHANGE

CASTRO has attempted through political means to achieve an egalitarian society and a mass market which Americans have been promoting unaware of the political implications involved. Until the Alliance for Progress the United States has been indifferent to the social and political consequences of the consumers' revolution we have been promoting across the face of the earth, for ours is a peculiarly ingratiating revolution. It is painless, pleasant, and irresistible. We stir people's appetites for all possible goods, and offer them for sale—cheaply, on credit, on the installment plan, on trial. The one thing we will not accept is a no. What we have to offer has to be accepted because it is good for people: it increases their pleasures in life; adds to the joy of existence; makes men strong and women beautiful. Easy to promote, it is done privately and for a profit; it requires no conspiracy or party line; and it is effective. It is, in fact, altering the face of the globe and modifying people's habits, attitudes, tastes and ambitions. The great change of our time is the consumers' revolution propelled by the United States.

An excellent example of this worldwide upheaval is the Model T turned out by Henry Ford. For taken together, the automobile has been more revolutionary in its consequences than Marx, Lenin and Stalin combined. It has changed the ways of men with each other and with nature. In the United States alone the automobile has killed off over thirty million horses, taken drudgery out of farm labor and greatly increased the size of the farm unit, modified the ways of courtship by moving it from the front parlor to the back seat of the car, undermined the little country town, made suburbia possible, raised rubber to an essential of survival and, among the thousand other things, made Nasser a world figure because oil has to be moved through the Suez Canal. These are random examples of the impact of the increasing flow of goods forming the consumers' revolution. The American standard of living which is the model we present to the world also includes electric light, television, radio, refrigeration, air conditioning, frozen orange juice, electric typewriters and canned pea soup. These things the common folk cannot re-

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sist as they have not been able to resist American jazz. America's impact is unofficial, private and personal, and the government has had a minimal part in it. The promotion of good business is an innocent venture. It is not meant to have any political consequences. Political influence upon foreign nations is reserved for official policy. But the government's notions proved to be wrong. The real American presence comes from the personal transactions of private firms and individuals. Official policy makers are relatively unimportant. And what the private personal business transactions are about is deeply revolutionary. They constitute, in fact, the most significant thing going on in the present day world—more important than Communist propaganda. Americans through private transactions are promoting an egalitarian society everywhere. The driver of a Model T or a jeep has the same rights on the highway as he who drives a Cadillac, and a man dead from an automobile accident is indifferent to the make of car that killed him. A "status" society cannot survive a culture saturated with mechanical gadgets.

Americans are unaware of their role as grave diggers of class-ridden societies; they are merely selling tooth paste, fountain pens, and modern plumbing. The fact is, however, that they are undermining the stratified society characteristic of Latin America and of much of the rest of the world. This we have been unable to see because in our culture the emphasis is upon productivity, efficiency and growth, which require order, law, regularity, and the honoring of contracts. Our associates in the nonindustrial parts of the world are the aristocratic leaders of the existing stratified societies while we are doing our best to undermine the foundation upon which they rest. The consumers' revolution we will continue to spread by all our means because we cannot help ourselves. That, in fact, is the major American business in this world. That this revolution is incompatible with a stratified society riveted into "*classes*" made up of the "*senorito*" and the "*pelado,*" is a matter of indifference to us. If confronted with our disruptive influence, we deny it. If the society is breaking down, blame it on the Communists. After all, we are only providing the things people want and offer to pay for.

What we have just characterized was and remains a peculiar blindness on the part of our political and business leaders. We still fail to recognize that the "American Way of Life,"

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the American presence, is incompatible with a socially and politically stratified world. A mass market requires an egalitarian society based upon the mass. We have remained unaware that the changes we are pressing upon the world are in effect political and social.

This is where Fidel Castro's role becomes important. He has dramatized for the world the fact that the political revolution comes first; social and economic improvement later. The seizure of political power precedes economic betterment and the wiping out of social differences. There is nothing new about this. The New Deal, as an example, was a political revolution that preceded and reinforced the mass market and an egalitarian society.

Castro has posed the question: How does Latin America move from an economy of poverty to an economy of well-being without a political revolution? How does it achieve adequate nourishment, shelter, clothing, schooling and public health if the present leaders continue in power? For on all of these accounts the majority of the people are insufficiently provided for and the difficulties are increasing in both town and country. The people in the mass have, of course, always been poor, not only in Latin America but in most of the world. They have been poor but not necessarily undernourished, not necessarily hungry. What has made the issue of poverty more worrisome is the sudden increase in population. What was formerly produced is no longer sufficient and the growing population is outpacing the increase in food production: food now produced is less per capita than in 1938. According to the United Nations, per capita food production in 1954–55 was 94 per cent, if the period 1934–38 is taken as 100 per cent. In 1958, agricultural production expanded 1.9 per cent while population grew by 2.6 per cent. Raul Prebisch says that over-all production increased 1.3 per cent in 1958 and by 0.3 per cent in 1959. The poverty is deepening, especially in the rural districts. When one looks at Haiti and Northeastern Brazil, for instance, the situation seems beyond immediate remedy, no matter how heroic. That is, the sum of the available natural and institutional resources, as well as available human skills, is insufficient to deal adequately with the immediate situation. I am not leaving out the possibilities of a social revolution. In Haiti or Northern Brazil a social revolution would merely make

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things even less amenable to human endeavor. The Haitian situation has lasted over 150 years and has progressively grown worse because the increasing population and the eroding soil have heightened the difficulties without making it easier for the people to do better today than they did twenty-five, or fifty, or a hundred years ago. This same may be said of Northern Brazil, of which the things said today were voiced at the turn of the nineteenth century. Any one who will read Daniel P. Koster's *Sketches and Travels in Brazil* will recognize the most recent newspaper articles as reiterating what was described with equal vividness more than a century ago. I am not saying that there is no remedy for these difficulties, only that there is no immediate remedy.

The poor in Latin America are poorer today because they want more than their forefathers did. Not only are there more of them, but they have learned to expect more of life. They look to have the gadgets we advertise and announce. Many of them have seen our movies, and heard the radio; more of them have seen pictures in newspapers and magazines—which they could not read. They have heard talk. The new roads built in many places—such as the excellent ones in Peru—have opened the way to the great city and large numbers of them have arrived in crowded buses or on foot. They have seen the wonders of the modern world and they want to participate in them. Hundreds of thousands of peasants in Brazil, Venezuela, Chile and Peru have come to the metropolitan centers and decided to stay—in growing shanty towns without streets, light, water, schools or medical aid. The lights they can see from the hillsides are too bright to abandon and the houses they have put together out of sticks and tin cans are no worse (or not worse by much) than those they occupied in the places they came from. These dwellings, too, were fabricated from simple materials—reeds or unbaked bricks—had dirt floors, no windows, or chimneys, no running water and no beds. What is worse in the new site is the crowding and the lack of land to till. The excitement of the city with its evening lights is what makes the difference. For the city seems to contain all the many things the poor desire, do not have and know no way of getting. The city—the visible embodiment of the twentieth century—has captured these people with their thirteenth century mode of existence. That is why they can never go back. A few places (some-

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times only one, like Guatemala City, or Port-au-Prince, or Caracas, or Santiago), are of this world, whereas most of the land belongs to a society which in Europe ceased to exist centuries ago. The city has all that is modern, not just the bright lights: schools, universities, libraries, newspapers, running water, sanitation, hospitals, doctors, stores, theatres. The people have money, dark clothes, and they wear shoes. Away from the city the mass of the people have few or none of these things. In fact, in the country and in the little towns most of these things that represent the modern world do not exist for any one—not just for the poor. For this is the great mark of Latin American culture—that the city belongs to one world and the rest of the land to another. Any one who wants to convince himself of this can do so by going a few miles out of any city in Latin America: from Mexico City to any little village in Hidalgo; from Quito to any *hacienda* where there are a number of *hausipungos* working the land; from Rio to any grouping of houses on a *Fazenda*; from Buenos Aires to a *fundo* worked by temporary tenants; and, in Cuba, from Havana to any sugar plantation with its workers in a typical *Batey*. This contrast between the modern city and the hinterland contains the challenge Castro poses.

Castro's revolution must be seen as an attempt to satisfy the urge set up by American pressure for a mass market and an egalitarian society. The egalitarianism we promote is incompatible with the traditional way in Latin America and will in the end have its outlet in political upheaval.

Castro's Revolution

Castro's political revolution against tyranny, base corruption and governmental indifference to the many needs of the populace was legitimate and inevitable. What was unnecessary and not legitimate was the turning of a political revolution into a totalitarian dictatorship. Castro had ample resources at his disposal to deal with the basic needs of the island: Cuba was rich, not poor. By comparison with other parts of Latin America it had a higher average income than any country except Venezuela, Argentina and Uruguay. In contrast to Haiti it was rolling in wealth. Argentina and Cuba are the only countries in Latin America where the caloric intake is greater than the estimated need.

What Cuba needed was an honest government, one that

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would save the estimated 200 million dollars stolen each year by a corrupt bureaucracy. That amount put to building houses, hospitals, roads, and schools would quickly have changed the face of the land. What it needed was an effective tax system; increased investment for agricultural diversification and rural settlement; greater investments in consumer industries. The nationalist urge sweeping throughout Latin America undoubtedly required increased Cuban participation in the ownership of industrial and agricultural establishments. An honest interest was badly needed in education and in the development of an effective university. Castro had all of the means at his disposal to carry forward such a program; he enjoyed a hero's standing among the people, as well. And yet, he threw it all away to become involved in a political morass from which there is now no visible way out.

Just why this profound tragedy has come to afflict the Cuban people and, in the end, Castro himself, will always remain a matter of dispute. There are, however, certain things visible which can be listed and added up. They may not explain everything that has happened but no adequate explanation can leave them out.

There is first of all the nature of the political situation in Cuba itself. No country in the Western world has had a history of political corruption so universal and so corroding. Nothing touched by the government was untainted and, as the central government controlled all of the political activities in the land, corruption was correspondingly wide spread and troubled political life in all places. The political parties were merely means for distributing what could be taken from the governmental till, from private business and from protected gambling, smuggling and prostitution. There was, in fact, neither a responsible nor an honest political party in Cuba. The two presidents who preceded Batista's latest coup were both civilian, "democratic," and possessed of an earlier gallant history of opposition to the tyranny of Machedo, but their administrations were irresponsibly corrupt. Any one trying to give Cuba an honest government would not have known where to turn. Nor would one have had any confidence that the new "revolutionary" administration would be more trustworthy than the old "revolutionary" governments had been. This fact must be written down as

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one of the reasons for Castro's nonreliance upon the existing political parties. If honesty in government was an objective of the revolution then it could not be achieved by falling back on the older political parties and probably not by the immediate formation of a new one. Honesty may not be the most important political asset, but in Cuba the people had been so frequently disillusioned on this issue that parties and political leaders had fallen into almost total contempt. Governmental integrity had become a popular aspiration. This then is one (though it may not be the sufficient) reason why the government of Fidel Castro turned its back on traditional Cuban political practices.

But a more fundamental reason lies in the nature of the Cuban attitude towards the political leader. This is not only Cuban, it is largely Latin American. The leader has exclusive power of government. When on the early morning of January 1, 1959, Fulgencio Batista, the dictator of Cuba, abandoned the government and, accompanied by his closest henchmen, flew to the Dominican Republic seeking personal safety and asylum, he left behind a political vacuum. All of the power had belonged to Batista, and when he was gone there was no army, no police, no judiciary, no congress, no one and nothing to substitute for the government that had vanished like a dream—evaporated like a fog. There was only Castro, the new leader, coming out of the mountains, who suddenly found himself possessed of all the authority formerly exercised by Batista. He was now the army, the police, the judiciary, the congress and the electorate as well. All of the power of the state had passed into his hands.

For an understanding of the revolutions in Latin America—past, present and to come—it would be well for us to ponder the meaning of Castro's sudden rise to power. For Castro had no army, no political party, no support from the unions, no strong following among the rural laborers and small landholders. He had no philosophy known to or understood by the masses. Almost to the day when he found himself in possession of all the attributes of the state, he had behind him only a few hundred young people, mainly students from middle-class families. Not until Batista's disappearance could he count on a few thousand men. The government became his by default. There was no other source of public power. The land was devoid of authority until it was as-

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sumed by the leader of a small band of ill-armed and ill-trained young men. In an authoritarian society there can only be one source of political power, and when that is gone it can only be replaced by another, and in each case it can only be an individual. After Machado, Batista; after Batista, Castro.

Personal power is the overriding presence which has conditioned Latin American history since the independence and is the most likely element in the current ferment for social change. For if the revolutions occur that are predicted by so many in and out of Latin America, they will come embodied in a person, not in an ideology, not in a party, not in a program, not in a political movement—they will appear in the shape of a revolutionary *caudillo* who, like Castro, will take over from a Batista, a Somoza, a Trujillo, or a Peron. We are talking about a fragile political structure. A few riots toppled the government of Ecuador. Attempts against the governments of Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela have been repeatedly made by young army officers. A captain or even a lieutenant with a few men captured a radio station or the telephone exchange on more than one occasion. Loyal government forces surrounded or killed the malcontents and the uprising failed. There have been other failures.

We know from the well-documented record that these attempts are possible only because there is a long history of political instability. The mere belief that the government could be overthrown by such a venture—a belief shared by many—casts a light upon the frailty of government in many parts of Latin America. They are caught in a political dilemma from which they have not been able to extricate themselves. The centralized authoritarian tradition requires a strong personal government. When that is absent, rebellions surge up at frequent intervals until one of the numerous uprisings succeeds and brings a *caudillo* into office once again, and the cycle repeats itself. The revolutions are personal—Madero, Carranza, Pancho Villa, Obregon in Mexico, Paz Estenssoro in Bolivia, Betancourt in Venezuela, Castro in Cuba. This record holds true for the liberals as well as the conservatives, or by whatever name one would classify those who have passed across the political stage in the last fifty years.

If any one thing is certain, the revolutions of the next

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fifty years will be more like those that preceded them than like changes that have occurred in the United States. Latin America has had a rash of imitators of Mussolini and Hitler and now will have a succession of imitators of Castro. Fidelismo will, in all likelihood, become a banner for aspiring political demagogues who would break through the crust of a static society and find a place for themselves. For by its nature the static society we have described in previous pages does not allow for political change without violence and without being embodied in a leader. If the leader happens to be like Castro—not only a national hero but a demagogue who brooks no criticism, takes no advice, who is shrewd, callous and power hungry—then, like Castro, he is free to make any kind of revolution he wishes. It is also true for the future, as it has been for the past, that Castro can only be driven out by violence—as were Machado, Batista and so many other leaders.

That Castro made this kind of revolution was a personal choice. No one else could have made it at the time. He had all the power and there was no restriction on how he used it. He could establish his own system of justice; take such lives as seemed right and proper to him; and confiscate private property for public use as he wished. Until he is driven from office by violence or taken from it by death, no one will stop him.

The taking of human life at will is in the older tradition; there is nothing new about it. The confiscating of private property for public ends, placing it in a government bureaucracy to manage, that is rather new. Traditionally, revolutions were justified by slogans that had a liberal ring; the new ones will be acclaimed on grounds of Marxian theory and social justice but, like the older ones, they will be embodied in an individual.

This age-old tradition of personal leadership just described is so deeply imbedded that it affects every policy, program and ideology. *Personalismo* will prove one of the barriers to the hopes held out for the Alliance for Progress; the persistent misconceptions of the United States will prove another.

A View of the United States

Latin Americans have neither known nor valued their

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North American neighbors. On the other hand, Latin American intellectuals have usually stood humbly before European culture. They have thought of themselves actually or potentially as Europeans. If there was an indigenous note in colonial painting, architecture and writing, it went unappreciated or was taken as representing a lesser competence. This attitude persisted throughout the nineteenth century. Every European fashion in politics or ideas was imitated: romanticism, positivism, Marxism, Fascism, existentialism have all had their votaries, their following and their influence.

When Latin Americans faced the United States they saw it through European eyes, and to the Europeans all of America was inferior, whether colonial or independent. Every European—Spaniard, Frenchman, or Englishman—when he looked at America, north and south, saw only uncouth barbarism or at best a poor image of himself. And Latin Americans accepted the European judgment because they read European and not American books; were educated in Europe and not in the United States.

Equally, the North Americans looked at Latin America through European eyes because they, too, for a long time were reared on European literature, and went to Europe for their "higher" education. North and South America saw each other as inferior because each in its own way identified itself with, and adopted, Europe's evaluation of the other America and sometimes of itself. This sense of insufficiency has persisted among our Southern neighbors in part because they are peaked at being left out of the main stream of modern history. First they were dominated and enchanted by Europe, but considered as something of a poor cousin. And now, quite suddenly, the United States identified by Latin Americans as the cruder nation, has extended its arena and acts in the world as an equal to the great powers, at least in economic and military matters. Latin America feels left on the margin of world affairs. No wonder that the League of Nations, the United Nations, international conferences became so important. They offered a place in the sun, so to speak, to those who were left to live in obscurity. When a Latin American nation can be represented on the Security Council, when one of its delegates can be president of the United Nations Assembly it has really come close to the

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center of world affairs. This aspiration for place, recognition and at least seeming power and influence is an honest desire to be counted among the true nations of the world. Our overwhelming power is resented because it casts a shadow over their aspiration for equality.

The hysteria of Cuban nationalism is just that. It wants to be independent of us spiritually—not just politically or economically. It wants to carve a niche for itself, a special place where it will not only feel secure but where it will shine forth to the world as a unique historic personality. That is why the Cuban revolutionaries are so bitter. That is why the memory of the Platt Amendment rankles so and is seemingly unforgettable. The desire to escape from our patronage and to stand out in the world as a distinctive, even if a small nation—as Holland, Denmark, Sweden, or Switzerland, for instance—is the inner drive. Just to be oneself and not be tied to American apron strings, not to be led by the hand. This is a matter of which we *will* hear much in the next generation or two. The changes prognosticated for the future, whether violent or peaceful, whether by "revolution" or by democratic process, are part of the effort to achieve "independence," the second liberation, as the Cubans say. And the inner passion is the greater because *this* independence cannot be won by violence. It has to be found, discovered, achieved, realized, grown into, whatever the word, for no one knows exactly how the miracle of being at home among neighbors—without being burdened by a sense of inferiority or exalted by a feeling of superiority—comes about.

And this is a matter which neither the Latin Americans nor the United States can do much—perhaps no one can consciously do anything—about. If we stopped feeling superior, the Latin Americans might stop feeling inferior, but that is not certain and no one can tell either them or us how to begin feeling less upish or more at ease.

The contrast between the two cultures as to material possessions and the accumulation of gadgets is so marked that there is a suspicion, if not a conviction, on the part of the Latin Americans that we would keep what we have for ourselves and obstruct the enrichment of the peoples to the South in the goods and artifacts we boast of as our most cherished accomplishment. When Latin Americans talk of

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imperialism, colonialism, and capitalist exploitation that is what they have in mind, our growing wealth and their relatively increasing poverty—for the gap has been growing wider, and they explain it on grounds of malice of forethought. We are accused of deliberately making them poorer so that we might become richer. They fail to recognize that these changes are the result of a higher rate of saving in an industrial nation and a higher rate of population growth in poor countries—as well as the consequence of the cumulative expansion of a scientific technology which by its nature becomes increasingly diverse, specialized and reproductive in new tools, skills and insights. They therefore regard their inability to maintain our pace of gadget reproduction as proof of our misuse of the relations which exist between us. They describe the contact between our industrial and their preindustrial economy as exploitative to our advantage by a policy of deliberate malice. "The United States is the chief obstacle to Latin America's industrial development." This idea may seem foolish to those with an average annual income of over $2,200, but it is not so incongruous to neighbors who may subsist on a money income averaging $200 or less annually.

They accuse us of keeping progress from them. In their desire to become modern, they have to reject a system which does not allow for the egalitarianism of an industrial society. To their chagrin they find the United States supporting the status quo in the present Latin America. Our business men and investors have inevitably tied their own commitments to the political world as it is—and the Latin Americans who accept the desirability of change are faced with the prospect of having to struggle against their own past as well as against the democratic world which they hope to copy.

This is especially painful because Latin American intellectuals—more so than most in the Western world—are preoccupied with their own destiny, with the culture they live in, and are worried about its direction. One may speak of this as a heritage of the king's conscience, for he was woefully aware of his mortal failing and his earthly shortcomings that might keep him from glory and from heaven. In that sense, the Latin American intellectuals are worried about the future, the accomplishment—in short, the destiny—of their continent, their culture. Where are they going, and

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will they achieve glory and grandeur: will they contribute something unforgettable, eternal, to all mankind? This is a continuing preoccupation of the most serious writers and thinkers. They really have a conscience about it. The fact that other peoples have managed to develop great cultures without this almost morbid awareness of self and destiny is beside the point. Their Spanish heritage provides for a sense of moral purpose not only for the individual but for the whole continent. Don Quixote is still very much alive. To the Latin American the fact that we in the United States have for all of these years taken our destiny for granted, that we allowed tomorrow to worry about the next day while we lived and wrought in the present, makes us seem short-sighted, materialistic and spiritually drab. In their view, our chief concern was immediate enrichment. We could only be morally obtuse.

It is this view of the United States that helps explain certain facets of the Cuban revolution. Castro is anti-American and denounces us in hysterical terms because he not only wants to be free from American influence, but repudiates our claim to superiority. He is asserting that the Cuban spirit is higher, richer, more spiritual. Cuba to be free must, in Castro's view, repudiate not only dependence upon the economy of the United States but it must free itself of American influence. It must be Cuban and only Cuban. The avowal of communist allegiance is no contradiction. For in this mood, anything that will save Cuba from "American Imperialism" is also "Cuban." This hysteria is present and real and self-defeating. But it is part of the mood, and Latin American early approval of Castro is largely explained by his repudiation of the United States claim to greater virtue. In this he was expressing their deepest feelings.

Cuba and Mexico

Castro's difficulties at home and abroad began when he decided to make an agrarian revolution in a country that had no agrarian problem; when he tried to impose a revolutionary program, forged in an agricultural subsistence economy, on a country that was preponderantly urban and commercial and tied to the international price system. He mistakenly identified social reform with agrarian revolution, obviously taking his model from Mexico.

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But Cuba is not like Mexico. To begin with, Mexico is an Indian country. In 1910, when the Mexican Revolution began, at least fifty per cent of the people were Indians, most of whom spoke no Spanish, followed the customs of their forefathers, lived in little isolated villages without any idea of the nation, and retained traditional attitudes and ways that made the phrase *"Patria chica"* a meaningful expression of localism and regionalism. Nothing like this can be said about Cuba. The few primitive Indians disappeared in the early years after the discovery to be replaced by the Negro coming from Africa. Most of the people are part African rather than Indian. Even in the nineteenth century, on at least two occasions—1817 and 1843, whatever the census is worth—the African people outnumbered the Europeans. Moreover, slavery lasted until 1890 and in remote places until 1897. By Cuban definition 12.7 per cent of the population is colored at present. In Cuba, the Negro played the part of the Indian in Mexico. The Indian was sad, serious, quiet, bound by traditional mores, immersed in the affairs of his village and family, devoutly religious, mystical and indifferent to the ways of the white man. The Negro in Cuba, on the other hand, filled the land with drums and the dance, conserved few traditions of his own, had no attachment to the land, lacked personal identity with any village, community, place or region. He was cheerful, unburdened by responsibility for village, family, community or region. He was mainly confined within the ambit of his master's domain, large or small. Even after independence from Spain, he never became absorbed within the discipline of a community such as the Mexican village that ruled its own members by a customary law which could only be broken at one's own peril and that expected each member to take his share of the burden of local affairs. For one must never forget that the Indian community in Mexico exacted a kind of civic responsibility from childhood to old age. It lived by a kind of internal self-government which preserved the community and marked it as a collective body (even if not a legal one). When the revolution came, the village proved a very effective source of power. But nothing like this has ever existed in Cuba. There are, in fact, no villages in Cuba. The *batey*, the typical Cuban rural grouping, is located within the plantations, is subservient to the owner, and was originally composed of

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slaves. In recent times it was constituted of workers who had only an incidental attachment to the place of their abode. In Mexico even the *hacienda* community often consisted of people whose ancestors had lived in the place and who preserved about the church the forms of an organized religious community. The Cuban country folk have never had the traditions of an organized rural community.

In 1910, Mexico was a rural country. Out of some fifteen million people which the census attributed to the nation only about five per cent lived in urban centers. The Mexican Revolution, therefore, began in a nation where most of the people were close to the soil, made their living from tilling the land and knew nothing of the ways of the city. The same can be said of Russia in 1917. This was also true of China when it began its social revolution. In Cuba, however, the urban population in 1953 was 57 per cent and now is 60 per cent, at least, of the total. (In 1953, 63 per cent of the houses of Cuba were in urban areas.) Havana alone contains about 20 per cent of all of the Cuban people.

It is important to note that what we call social revolutions have all occurred in agricultural countries where the mass of the people lived on what they themselves raised from the soil. In such a society, a revolution is a simple thing. First, you cut off the head of the *Hacendado,* then you distribute the wheat, corn and barley stored in the barn, and the cows, horses, sheep and chickens. Similarly the plows, digging sticks, and other tools are distributed. The land is taken by the peasants and the revolution is over. What really happened was that the stored consumer goods were divided up among the surrounding peasants, and the limited producers' capital in the form of seed, animals and tools and the land itself fell into the hands of those who had always worked the soil. In that sense the real income of the rural population increased or was expected to increase. The income of the urban population declined. That happened in Mexico, in Russia, in Bolivia, and, one would assume, in China. In Russia, the Communists went out into the country and by force of arms collected the food for the urban proletariat. It could be done in Russia because the city was small.

In Cuba, however, where food had to be imported from abroad and where the city folk outnumber the rural population, the urban centers could not be supplied by force. Food

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had to be purchased abroad. In recent years, about a third of the island imports have been food items. Clearly the issues of the Cuban revolution are not like those of the Mexican. Cuba is a commercial, industrial, monetary culture, whereas Mexico was a subsistence one. Mexico had no national market, most of the food was locally produced and locally consumed, and what was exchanged was bartered in parochial markets. Cuba, on the other hand, has long lived on what it could import from the outside. Its entire population lives on a monetary economy, whereas the vast majority of the people in Mexico in 1910 lived outside the money market. But in a monetary economy, income is not increased by expropriations, or revolutionary zeal, or by denunciations of Yankee imperialism.

This really brings us to the crux of Castro's difficulty: a monetary, commercial and industrial urban economy cannot be treated like one that depends upon subsistence agriculture. The only way to increase the income of the mass of the people in a monetary and industrial society is to increase production at home or to increase the amount that can be purchased from outside. It is as simple as that. Only by having more goods available can the people find more to eat and to wear. And increased production is something that cannot be had by expropriation or by revolutionary slogans. If most of the population is urban and if the entire population lives on a money economy, the Mexican model for revolution is a snare and a delusion. It can only lead to a lower standard of living for the entire population, not only for those living in the cities. It is no accident that the social convulsions—French, Mexican, Russian, Chinese and Bolivian—have all occurred in countries where the vast majority of the people made their living by working the land.

All of this happens in spite of the Marxian doctrine of the class struggle in urban and industrial areas and the concept of a proletarian uprising against the capitalists. The uprisings, in fact, have occurred in countries where there were no proletarians in the Marxian sense and no capitalists. There is no single instance of an attempt by an industrial population to tear the society apart and distribute the goods they could lay their hands on. Intuitively, the populace knows that it would gain nothing by dividing the subway and allowing the workers to carry a piece of rail home. If the

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Marxian concept of the class struggle has reality, it is to be found in a stratified agricultural society where the distance between the *Hacendado* and the *peon* cannot be bridged, where there is no middle-class and where there is no built-in mechanism for social and economic change. In those societies social convulsion has occurred and may well occur again. But in an industrial and monetary society, not all of the Marxian theorizing has produced a single proletarian uprising.

This view of the nature of revolution places Castro in a most difficult position. Having defined the Cuban problem as primarily an agrarian one, he initiated a series of policies that did not meet the needs of the Cuban economy and could only bring harm to the island and its people. It is understandable why Castro took this direction so unworkable for Cuba; he had no other model. If he was going to make an agrarian revolution in Cuba, then Mexico, Russia, China were the living examples he could study. That Cuba was unlike these countries was not easily visible to one brought up on the idea of anti-imperialism and class struggle. Given the Marxist background of so much of the political thinking and writing in Latin America and given the Mexican example, it was natural that Castro, when possessed of the power of government and filled with revolutionary zest, should turn to land reform as the great panacea, as the basis for all else that the revolution might hope to do in the future. Unfortunately for Castro and for Cuba, he did not realize the significance of the fact that the urban population of Cuba greatly outnumbered the rural and that all of the people were enmeshed in a monetary economy and dependent primarily on the export of sugar in a world market at a price over which Cuba had no control.

Stated this way, it becomes evident that Cuba faced serious needs in education, health and housing. It suffered from large scale rural and urban poverty, and unemployment. But Cuba did not have an agrarian problem.

For one thing, the mass of the people had no tradition of farming. There were no thousands of villagers as there had been in Mexico who remembered that the surrounding lands now occupied by the *Hacendado* had once belonged to their forefathers and had been taken by force; there was no tradition of peasant uprisings; there was, in fact, no demand for

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land distribution. Castro was no Emiliano Zapata fighting the battle of the villages in Morelos. The notion of agrarian reform was something Castro had learned abroad. It did not emanate from the people. It never really occurred to them because Cuban agriculture had long since been in the production of sugar, tobacco, and coffee for export. These crops were grown on large estates (especially sugar), mainly with transitory labor. The small self-sufficient farmers who could benefit from land distribution were few.

But a sugar plantation cannot be broken up without destroying its efficiency. To operate at all, the work of the plantation must be so organized that the planting and the cutting of the cane can be scheduled to provide a regular flow of new cut cane as it ripens during the four or five months of the grinding season.

The central office must have unified control over the labor force, the loading and the maintenance of the animals, wagons, trucks or railroad cars that are part of the operation. It must also be able to deal with plant disease and the danger of fire. Once set in motion, the *Ingenio* has to keep going until the *Zafra* has come to an end.

What we have described is a factory in the field rather than a farm. If agrarian reform had not been an obsession based upon Mexican experience, it would not have occurred to anyone that the way to deal with Cuban difficulties was by dividing the large sugar plantations.

That the sugar plantations cannot be broken up must have become clear to Castro and his advisors early in their program. For, instead of breaking up the estates, they have been taken over by the government and entrusted to an agency popularly known as INRA (*Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria*). The workers on the plantation are organized into "cooperatives," but effective control is in the hands of the government. INRA has replaced the former owners and instead of 161 separate plantations under separate management there is now just one employer and one manager. The "cooperatives" are merely the tools through which INRA operates the industry. INRA gives the orders, pays the wages (often in script which can only be exchanged in the stores it maintains), and finally purchases the crop from itself at the price it sets. What has really happened is that there is now only one employer, one supplier, and one purchaser. For the

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sugar-cane cutter these changes have been dramatic and of dubious value. Before the revolution, the worker could complain to his employer, could take his grievance to his union and finally could go on strike and appeal to the government for help against the owner, something that had happened many times. The owner or his representative was at hand and was amenable to union persuasion or pressure and to the threat of the government. Now, however, the "owner" is far away in a government office guarded by militia men armed with machine guns, the trade unions have been stripped of their power and are under the thumb of this same owner. Most dramatic of all, the "boss" and the policeman are now one and the same person. The worker has no recourse and no one to whom to turn. What started out to be a liberating social movement in the guise of an agrarian reform has turned into a monopoly of all economic, social and political power, immune to either persuasion or pressure. It has, in fact, become omnipotent and embraces the greater part of the agricultural plant.

Castro was dealing not with a subsistence economy but with a commercial one, dependent upon a foreign market. It could only be operated on the basis of production credit and by the payment of wages against a future harvest. When the employers were removed, there was only the government in the form of INRA that could take over the management, the payment of wages, the operating of the stores, the purchasing and the disposal of the crop. And if one remembers that this adventure in centralizing embraces the industry that provides the major source of foreign exchange and a large part of the national income, it follows that the control of the rest of the economy was inevitable. But the control of nearly all economic and social activities by a single bureaucratic agency automatically impels the government to depend upon force as its major instrument for enforcing its program. In Cuba the policeman now rules every facet of human life. In the absence of intermediary powers between the individual and the government the police has become the sole disciplinary agency.

It must by now be evident that an industry upon which the life of the nation depends is something other than an agrarian problem. And if the food the people eat and the elemental things that make up their standard of life have to be

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imported, the resource which makes this import possible can only be hastily meddled with at the peril of the well-being of the people itself.

These changes in Cuba were wrought in the name of a future egalitarian society and have been imposed upon a people proud of their sense of freedom and their delight in song and dance. To force the Cuban people to conform to some preconceived design and to convert them to a severe puritanical outlook upon life will require painful efforts and will fail in the end.

In contrast to what is going on in Cuba, the Mexican Revolution had more modest ends. The changes that have followed in the wake of the Mexican upheaval have been the by-products of a popular movement whose leaders came from the bottom and who had no fixed design to impose on the nation. Nor did the Mexican Revolution concentrate all power in one man's hands nor make one man's voice the only one that could be heard in the land.

The Alliance for Progress

Castro has dramatized the political basis of social and economic renovation. The Alliance for Progress is our belated acquiescence to that same idea. Much social and economic change in the world takes place informally and unconsciously, without deliberate decision or formal policy. But when men set out to change the institutions about them they have to base their policy on some sort of consensus, some moral justification, some political sanction. Without deliberate intent we have been engaged for many years in promoting an egalitarian society and a mass market. Now we have come to the point of recognizing that the industrialism we promote cannot abide a stratified social and economic structure, that the political system which maintains it must yield to the demands for greater vertical mobility, for a more equitable distribution of income, for easier access to schooling. We now recognize that the very poor, the excluded, those that were sold with the land, those for whose children there was no access to the modern world, could no longer be kept in their traditional place without risking a violent upheaval or slowing the consumers' revolution we have been promoting. The United States is now saying that the world it represents is no longer compatible with the present state in Latin America, and that

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it will contrive the necessary political changes to allow for a peaceful dissolution of an immobile and aristocratic society.

For the first time in our history we are setting out to promote social and economic reforms in foreign countries as a matter of public policy. To deliberately promote an egalitarian society more quickly, we are telling our neighbors to change their land system, their tax structure, their education and their political organization as a condition of our aid. We are really telling the leaders of Latin America, the aristocratic families who have ruled the land for four hundred years, to surrender not only the basis of their social status and economic wealth but the source of their political power as well. We are telling them to do this as a condition of our aid in industrialization which, if successful, will promote an egalitarian society and a mass market and destroy the basis upon which the present political system rests. We have, in fact, taken our stand on behalf of social revolution. We are probably doing this unconsciously without understanding the full implication of land reform, tax reform, universal education, and so on. The present system in Latin America rests on the large plantation, on inequality in taxation, on illiteracy, on an unbridgeable gap between the *senorito* and the *pelado,* on the idea of a natural aristocracy and its followers and servants. The leadership of Latin America believes in paternalism, in charity, in the idea of the *compadre* (god father) but not in equality, not even as a price for industrialism. Those who do believe in equality, social reform, social revolution, are a small number of intellectuals, students led by Marxists and a few labor leaders in the grip of communist ideology who—with Sputnik and Castro in front of them—believe that everything is possible by revolution. One need only take a careful look at the present political complexity of Colombia, Argentina, Ecuador, and Guatemala to recognize how difficult it would be to predict the consequences of any political program brought in from the outside.

We have committed ourselves to the promotion of social reform by peaceful means on the assumption that the present governments will and can change the political and social institutions sufficiently to enable them to move ahead towards what we understand to be democracy, that is, an egalitarian society with access to the mass market. One would have to be an optimist to believe that such a policy can be success-

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fully initiated and carried through by the present governments. A program of this kind will be resisted by the aristocracy because, in effect, it amounts to liquidation of the aristocracy itself. A successful agrarian reform in the highlands of Peru would displace the political power of the *Mestizos* in the towns because they own the lands that the Indians work. This is what happened in Bolivia as a result of the revolution of 1952. To believe that the present government in Lima or any government similar to it would or could carry through such a plan is to forget the history of Peru. Something like this can be said about nearly every country in Latin America.

Without profound social and political reform the egalitarian democracy we stand for is impossible. It is also unlikely that the governments of Latin America can carry forward the necessary changes. There really are only two possibilities. The pragmatic one, the one we ought to pursue, is the promotion of industrialization as best we can while letting the changes occur as they come—they will be intermittently peaceful and violent. But our role remains that of supporting the development of industrial growth, housing, education, and so on, without commitment to a political program, without asking for specific change in governmental policy. This would enable us to define our responsibility for social change as limited to helping governments—even if they come to power by violence—to meet their problems. Or we can commit ourselves, as we apparently have done, to promoting social changes which would in effect destroy the present basis of government in Latin America. We are not deliberately bent on overthrowing the age-old ruling class in the southern part of this hemisphere, but that is what agrarian reform, tax reform, and the other items of our policy really come to.

It will not be surprising if these proposals of ours do result in a whole series of social revolutions where the slogans will be copied from statements by American political leaders. The revolutions may well be made in our name, rather than in that of Russia, but we will not be able to control them. They will be made by individuals—by leaders who will find their justification in the Alliance for Progress. This is a bit of prophecy that may not come true—we may simply stir up the revolutions and have the communists take the credit and

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control them. For it is hard to think of our supporting a government, come to office by violence, that killed or exiled our friends. That is just what a social revolution means; the changes we are proposing as a condition of our help may well produce these results.

The gap between the rich and the poor in Latin America is so wide that it cannot be bridged *in a hurry,* except by violence, and perhaps not then. To speak of this as a ten year program is to speak of ten years of convulsion, or of a magic universe where miracles can be performed. The gap can ultimately be closed by changes stimulated by industrial developments. This would be a process, as we said, mainly peaceful but also sporadically violent. It would, so to speak, gradually ease the backward parts of Latin America into the present in stages as the developing resources permitted. To attempt to do so quickly by our pushing the reform as a condition of furthering development will either bring military dictatorship in its wake as a way to stand off social convulsions or produce the violent outbreak without necessarily hastening the desired social changes. Anyone who believes that an egalitarian democracy can be developed in ten years in Guatemala is due for an unhappy awakening. Not all the resources at our disposal—if they were all dedicated to Guatemala—would produce this result. The remedy might in the end prove worse than the disease. Our political responsibility for the egalitarian revolution we have been promoting would be satisfied if we accepted the social changes as they occurred and did our best to help the governments to deal with the difficulties that follow in the path of industrializing a stratified society. Up to now we have refused to admit that the demands for change, or that the rebellions, had legitimate grounds and should be eased over their greatest difficulties. There is only one exception to this rule—and that is our support of the Bolivian revolutionary government.

This sounds like a criticism of the Alliance for Progress but it is not meant to be. It is meant to question the emphasis on "conditions" to be met before the aid is given. With or without our aid, there are likely to be many upheavals in Latin America in the next twenty-five years and these upheavals will all demand a greater share of the consumers offerings we display. These revolutions we have to learn to accept. Their number will decline as the countries become

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industrialized. In the meantime, we cannot work miracles, and the "Marshall Plan" may prove more difficult to apply in Latin America than it was in Europe. The ground is so different. It will be some time before Latin America can take a Marshall Plan in its stride. It is like asking: How would a Marshall Plan have been applied in Europe during the years of the French Revolution? For it is no exaggeration at all to say that the greater part of Latin America is closer to the Europe of the French Revolution, before the industrial revolution had spread to the continent, than it is to the Europe after the Second World War when the Marshall Plan was developed.

A Policy Proposal

With or without the Alliance for Progress, as we have just said, Latin America, as well as a good part of the nonindustrial world in other continents, is likely to be the scene of political upheaval during the next twenty-five years. For, as we have argued, social convulsion is a phenomenon manifest in relatively primitive agricultural countries. The real question faced by the United States and other industrial nations is how to allow for the seemingly necessary revolutions among preindustrial countries without unduly interrupting their development—that is, without interrupting the flow of foreign investments they require if they are to industrialize at more than a snail's pace. The issue is a real one. Among other things, every revolution takes the form of confiscating foreign property as an evidence of its zeal and patriotism. This is partly nationalist self-identification and partly Marxist belief in the essentially evil nature of "capitalism and imperialism." The issue is grave enough to require some corrective measures in the interest of the preindustrial areas themselves. It not only slows down further investment, stimulates a flight of capital from areas where it is most needed, but also disrupts and sometimes destroys the industrial plants already in existence. Further, it postpones the possibilities for increasing the standard of living of the people in whose name the revolution is made. The issue is complex and difficult to deal with because it goes to the heart of the relations between the industrial and nonindustrial nations and touches the latter's aspirations for liberation and economic independence. Both of these seem involved in the right to expropriate

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foreign property. The fact that expropriation either postpones or retards the economic growth an expanding population requires is lost in the revolutionary excitement. Politically, measures need to and could be developed to sustain the objectives of social reform and protect the foreign investor at the same time.

The number of industrial nations in the world is limited. These nations supply the capital for both short- and long-term investments. Every railroad, factory, mine or power station in the world has come from the resources made available by the citizens or governments of this limited number of nations (except Russia and its satellites in the last few years). The rest of the nations of the world secure their international exchange by the export of raw materials to these same nations. The underdeveloped nations have only the market available in the industrially developed nations. This would make it possible for the industrial nations individually or collectively to evolve a policy that would protect their own investments without preventing industrial growth in nations that are caught up in a revolution. The issue can be illustrated by Cuba.

In the light of what happened in Cuba all of our investments in Latin America are in jeopardy. The Alliance for Progress could not survive another Cuba and Latin American industrial development would be seriously retarded. With the Cuban example the expropriation of American (foreign) investments has become a fashion. It is the one way which new governments that come to power by violent means can prove to themselves or to their followers that they are revolutionary. This gesture has little to do with the economic improvement of the people. But expropriation feeds the political excitement the new governments need and satisfies a latent nationalism and a desire to be complete masters in their own house which the newer political doctrine requires. Mainly it is fashionable for a revolutionary government to behave in that manner. It is easy—all it requires is a decree—it is dirt cheap for it costs nothing at all, and it seems to transfer to the nation wealth and property from foreign hands. As long as the governments newly come to office can do this without having to pay the piper immediately then the fashion will continue and spread to other countries in Latin America and around the world. As long as it seems

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easy and free to transfer foreign owned property to the local government there will be no stopping it for some considerable time to come. Our insistence on prompt and adequate compensation which the governments are neither able nor willing to pay places us not only against the expropriation but against the changes the government is proposing to bring about. We end up accused of being opposed to social change and unpaid for the expropriated property as well. We come out of the controversy poorer and with less prestige. Somehow expropriation must cease to be fashionable and we must not seem to stand in the path of needed reform.

The way out of the difficulty is a simple one. If it were adopted as a unilateral and later through treaty arrangements as a multilateral policy it would both turn the tide of fashion in the matter of confiscation and at the same time place us in a position to support efforts to modernize the semi-feudal societies in Latin America. The idea suggested is twofold. To be effective, it must be fully committed to both parts of the program. The first is the enunciation and immediate implementation of a policy of placing a temporary reimbursement duty on all imports from the country that has confiscated American (foreign) property for the purpose of paying for the expropriated property. In the case of Cuba it would have included a temporary duty on sugar, tobacco, citrus fruits and all other products sold to the United States. It would be a duty imposed until the confiscated properties had been paid for and then lifted. A joint commission with an impartial chairman would be charged with evaluating the properties seized by the government. This policy ought to be universally applicable, almost automatic in its operation. It would act as a kind of insurance for foreign investors. It would make possible the transfer of foreign-owned property to national hands without rancor or bitterness. The government undertaking the expropriation would have to accept the responsibility of living with a lower income from exports than its predecessors until such time as the expropriated properties had been paid for. It would facilitate expropriation but it would reduce its likelihood. The fashion would lose its attractiveness and might well cease to appeal to revolutionary governments.

This, however, is only one part of the proposal. The other is that this new policy should be coupled with the announce-

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ment that the United States will support the governments in their efforts to improve social and economic conditions. That, even while the reimbursement duty imposed for the payment of foreign properties was being collected, it will encourage both private and public financial institutions to extend aid to the new government in its constructive programs. This support of the reform effort would include encouragement of private investment and other forms of aid if the new government desired foreign capital or technical assistance.

With a program such as this the United States would place itself in the position of living with the convulsive nationalism and social upheavals which characterize our times without being charged with protecting the status quo and opposing the changes it cannot control. We would no longer have to insist upon immediate payment as a condition of friendly relations and we would not have to adopt punitive methods. In fact, the knowledge that the properties expropriated would be paid for would give confidence to American investors and the prospect of a lower income would reduce the urge to seize American properties. It would at the same time give governments a way of dealing with the issue of foreign permanent holdings in their countries which could be mutually acceptable.

Such a program if quickly adopted and consistently applied might change the character of contemporary revolutions and give us an opportunity to be helpful without being intrusive. Perhaps it would make us seem more understanding and acceptable to the generation in Latin America bent on reforming the society they inherited from their forefathers.

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AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN SIBERIA: A REINTERPRETATION

I

THE participation of the United States in the Allied Expedition to Siberia in 1918 remains a baffling episode, in spite of all that has been written about it. What were American troops doing fighting on the side of the counter-revolution in Russia? How could Americans reconcile intervention with "self-determination"? The question haunts all studies of the subject. Indeed, the need to excuse has taken precedence over the need to understand. As a result, we are hardly nearer to understanding than we were in 1918.

It is not easy even to excuse intervention.[1] Efforts to do so encounter at once two difficult facts. In the first place, the United States did not go into Russia at once—in March, 1918, when the Allies wanted to. Instead it waited until August. Why? Wilson's hesitation seems to confirm the suspicion that intervention was a nasty business from start to finish. If it wasn't, why did he wait so long before acting, and why, when he did act, did he act with such obvious reluctance? As the *Nation* put it at the time:

> From the start the unfriendly intent behind Allied intervention in Russia was revealed by the frank though futile opposition of President Wilson. His objections gave the situation away; he admitted it to be a bad business before he became a partner in it, and his final surrender served only to emphasize the helplessness of benevolent intentions before the cynical determination of the controlling forces among the Allies.[2]

1 This paper deals only with the expedition to Siberia, not with the expedition to North Russia. That was an entirely separate affair and was undertaken for quite different reasons. It has never been as controversial as the Siberian expedition because (a) it was on a smaller scale; (b) it was plainly directed at Germany, not at the Bolsheviks; and, (c) the Bolsheviks themselves invited the Allies in, though they subsequently changed their minds. See Leonid I. Strakhovsky, *The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia* (Princeton, 1937), *passim,* and George F. Kennan, *The Decision to Intervene* (Princeton, 1958), chaps. 1, 2, 5, 11 and 16.

2 *Nation,* Vol. CVIII, Jan. 4, 1919, p. 6.

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In the second place, the official reason given for intervention was never very convincing. The British and the French talked of restoring the eastern front, and although the method proposed seemed somewhat fantastic, the desirability of doing so, in the face of the great German drive in the west in the spring of 1918, was beyond question.[3] But the United States government never accepted the second-front theory of intervention. It justified the sending of American troops to Siberia solely as a means of relieving the Czech Legion, which had become involved in hostilities with the Bolsheviks in its effort to get out of Russia by way of Vladivostok. But that explanation, while it might have been plausible in May, 1918, was not very plausible in August, when it was put forward as the official policy governing intervention, because by that time the Czechs were moving westward over the Trans-Siberian Railway in an effort to reunite their scattered force. The government itself, in its statement of August 4, 1918, referred to the "westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks."[4] Critics of intervention immediately seized on the phrase as proof, if further proof were needed, that the government of the United States had openly thrown its influence on the side of the counter-revolution.[5]

It was not until after the Second World War that students of the subject worked out an answer to these questions. Then the answer seemed so obvious that it was hard to see why no one had thought of it before. The answer was simply that the real reason for intervention had never been avowed; it *couldn't* be avowed at the time, not publicly at any rate, because to have done so would have embarrassed an ally. That explained why aid to the Czechs had never seemed a satisfactory explanation; it also explained Wilson's

[3] Although the British stressed the restoration of a second front, they were not unaware of other advantages to be gained by military action. Balfour cabled to the British ambassador to the United States: "Our intervention would, I think, cause downfall of the Bolsheviks, but if it is to retain its element of surprise, . . . then initiative must come from our side." Wilson at this time insisted on waiting for an invitation from the Bolsheviks. This attitude Balfour regarded as pure sentimentalism. "We cannot . . . afford to waste [further] time," he said flatly. Balfour to Reading, May 31, 1918, William Wiseman MSS, Yale University Library.

[4] *New York Times,* Aug. 4, 1918.

[5] See, for example, Springfield *Republican,* Aug. 5, 1918, Jan. 30, 1919, June 23, 1919; *Public,* Vol. XXI, Aug. 10, 1918, pp. 1006–07; *New Republic,* Vol. XVI, Sept. 28, 1918, p. 241.

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hesitation. Wilson hesitated because he was not sure whether the Japanese, who saw in Russia's internal troubles a chance to lop off Siberia, would be so bold as to land troops in Russia in the face of American opposition. For a time, it looked as if the United States could prevent Japanese intervention simply by making it clear that the United States could not approve such a step. But as the summer wore on, it became clear that the Japanese intended to act anyway. Only then did Wilson acquiesce in the plan to send a joint Japanese-American expedition into Siberia. That was better, in the last analysis, than unilateral Japanese action. By joining Japan, the United States might restrain her almost as effectively, in fact, as if she had been free to oppose her outright. Outright opposition, of course, was impossible because Japan was unfortunately an "Associated Power."

Such was the explanation which at last seemed to acquit the United States of the crime of having taken part in the counter-revolution. It was no coincidence that it first emerged in the late 1940's. We had just fought a devastating war with Japan. Naturally historians tended to read back our antipathy to Japan into the diplomacy of the First World War. Nor is it surprising that the theory that intervention was designed to stop Japan continued to flourish in the 1950's. The demands of the Cold War required us to show that we were not the aggressors in that conflict—the origins of which were now also projected back to 1918. It had never been our intention to interfere with the revolution in Russia. As long as it confined itself to Russia we had had only sympathy for the revolution. We intervened only to save the Russians from the Japanese. If anything, the Russians should have been grateful for our help.

The anti-Japanese theory of intervention, first formulated by John Albert White in 1950 and repeated after him by all who sought to justify intervention, thus accorded well with the exigencies of the moment.[6] It was clear, it was simple,

[6] See John Albert White, *The Siberian Intervention* (Princeton, 1950), pp. 261–262, 353–355. "In retrospect," White concluded, "the conflict of policy between the United States and Japan seems very clear-cut. Japan wanted Eastern Siberia; the United States was determined to prevent her from acquiring it. Such objectives, however, are rarely broached in the circumspect language of diplomatic or other official correspondence. The openly announced objectives of the United States were aid to the Czechs and economic assistance to the Russians." Pauline Tompkins, *American-Russian Relations in the Far East* (New York, 1949), p. 86, although more critical of interven-

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it explained everything that needed to be explained. It had everything to commend it except accuracy. For in fact it rested on a fundamental confusion between American policy toward Japan after 1919, which was one of hostility, and American policy toward Japan during the First World War, which was almost unmarred by suspicion or bad feeling. The anti-Japanese theory of intervention, in other words, was purely retrospective. Having served its propagandistic purpose, it can now be discarded.

The difficulty is to find something to take its place. Those who are unhappy with it—William Appleman Williams, for example—fall back on the original anti-interventionist argument that intervention was really designed to overthrow the Bolshevik regime.[7] But that argument is itself open to grave objections. It requires us to believe that Wilson knew exactly what he was doing, when there is every evidence that he and most of his contemporaries were uncertain and confused. It requires us to believe that he and his advisers hated Bolshevism because it was a threat to capitalism, when a thorough study of American opinion on the revolution shows that most Americans, including Wilson himself, were not

tion than White, anticipates his interpretation. "In essence, the United States consented to intervene after a policy-duel of several months had failed to turn the Japanese from their desire to send an army to Siberia . . . Czechs, Germans, the war in Europe, and the interests of the Russian people provided a moral rationalization for what was basically a political struggle between Japan and the United States." Betty Miller Unterberger, *America's Siberian Expedition, 1918–1920* (Durham, 1956), p. 88, arrived at the same conclusion. "Despite the publicized reasons for intervention, the documents reveal that once Japan had indicated her intentions to undertake an independent expedition to Siberia . . . , the hand of the United States was forced. The 'open door' in China was at stake. If Japan went into Siberia, the United States must also go." What "documents" she referred to is not clear.

[7] See William Appleman Williams, *American-Russian Relations, 1781–1947* (New York, 1952), chap. 6. Williams is of course aware—as I am aware—of the underlying conflict of interests between the United States and Japan in the Far East (a conflict, however, which was quiescent during the period of the war). See, for example, *ibid.*, p. 163. But he does not explain the American decision to intervene as an expression of this conflict. According to Williams, the fear of Japan became a determining influence in American policy toward Russia only in the spring of 1919, when Wilson decided to support Kolchak because he was opposed to (and by) the Japanese as well as hostile to the Bolsheviks (*ibid.*, p. 170). I am in full agreement with this interpretation; and it is only when Williams seeks an alternative explanation of intervention in the opposition of American capitalists to Russian socialism that my views diverge from his.

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greatly disturbed by the economic theories of the Bolsheviks.[8] It requires us to believe, in short, that American policy was determined in strict accordance with the interests of the business community. It is therefore open to all the objections to which a crude economic interpretation of history is usually open. Historians might well take refuge in the Japanese theory of intervention if only because the economic interpretation is on its merits so unconvincing.

It is the purpose of this discussion to show that *both* theories are erroneous and to suggest a third theory which will explain what neither one of them does explain.

II

The best argument against the Japanese theory is simply that nobody at the time the decision was under consideration cited fear of what Japan would do in Siberia as a reason for joining the proposed expedition. Only after the decision had been made, and after the war with Germany had ended, did the fear of Japan come to influence American policy toward Russia. At the time—that is, in the spring and summer of 1918—fear of Japan was cited as a reason for *not* intervening, if it was cited at all. Those who wanted to intervene argued, on the other hand, that the Japanese had only the best intentions in the world. They were very impatient with those who argued that Japan could not be trusted.

Thus one finds that the ambassador to Russia, a convert to intervention in the summer of 1918 (he had opposed it in March), saw the problem as one of *inducing* Japan to join the expedition. He seemed quite unaware that Japan was one of its instigators. "In my judgment," he wrote to Lansing, "no promises should be exacted of Japan and no promises made to her if she will consent to intervene without them. If Japan can be induced to join with us in intervention we need have no fear concerning her exactions or demands when the war ends." He added that in any case, the Allies would "dominate the peace table" and that Japan would "be com-

[8] I have discussed American opinion on the Bolsheviks at length in my doctoral dissertation, "Revolution and Democracy: The Russian Revolution and the Crisis of American Liberalism" (Columbia University, 1961); see especially chaps. 4 and 5.

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pelled to accept the just terms offered whether she likes them or not." [9]

These views were shared by the State Department. Frank Polk tried to convince Lansing of the "squareness of the Japanese in [the] Siberian matter." [10] But Lansing did not need to be convinced. In July, 1919, long after many Americans *had* developed qualms about the Japanese, Lansing wrote in his diary:

> Japanese designs as to Siberia are worrying a lot of Americans, who see in everything that the Japanese Government do some hidden motive, some insidious purpose. The present anxiety is caused by the large number of Japanese troops now in Siberia, from which it is deduced that Japan intends to annex Eastern Siberia or at least obtain all the valuable concessions of that region by bargain or threat.
>
> The Japanese are not fools. They know that a white race would never submit to the domination of a yellow race. [!] To take the sovereignty or economic control of Eastern Siberia would mean endless trouble for Japan, as the Siberians would never rest until they had driven the Japanese out of the country.
>
> I have little patience with these people who are forever on the verge of hysterics about the deep and wicked schemes of Japan.[11]

To be sure, Lansing himself, though hardly on the "verge of hysterics," had at an earlier stage in the sequence of events shared some of these misgivings about Japan. In the last week of July, 1918, after the decision to intervene had finally been taken (but only afterwards), relations between the United States and Japan were strained by the desire of the Japanese to send in more troops than had originally been agreed upon. But what the administration feared "at heart," as Frank Polk put it, was not a preponderance of Japanese troops as such but the "impression which would be made on the Russian mind." [12] Polk, speaking for the State Department, was quite prepared to recognize the "special position

[9] David R. Francis to Lansing, June 22, 1918, Francis MSS, Missouri Historical Society, St. Louis. See also *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918: Russia* (Washington, 1932), Vol. II, p. 222.

[10] Lansing MS Desk Diary, Oct. 1, 1918, Robert Lansing MSS, Library of Congress.

[11] Lansing MS Diary, July 31, 1919.

[12] Polk to Wilson, memorandum of interview with Japanese ambassador, July 25, 1918, in Polk MS Diary, Frank Polk MSS, Yale University Library.

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of Japan" in East Asia; indeed he considered that the United States had already done so in the Lansing-Ishii agreement of 1917, and to do so again, as the Japanese were asking, appeared unnecessary.[13] That at least is what Polk told the Japanese ambassador. Perhaps he was only being tactful. But Lansing, Wilson and Colonel House had all said the same thing in private, on any number of occasions.

The great fear in Washington was that Japanese intervention "would be received with genuine disfavor [by the Russians] and would probably be met by armed resistance." Russia would then turn to Germany for help and "might definitely ally herself with the Central Powers." [14] So felt Lansing, and so the President himself. "With the foregoing," Lansing noted, "the President entirely agrees." [15] Somewhat later Sir William Wiseman, special British agent in the United States, wrote after an interview with Wilson that Wilson's objection to intervention was "simply that such action on the part of the Allies would play into German hands." [16] In another interview with Wiseman, Wilson was more explicit. "If we relied mainly on Japanese military assistance we should rally the Russians against us, excepting for a small reactionary body who would join anybody to destroy the Bolsheviks." When Wiseman objected that "it was not possible to make the situation worse than it was now," Wilson said that:

> that was where he entirely disagreed. We could make it much worse by putting the Germans in a position where they could organize Russia in a national movement against Japan. If that was done he would not be surprised to see

[13] Polk to Ambassador Morris in Japan, July 27, 1918, *Foreign Relations, 1918: Russia,* Vol. II, p. 307. In the Lansing-Ishii agreement the United States recognized that "Japan has special interests in China."

[14] Lansing MS Diary, March 18, 1918. Lansing was to sound this note again and again. Two days later he cabled to Ambassador Morris in Japan that the United States objected to sending an expedition to Siberia not because it distrusted Japan—"on the contrary we have implicit faith in the loyalty of Japan to the common cause"—but because "the moral effect of such action upon the Russian people would be bad and would undoubtedly work to the advantage of Germany." *Foreign Relations, 1918: Russia,* Vol. II, p. 82. In June he asked Francis for his opinions "as to the effect upon the attitude of the people of European Russia if the Japanese entered Siberia with the approval and support of this country and the Allies." *Ibid.,* p. 189.

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Wiseman to Sir Eric Drummond, June 14, 1918, Wiseman MSS.

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> Russian soldiers fighting with the Germans on the Western Front.[17]

So far was the President from giving the impression of suspecting the motives of the Japanese, however, that the British in their impatience began almost to believe, as Wiseman wrote to Lord Reading, "that there must be some secret understanding between the U. S. and Japan, of which [the other Allies] were not aware"—some understanding, that is, according to which the Americans and the Japanese would divide a Siberian sphere of influence between them.[18]

As for Colonel House, not the fear of Japan but solicitude for the "Russian mind" was the burden of his misgivings about intervention from start to finish. Nor were these opinions peculiarly his own; they were shared, he said, even by so conservative a statesman as Elihu Root.

> He agrees with you and with me [House wrote to Wilson at one point] as to the danger of the proposed Japanese intervention in Siberia. He thinks that even if Japan should announce her purpose to retire when the war was over, or at the mandate of the peace conference, the racial dislike which the Russians have for the Japanese would throw Russia into the arms of Germany.[19]

When the Japanese in violation of their understanding

[17] Wiseman to Drummond, May 30, 1918, *ibid.* See also, for further evidence of Wilson's views, Wiseman to Drummond, March 14, 1918; Reading to Balfour, March 27, 1918; Wiseman to Arthur Murray, July 1, 1918, *ibid.*

[18] Wiseman to Reading, July 19, 1918, *ibid.* At this point American relations with Britain and France regarding Russia were at least as uncomfortable as relations with Japan. Wiseman thought the trouble was that the President believed that the Allies were trying to "trick" him into using the Czecho-Slovakian troops in Russia to restore an eastern front and incidentally to overthrow the Bolsheviks—objectives with which the United States had no sympathy. "There is a feeling [in Washington]," Wiseman noted, "that the Czechs are not making an attempt to retire." Wiseman to Reading, Aug. 23, 1918, *ibid.* Indeed they were moving westward over the Trans-Siberian Railway, and it was this action of the Czechs (encouraged by the Allies), at least as much as the action of the Japanese in sending in more troops than agreed upon, that served to arouse American apprehensions about intervention. In both cases Wilson's misgivings reflected his fear that the anti-Bolshevik Russians would cast their lot with Germany rather than submit to outside interference in their affairs.

[19] House to Wilson, March 3, 1918, Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (Boston, 1928), Vol. III, p. 393. The ambassador of the Provisional Government, Boris Bakhmetev, told House again and again that Japanese intervention would "throw Russia into the arms of Germany." See House MS Diary, March 2, March 3, 1918; see also, for Bakhmetev's views, S. R. Bertron to House, March 8, 1918, House MSS; Polk MS Diary, March 1, March 6, 1918; Bakhmetev to Lansing, Dec. 21, 1917, Lansing MSS.

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with the United States dispatched additional troops to Siberia, the United States not only protested that such action would antagonize the loyal Russians but threatened to withdraw from the whole undertaking if Japan and the other Allies were bent on "a large expedition." [20] This curious threat was reiterated as late as September, 1918, when the expedition was well under way.[21] If our aim was to contain the Japanese in Siberia, a more logical policy, it would seem, would have been to send additional troops to the area, for to retire would merely have given the Japanese a free hand. To be sure, there were not many troops that could have been spared from the western front; and the talk of withdrawal may have been in any case only a bluff. But it seems reasonable to conclude that what disturbed the State Department at this point was not Japanese expansion as such, but the repercussions in Russian politics of an expedition almost exclusively Japanese in character—its effect on the "Russian mind." If the "loyal" Russians, who presumably hated Japan as much as they hated the Germans and the Bolsheviks, were to object, then the United States might retain their good will by dissociating itself from an unpopular policy. From that point of view withdrawal made some sense.

These doubts, then, about how Japanese intervention would strike the Russians explain the administration's hesitation and indecision during the long debate over intervention in the spring and summer of 1918. But it should be noted that those who worried about the effect of intervention on the course of events in Russia had already decided, quite independently of the Japanese, that *some* intervention was desirable. As soon as the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, the administration began to speculate about how Russia could be saved from "German domination"—and this fear of German domination and/or a Russo-German alliance was the central consideration in the deliberations which followed. The question was just how Russia could be "saved." There were two alternatives: a program of economic aid designed to get Russia back on its feet so that the Russians would not become dependent on Germany, and military intervention, designed to oust the Germans by force. (Some people, in addition, thought of actually restoring a

20 Polk to Morris, July 27, 1918, *op. cit.*

21 Lansing to Morris, Sept. 9, 1918, *Foreign Relations 1918: Russia*, Vol. II, p. 373.

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second front, but as we have noted, that idea never carried much weight in the United States. The military men condemned it as utterly impracticable.[22])

Both alternatives were beset with difficulties. If economic aid were sent, through what forces in Russia could it be distributed? The Bolsheviks would use Allied aid as a means of defeating their enemies, and vice versa. How could economic aid be kept out of Russian politics? [23]

Military action raised a different problem, but one equally formidable. Which of the Allies could afford to send a force into Russia? The troops of Great Britain, France and the United States were tied up on the western front. "The only country that can send a formidable army into Russia at this time," as Ambassador Francis wrote, "is Japan, against which there is a strong prejudice among the Russians who fear that Japan may have a covetous eye upon Siberia." [24] Japanese intervention might therefore provoke exactly what it was designed to prevent, a Russo-German rapprochement.

It was in these terms that the problem presented itself to the administration. Note that in none of these discussions was the problem presented as a matter of intervening in

22 Peyton C. March to Newton D. Baker, June 24, 1918, Woodrow Wilson MSS, 2d series, Library of Congress.

23 Notwithstanding these objections to a program of economic aid, it should be noted that the idea was never given up, not even after military action was decided upon. Economic aid was to go hand in hand with military intervention, and the troops were to be accompanied by a commission of experts, the membership of which was much discussed in Washington in the summer of 1918. Indeed, for some people military intervention was justifiable only as a means of preparing for a program of aid and relief. The soldiers were merely to see that the relief was distributed fairly. Thus Wilson himself wrote to House (July 8, 1918, Ray Stannard Baker MSS, Library of Congress): ". . . I have been sweating blood over the question what it is right and feasible (*possible*) to do in Russia. It goes to pieces like quicksilver under my touch, but I hope I see and can report some progress presently, along the double line of economic assistance and aid to the Czecho-Slovaks." For discussion of the composition of the economic commission see House MS Diary, June 13, 1918, E. M. House MSS, Yale University Library; Norman Hapgood to House, June 17, 1918 (two letters of that date), July 14, 1918, *ibid.*; Edward A. Ross to Charles R. Crane, July 25, 1918, Edward A. Ross MSS, State Historical Society of Wisconsin; Samuel N. Harper to Charles R. Crane, July 17, 1918; E. Chappell Porter to Harper, July 20, 1918; Harper to Frederic M. Dixon, July 28, 1918; Frederic M. Corse to Harper, Aug. 2, 1918, all in Samuel N. Harper MSS, University of Chicago Library; Lansing MS Desk Diary, July 3, 1918, Aug. 13, 1918, Sept. 11, 1918, Sept. 14, 1918; Norman Hapgood to Louis D. Brandeis, July 29, 1918, Brandeis MSS, University of Louisville Law Library.

24 Francis to Perry Francis, June 20, 1918, Francis MSS.

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order to prevent the Japanese from gobbling up Siberia. It was the *Germans,* not the Japanese, who were presumed to be on the verge of gobbling it up. The only question was whether the Russians would see the matter in the same light as the Allies saw it. By July, the administration believed that it had brought the Russians around to the Allied view of things. No sooner was that accomplished, however, than the Japanese proposed sending in extra troops. The administration then objected because, as Polk told the Japanese ambassador, it would frighten the Russians into the arms of Germany. His statement, in the light of the rest of the evidence, has to be taken on its merits. He meant exactly what he said.

There were many Americans, of course, who insisted that Japan could not be trusted at all. The Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, held that opinion, and so did Wilson himself, at bottom. But Baker opposed intervention all along, precisely because he *was* afraid of Japan. Thus he advised Wilson in November, 1918, that "the presence of our troops in Siberia is being used by the Japaneze [sic] as a cloak for their own presence and operations there. . . ." He did note that some people were now arguing that the presence of the Japanese in Siberia had become a reason for American troops to remain. (That, he said, was one of two reasons given for remaining, the other being "that we must have a military force to act as guardians and police for any civil relief effort we are able to direct toward Siberia.") But the presence of the Japanese seemed to him a good reason for getting out. "The longer we stay, the more Japaneze there are and the more difficult it will be to induce Japan to withdraw her forces. . . ." [25] Wilson himself appears to have agreed with Baker on this point. David Hunter Miller quotes him as saying in January, 1919, that:

> he did not trust the Japanese; *that he had trusted them before* [my italics],—in fact they had broken their agreement about Siberia. We had sent 7,000 troops to Siberia and they promised to send about the same number but had sent 70,000 and had occupied all the strategic points as far as Irkutsk, and that he would not trust them again.[26]

[25] Baker to Wilson, Nov. 27, 1918, Wilson MSS, 2d series.

[26] David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris* (Privately printed, 1924), Vol. I, Jan. 30, 1919, p. 100.

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His distrust of the Japanese, however, merely reinforced the President's determination to bring the whole business of intervention to an end.

But as Wilson soon discovered, it was "harder to get out than it was to go in." [27] The problem was how to get out without leaving Russia in a complete shambles, torn by civil war and threatened in the west by a resurgent Germany and in the east by Japan. The war having ended, it was now possible for Wilson to see the situation in the Far East in particular in a clearer light—to see it in the light in which historians have insisted he saw it all along. Until November, 1917, the minds of American officials had been riveted to the problem of defeating Germany, and they weighed every international development as it bore on that single objective. Japanese intervention was objectionable because it might throw Russia into the arms of Germany. By the time the peace conference assembled, however, that danger seemed for the moment at least to have subsided. What now became clear was that Japanese intervention was undesirable in itself. The mirage of Japanese good intentions quickly dissolved. At the peace conference the Japanese design of a "new order" in east Asia (although it was not yet called that) for the first time became unmistakable. Japan's determination to get recognition for the special concessions which she had wrung from China brought her into direct conflict with President Wilson, for the arrangement she proposed violated not only the principle of self-determination but the cherished (although for some time almost forgotten) Open Door. By May, 1919, Wilson was sufficiently alarmed about the Japanese penetration of Siberia to give it as a reason for supporting Admiral Kolchak.[28]

But these later fears about Japan must not be read back into the period in which the decision to intervene was taken. During that earlier period the Wilson administration had great confidence in the good faith of the Japanese, who were allies in the war against Germany. This confidence may have been misplaced and decisions based on it mistakes, but the mistakes were discovered only in retrospect. That probably accounts for our feeling, in the 1920's and '30's, that the

[27] Wilson to Grenville S. MacFarland, Nov. 27, 1918, Wilson MSS, 2d series.

[28] Notes of a meeting at Wilson's house, May 9, 1919, *Foreign Relations, 1919: Russia* (Washington, 1937), pp. 345–6.

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Japanese had actively betrayed our friendship. In the same way we felt betrayed, after another war with Germany, by our friends and allies the Russians.

III

One theory of intervention insists that it was directed against the Japanese. The other theory insists that it was really directed against the Bolsheviks. But the evidence already cited seems to indicate that intervention was directed against neither, but against the Germans. As a matter of fact, that is how the administration explained intervention to the American people: the Czecho-Slovaks were engaged in heroic resistance to the Germans and had to be rescued. (That was the unmistakable implication of the explanatory statement issued by the State Department, although the Germans were not mentioned by name. Neither were the Bolsheviks nor their opponents in Russia, with whom the Czechs were cooperating.) It is difficult sometimes for historians to accept what people say at its face value. It is particularly difficult when what people say doesn't make much sense, as was the case in 1918. But that fact—the nonsensical nature of the discussion regarding intervention—is precisely the most important thing about the whole episode.

We can better understand why the United States finally joined the expedition to Siberia if we remember that one consideration took precedence over all others in arriving at such a decision. If military intervention was to be undertaken, it had to be reconciled with Russia's right to "self-determination," so dear to American liberals. But we must not think of the explanation which eventually emerged, and which served to reconcile the contradiction, as merely a rationalization. We must not assume, in other words, that the decision was taken for some other reason which could not publicly be avowed, after which a plausible excuse was invented. The excuse and the reason for intervention were one and the same thing. When the administration said that it was sending aid to the Czechs, it meant exactly that and no more.

But hadn't the Czechs become participants in the Russian civil war? Weren't they fighting the Bolsheviks? On the contrary, advocates of intervention insisted that they were fighting not the Bolsheviks but the *Germans*. How could

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the Czechs in Siberia be fighting the Germans, whose armies were thousands of miles away? There were two reasons for thinking that they were. In the first place, it was widely believed in the United States that the Bolsheviks at Germany's bidding had provided arms to the German prisoners of war, captured by the armies of the Tsar and the Provisional Government, who were scattered all over Russia and Siberia. That these prisoners were so numerous and so highly organized as to constitute an army capable of taking over all Siberia, and that they were armed to the teeth, were illusions nourished by the American wartime habit of exaggerating the prowess of the enemy. In fact, most of the prisoners were not German at all, but Austrian; and, although they numbered altogether about a million, they were in no sense an army. At most only a few thousand of them were armed. Two Allied investigators sent out in March, 1918, found large numbers of armed prisoners only at Omsk, and even there they found less than a thousand.[29] Thomas Masaryk, commander of the Czech Legion, who could hardly be accused of Bolshevik sympathies, later testified: "Nowhere in Siberia, between March 15th and April 2nd, did I see armed German and Austrian prisoners." [30]

Nevertheless, Americans were convinced that all Siberia was about to fall into German hands. Even Lansing, who has been pictured by his admirers and by his detractors alike as a hard-headed anti-Bolshevik, a man who advocated intervention, not only in order to help the Czechs, but as a means of getting rid of Lenin and Trotsky—even Lansing came to favor intervention only when he was convinced that the Germans were about to overrun Siberia. Thus on March 18 he opposed a Japanese landing on the grounds that it would antagonize the Russian people, but four days later, after hearing alarming reports of German advances eastward —occupation by German troops of points as far east as Irkutsk now seemed not impossible—he changed his mind. "The

[29] The investigators were Captain W. L. Hicks, a member of the British military mission to Russia, and Captain William B. Webster, a member of the American Red Cross mission. They were sent out by Raymond Robins and Bruce Lockhart. See their report, April 26, 1918, in Raymond Robins MSS, State Historical Society of Wisconsin. See also Robins to William Boyce Thompson, April 4, 1918, *ibid.*

[30] Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs* (Princeton, 1951), Vol. I, p. 104n.

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restoration of order in Siberia when the confusion is due to civil strife between Russian factions" was in his opinion inadmissible, but "the wresting of control of the territory from an organized body of troops operating under German officers" was another matter.[31] When, after the Czech uprising (May, 1918), Lansing finally became convinced of the necessity for intervention, he put the question to himself in the following terms: "Furnishing protection and assistance to the Czecho-Slovaks, who are so loyal to our cause, is a very different thing from sending an army into Siberia to restore order and to save the Russians from themselves." The United States, he thought, should "cooperate with [the Czechs] in disarming and dispersing the Germans and Austrians [sic] who oppose them." [32]

The reports of Ambassador Francis in Russia probably had something to do with converting the Secretary of State to this view of things. As early as May, 1918, Francis cabled that the Germans dominated the Soviet government and that the German ambassador "was practically dictator in Moscow." [33] By the end of that month he was "almost convinced that Lenin and possibly Trotsky are pliable tools if not responsive German agents." [34] Intervention, therefore, was to be regarded as simply another battle in the struggle with German autocracy.

Occasionally someone admitted, as William Howard Taft wrote a few days after the first Allied landings at Vladivostok, that "we are now at war with the Bolsheviki." [35] But most people maintained the fiction that the Bolsheviks were not involved. Even if they were involved, however, that did not necessarily mean that the United States had cast its lot on the side of the counter-revolution, as opponents of intervention maintained. The Bolsheviks, when one thought about it, were not really revolutionists at all. They were German

31 Lansing MS Diary, March 18, March 22, 1918.

32 *Ibid.*, July 4, 1918. Lansing realized that the Bolsheviks might object to intervention, but he seems to have decided that, since they had "furnished arms to the German and Austrian prisoners"—that is, since they had identified themselves so closely with the German government as to become practically indistinguishable from it—their objections did not need to be considered.

33 Francis to Lansing, May 2, 1918, *Foreign Relations, 1918: Russia*, Vol. I, p. 520.

34 Francis to Lansing, May 23, 1918, *ibid.*, p. 538.

35 Philadelphia *Public Ledger*, Aug. 22, 1918.

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agents. That was the second reason, and the most important reason, for thinking that the Czechs (and therefore the Allies) were fighting only the armies of the Kaiser. Bolshevism itself was merely an extension of Kaiserism.

The need to believe that proposition accounts for the intense interest, in the United States, in the so-called Sisson documents, which purported to prove that the Bolsheviks were hired agents of Germany.[36] No other Allied country gave these documents the attention which they attracted in the United States. Only in the United States were they endorsed and published by the government, the President himself professing, in the face of abundant evidence to the contrary, to be "thoroughly satisfied" of their authenticity.[37] Only in the United States was their authenticity vouched for by eminent historians and accepted without question by most of the press. In Europe, on the other hand, they were treated by governments and peoples alike with suspicion and scorn. Such an attitude on the part of the Old World reflected, not a nicer sense of propriety, but merely the fact that the British and the French advocated intervention frankly as a means of overthrowing the Bolsheviks (as well as of restoring an eastern front). Only those who were committed to the view that intervention was directed solely at Germany and thus did not constitute intervention in Russia's internal affairs needed the Sisson documents to buttress their case. Those who had no qualms about intervening in order to overthrow a regime which was undesirable in itself, regardless of its alleged connections with Germany, did not have to prove the existence of a German-Bolshevik conspiracy. Lansing, for instance, refused to have anything to do with the Sisson documents, because, once he had finally taken the step of accepting intervention as a necessity, he was not averse to using it on behalf of the counter-revolution. It was no coincidence that it was the conservative State Department that opposed publication of the Sisson docu-

[36] The Sisson documents were sold in Russia to Edgar Sisson of the Committee on Public Information by enemies of the Bolsheviks and published in Sept. 1918 by the Committee on Public Information under the title, "The German-Bolshevik Conspiracy" (War Information Series, No. 20). That they were forgeries is now generally agreed upon. See George F. Kennan, "The Sisson Documents," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. XXVIII (June 1956), pp. 130 ff.

[37] House MS Diary, Sept. 24, 1918.

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ments, while Wilson and George Creel, without consulting the State Department, pushed them on the public in order to explain the disparity between the principle of self-determination and the fact of intervention.[38]

IV

It was not easy for those who opposed intervention to understand that the administration thought of the expedition to Siberia as merely another way of defeating the great enemy, Germany. Remembering the way in which European monarchists had intervened in the French revolution, they assumed that intervention in Russia was prompted only by a desire to overthrow the Bolshevik regime. Predisposed toward an economic interpretation of history, they suspected that intervention was an imperialistic conspiracy directed against a promising experiment in social democracy, a conspiracy of international bankers to restore the old regime with which they had enjoyed such profitable business relations.

> The whole of this Russian situation [one liberal wrote] can be traced down to this— . . . the French government soaked many millions in Russian bonds years ago. . . . At that time the Russian socialists protested and said they would never pay those debts if they overthrew the czar. And they overthrew the czar and told the French they didn't intend to pay those debts. So the French want to oust the bolsheviki. And they have been behind a lot of the propa-

[38] "I found out from Lansing later," said Col. House, "that George Creel had persuaded the President to publish them and that the State Department knew nothing of it and disapproved entirely." *Ibid.*

The relation of the German government to the Bolsheviks is a complicated subject, more complicated than can be suggested here. Documents from the German Foreign Office have recently come to light which make it perfectly clear that the Germans paid considerable sums to the Bolsheviks to help finance the revolution. Z. A. B. Zeman, ed., *Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915–1918* (London, 1958). They do not, however, prove what Sisson wanted to prove, that the Bolsheviks kept faith with their employers; they do not prove that the Bolsheviks were "German agents" in the sense in which Sisson used the term. Nor do they prove any lasting community of interest between the Bolsheviks and the Germans; quite the contrary, in fact. By June, 1918, the German High Command had concluded, in view of what Ludendorff called the "obscurity" of Soviet policy, that it was necessary to look for "other Allies in the East." Ludendorff to Kuhlmann, June 9, 1918, *ibid.*, pp. 134–136.

These documents from the German archives, it should be noted, are not the documents published by Sisson; the two sets of papers have nothing whatever in common.

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> ganda against them. Many other elements enter of course—the instinctive fear of socialism which so many people have helps. And England as well as the United States has money in the old government or the Kerensky government.[39]

Intervention, in short, was "class war." [40]

Historians who deplore intervention follow the contemporary liberal critics in regarding it as an attempt to restore the old regime, or at least to restore some regime with which Western capitalists could do business. In such a view, the publication of the Sisson documents can be explained only as a deliberate effort to create a "red scare" by associating Bolshevism with the German menace.[41] But there is no more evidence to sustain such a theory than there is evidence to sustain the theory that intervention was directed against Japan—a theory which critics of intervention have always rightly rejected.

The facts of the matter are more depressing than the critics ever imagined. It was possible, after all, to make out a case for massive intervention against the Bolsheviks on the grounds of self-interest. Winston Churchill stated such a case before the Versailles conference, before he was quickly overruled by Wilson and Lloyd George.[42] For Churchill, the real objection to intervention was not that it was undertaken in the first place, but that it was undertaken half-heartedly; and there is a good deal to be said for his argument. Whether a massive assault would have worked is another matter, but

39 Raymond Clapper to his wife, n.d. [Jan. 1919], Raymond Clapper MSS, Library of Congress.

40 See, for example, Evans Clark, *Facts and Fabrications about Soviet Russia* (New York, 1920), p. 52.

41 See Williams, *American-Russian Relations*, pp. 154–155. Those who take this view of things find it hard to explain Wilson's approval of the publication of the documents, unless, like Williams, they regard Wilson himself as merely a conservative in disguise, or perhaps simply as the tool of Wall Street. (Williams himself is never quite clear on this point.) But those who still regard Wilson as a liberal are puzzled. "Presumably," says one writer, "he approved publication, and yet more than anyone else he knew that intervention was not designed to defeat Germany." [!] Winton U. Solberg, "The Impact of Soviet Russia on American Life and Thought, 1917–1933," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Harvard, 1952), pp. 156–157. But, as we have seen, that is exactly what he did not know.

42 Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, Feb. 15, 1919, Ray Stannard Baker MSS, Princeton University Library.

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such a proposal could be defended.[43] What could not possibly be defended was what was actually done—sending in an army to meet an imaginary enemy. Intervention made sense, as the administration conceived of it, only if one assumed that the Bolsheviks were German agents and that they had given arms to the German and Austrian prisoners of war so that the Central Empires could take over Siberia. None of these things happened to be true. The whole business rested on an illusion of staggering proportions.

If it seems preposterous that men in their right minds could have entertained such an illusion, the answer is that Wilson and most of his countrymen were not perhaps *in* their right minds. They were at war, and war has a way of distorting one's view of the world. That seems particularly to be true of the United States. For Americans in 1918, there was only one enemy, Germany—an enemy so subtle, so insidious, so relentless in its determination to conquer the world that it had launched revolutionary movements to subvert free institutions wherever they existed. These movements, of which the Russian revolution was the most terrifying example, were of course not revolutionary at all, but secretly allied with the reactionary designs of imperial Germany. Nor were they in any sense spontaneous; on the contrary, they were planned, directed and financed by Germany herself. They could be put down, in the long run, only by force.

These views are so manifestly absurd that historians for a long time have simply ignored their existence. But perhaps it will be easier to accept their existence as a fact and to judge the hold they exercised over the men of that time, if we consider that Americans now entertain exactly the same views about the Soviet Union. Thus, in our own time the revolutionary movements in such countries as Cuba, Egypt and Indonesia are regarded by Americans as having been conceived and dominated by Russia. Our policy has been based on that assumption, just as our policy was based on a similar assumption in 1918.

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[43] See, for example, Leonard Schapiro's review of Kennan's *The Decision to Intervene* in *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 24, 1958.

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THE CITY MANAGER, ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY AND POLITICAL POWER

ALTHOUGH the formal structure of the city-manager government has not changed much since the system originated half a century ago, its theory and practice have changed considerably. That the operational patterns and theoretical conceptions of manager government should change is no occasion for surprise—no institution with a dynamic role to play could fail to change in such times. The rise of the metropolis, the development of suburbs, the growth of planning, the initiation of urban renewal, and many other factors have had their impact on the manager system as on other institutions of local government. Also, significant developments in administrative theory have contributed to the revision of manager theory in interesting ways. Summarily stated, the theory of absolute separation of policy and administration, once a key idea of protagonists of the manager system, has been abandoned by nearly all administrative theorists, and even the leading spokesmen of the manager profession have joined in the abandonment. In essence, changes in administrative theory have eroded away much of the theoretical foundation on which the manager system was originally erected.

This changed conception of the place of the manager in the political life of a community cannot be dismissed as unimportant on the ground that theoretical constructions are matters apart from the day to day operations of officials in a city-manager government struggling with immediate problems and not given to cogitation on administrative or other abstractions. On the contrary, the behavior of all agents in the local political process is conditioned by their conception of appropriate roles for themselves and others and by their respect or contempt for the principles underlying any governmental system. Behavior follows belief and belief reflects theory, however vague or profound the comprehension of the theory may be. Doctrinal shifts filter down slowly from learned journals and the exchanges of theoreticians, but in the end they have an effect. The theoretical principles of the city-manager system may have sunk to the cliché level by

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the time they reach some of the practitioners who are influenced by them, but the effect is no less important. Changes in theoretical conception of the managerial role inevitably affect what an actual manager will feel it is his duty to do (or not do), for he, like every human faced with dilemmas of decision, seeks a rationalization to explain and justify his actions to himself and to others. (There is a "feed-back" process, too, as the ensuing pages suggest: that is, observations and reports from "the field" condition theory which then guides future actions.)

Herbert Kaufman a few years ago traced three lines of development of administrative theory and speculated on some of the "emerging conflicts" that these diverging lines of thought and action were producing.[1] His categories were broad, but they fit perfectly the shifts of doctrine concerning the manager system in the past half-century. Kaufman identified three separate "quests" that had motivated theorists and practitioners alike in the history of American government, emphasizing separate quests for representativeness, neutral competence, and executive leadership. Each theme, he noted, has been dominant at various times, although never to the absolute exclusion of the others. Early emphasis on representativeness (as seen in the long ballot, for example) gave way to a drive for neutral competence (for example, the demand for civil service careers and training for administrators). Governmental fragmentation and irresponsibility later produced a new theme: the demand for concentration of power in the hands of the chief executive (for example, the plea for integration of administration under a strong executive).

The Manager and "Neutral Competence" Theory

The manager plan, dedicated to competence and "objectivity" in management, is the apotheosis of the quest for neutral competence. Believers in the separation of politics and administration (and this included most of the great names of political science in the years when the manager system was emerging) took readily to the manager plan; it seemed an ideal way of proving that it was possible to remove "politics"

[1] Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 50 (1956), p. 1057.

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from administration. This was after all an age of emerging emphasis on specialization and expertise, and it must therefore have seemed that trained technician-managers, independent of the "political" council in matters of administration, would produce "nonpolitical" government. Leonard White, writing when the manager movement was young, said:

> It ought to be possible in this country to separate politics from administration. Sound administration can develop and continue only if this separation can be achieved. For a century they have been confused, with evil results beyond measure. . . . [City] managers have an unparalleled opportunity and a deep obligation to teach the American people by their precept and conduct that their job is to administer the affairs of the city with integrity and efficiency and loyalty to the council, without participating in or allowing their work to be affected by contending programs or partisans.[2]

Faith in the doctrine of separation died hard among reformers and the more traditionally oriented managers, and indeed some cling to the doctrine yet. In 1940 when Stone, Price and Stone turned out their detailed comparative study of the manager system, they adhered to the separation idea, notwithstanding the fact that the book otherwise reflected a political realism unusual in the literature on the subject. They admitted that not all cities had achieved a proper separation but reserved kind adjectives for cities that had come closest. It is revealing to note that they slip into description of the character of the *electoral* process rather than of the decision-making process when they seek to demonstrate the separation of politics and administration. They speak of a "complete distinction between politics and administration" that developed in cities which "conducted their political campaigns entirely without reference to the city manager or the administration. . . ." Under these conditions, "the city manager and his relations with the council never became a political issue."[3] This, it scarcely needs be said, is no evidence that the conduct of the government in these cities left administration and politics in separate categories. It merely says that the manager did not become involved in open controversy, which is not the same thing as saying that the man-

[2] Leonard White, *The City Manager* (Chicago, 1927), p. 301.

[3] Harold A. Stone, Don K. Price, and Kathryn H. Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States* (Chicago, 1940), pp. 248–249.

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ager had nothing to do with the formulation of policy or that the administrative decisions of the city did not involve the significant use of influence among competitors for the prizes at stake in a city—to use the language of Sayre and Kaufman's *Governing New York City*.

In order to go on believing that administration and policy were separate entities, it was helpful, perhaps necessary, to think in rigidly structural terms. Early students of the manager plan, and even more so the reformers promoting it, tended to see the system in static terms, emphasizing formal relations between manager and council rather than viewing the government in more dynamic terms. Thus Stone, Price and Stone say that it "seems obvious that in the last analysis the city manager has absolutely no independence and exercises his authority only at the pleasure of the council, for the council may discharge him at its discretion, and he has no legal recourse." [4] It does not seem obvious at all. A city manager with long tenure and support among influential community leaders has a considerable base of power from which to act. He may not be independent in the sense that he can ignore the council (few executives in democratic systems can for that matter), but to cite the fact that the manager has no "legal recourse" is to miss the political essence of the relationship. The many case studies in city manager government of recent years (for example, Frank Abbott's telling study of the Cambridge City Manager [5]) demonstrate beyond doubt that a manager is an actor in the politics of a city. It is hard to imagine a council that would move against a manager without taking account of the resources for counter-attack at the disposal of the manager. Whether this is independence in the legal sense of the term is the least of the matter; the calculation of the power resources is the significant factor. It is always possible, subtly or otherwise, to convert an attack on a manager into an attack on the manager system—or at least to convince a good many manager-system supporters that it is less the manager than the manager system that is under attack. And this, as candid councillors will admit, can be a political force of considerable moment. The legally prescribed remedy, removal by majority vote, gives no

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

[5] See Harold Stein, ed., *Public Administration and Policy Development* (New York, 1952), pp. 573–620.

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hint of the political difficulties that dissuade councillors from taking that step.

As the hortatory and formalistic approach to local government has slowly been replaced by analysis concentrating more on operational realities and decision-making processes, the theory of separation has inevitably suffered. The changed method of inquiry as well as the jettisoning of the normative element (*promoting* separation, as well as looking for evidence of it) doomed the theory.

Notwithstanding the acceptance of the doctrine among early managers, the system had not long been in operation before managers began to debate the principles of separation. Having tested the precepts in practice, they debated among themselves as to the appropriate role of the manager, and particularly they questioned the extent to which a manager should allow himself to become involved in open contests over public policy. At first a conventional line, consistent with the separation doctrine, prevailed—although over the complaints of a minority who disliked so neutral a role. The prevailing doctrine, enunciated in the first "Code of Ethics," was that the manager should remain apart from political controversy: "No manager should take an active part in politics."

Each annual convention of the International City Managers Association produced a new round of discussion on the point, however. It was agreed that the manager should stay out of partisan politics and election campaigns for the council. But there was far less agreement on whether the manager should influence the choice of community policy goals and actively promote them. Public speech making and open support of policies agreed upon by the council became common practice and were supported in the professional manager journals. Some managers right from the start had been active promoters, but many in the early days (no doubt most of them, in fact, since the majority of managers were trained as engineers) did little to promote policies but instead served as expert-caretaker-administrators.[6] The advocates of a freer

[6] It is particularly interesting that the first man ever to serve as a city manager (Charles E. Ashburner in Staunton, Virginia, in 1908) cared little about administrative detail and had a passion for constructive work. "With the greatest of emphasis and decisiveness," Ashburner told Leonard White, "By God, I go into a town to build! When I can't build, I get out." White later adds that Ashburner "gives little thought to the detail of management." White, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

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role for the manager won out in the redrawing of the Code of Ethics in 1938 and added considerably stronger language to describe the managerial responsibility for leadership:

> The City Manager is in no sense a political leader. In order that policy may be intelligent and effective, he provides the council with information and advice, but he encourages positive decisions on policy by the council instead of passive acceptance of his recommendations. . . . The City Manager keeps the community informed on municipal affairs but keeps himself in the background by emphasizing the importance of the facts.

The negative tone of the denial that the manager is a political leader is deleted in the 1952 version of the code; instead there is an affirmation that the manager is a "community leader" who "submits policy proposals to the council and provides the council with facts and advice on matters of policy to give the council a basis for making decisions on community goals. . . ." At another point in the code the following is added: "The city manager keeps the community informed on municipal affairs. He emphasizes friendly and courteous service to the public. He recognizes that the chief function of local government . . . is to serve the best interests of all the people on a nonpartisan basis." [7]

City Managers on Contemporary Manager Theory

The very fact that the Code has been revised twice suggests that the managers themselves have derived from their practice some notions on theory and have made their own contributions to its evolution. Indeed some managers have now denied the validity of some of the first precepts of the system. Thus in 1959, two city managers said:

> When modern political scientists state that administration is part of the political process and that administrative agencies are engaged in politics, they mean that administrative officials and their staffs are inescapably a part of the total process of government which includes the determination of policy. The new definition seems to the city manager perfectly evident and arguments to the contrary uninformed.[8]

[7] Hugo Wall presents a more detailed survey of these changes in his article, "Changing Concepts of Managerial Leadership," *Public Management,* Vol. 36 (1954), p. 50.

[8] C. A. Harrell and D. G. Weiford, "The City Manager and the Policy Process," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 19 (1959), p. 109.

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This should not be taken to mean that the managerial profession now embraces open political participation, nor even that the idea of the political content of administration is widely accepted. Thus another manager comments:

> We have passed from the clear and definitive separation of policy and administration . . . [to the idea] that the two are but aspects of a whole approach, commingling in the heady wine of practice. Be that as it may, the council-manager plan's unique contribution is the establishment of a formal polarity by which general policy matters flow to the consideration of the elected representatives and administrative details gather themselves together at the desks of the appointed officials.[9]

In short, by emphasizing the distinctions between the more political and the more administrative elements of the governmental process (and the evident tendency in manager government is to emphasize these distinctions) the concept of separation subtly re-enters. The case is made for "polarity" of aspects of government rather than for absolute distinctions. Yet in terms of the dilemmas of power—the contests over desired prizes that bring political influence into the situation—the polarity has little meaning. Budget-making is a matter of both policy and administration. The desk on which the duty of budget-drafting lands does not classify the subject according to its essential quality, as a vigorous fight over teachers' salaries well illustrates. The problem is that the manager's desk is *both* administrative and political; in cases where it matters most, the polarity argument has little bearing.

Still another manager illustrates the problems of managerial leadership with a finesse that would have charmed the great Florentine master of political strategy. Dismissing two types of manager-leaders as ineffectual (one, "who leads with his neck" and has the facts but is sometimes "statistically right and politically wrong"; the other, who really doesn't lead at all but passively waits the bidding of the council), he then describes his ideal manager. The ideal type should be a good "salesman" and should have the "ability to set goals, that is, to determine the final objectives which underlie any

[9] William A. Sommers, "Council-Manager Government: A Review," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11 (1958), p. 137.

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successful program." He should keep in harmony with the council, for

> With the manager playing a large role in developing policy, decisions must be sound because the council in the end will be judged by the public on its over-all policy decisions. *Indeed, in a sense, the success or failure of a city council is a definite responsibility of the manager.* It is difficult for a city council to stand up and defend a city policy when it is not 'saleable'. . . .
>
> A manager should stay in the background—should push and lead through the council and the staff. *The council is elected for leadership.* Things should be accomplished through others, avoiding differences whenever possible. It is practically axiomatic that in most council-manager differences, the manager generally comes out second and goes out first. When the manager is right, few people remember; when wrong, no one forgets. . . .[10]

Recognizing that brickbats come to the adventurous and unsuccessful policy promoter, Leonard White urged a diametrically opposite course of action for managers. To supplant the council as leader may be a sore temptation when the council fails, but to take this course, White said,

> will sound the death knell of the manager plan as now conceived, for a manager who undertakes civic leadership stakes his position on the acceptance of his program by the voters. If his program is rejected, and no man can supply effective leadership without openly courting the possibility of rejection, he sacrifices his position as manager.[11]

City manager Matthews, quoted above on the manager's responsibility to develop policy, openly (and some others more covertly) suggests a way around the dilemma posed by White, suggesting that the manager push policies by strongly endorsing points raised by his staff or by council members. Charles Adrian, in his intensive five-year study of three operating manager systems, found a consistent pattern of managerial promotion of policy through others. He observes that there

> appeared to be a psychological advantage to the manager if he could place himself in the position of defending a policy

10 Steve Matthews, "How Managers Lead," *National Civic Review,* Vol. 50 (1961), pp. 295–297. Italics added.

11 White, *op. cit.,* p. 301.

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> developed by [administrators, advisory groups, or private groups]. He would take a strong stand, but could use the protective coloration of saying, 'professional planners tell me. . . .' He would, in other words, take a public position of *leadership* in policy matters, but preferred to attribute policy innovation to technical experts or citizens groups.[12]

Although many contemporary managers speak of their duty of "seizing the initiative," of "taking the government to the people and . . . presenting it in symbols they know and understand," and of being "human" so as to win public popularity and support, the case histories of managers who have gone too far out on the limb of policy innovation without substantial backing apparently has convinced managers of the need for due caution before venturing forth.[13]

"Neutral Competence" vs. "Executive Leadership"

Are there implicit difficulties in the effort to achieve simultaneously neutral competence, so much at the heart of the system in theory, and executive leadership, so universal a quest in modern government? Are the two quests incompatible in that the maintenance of neutrality forbids the development of vigorous leadership? Executive leadership certainly appears to be a "need" in modern society where bureaucracy rises in importance and the legislative branch declines and where pluralism seems to vest all with some power, rendering the more significant the degree of centrality of power that a strong executive leader can muster. To curb and occasionally stimulate the bureaucracy, to persuade warring factions that concessions are necessary, to rise enough above the fray to acquire visibility convertible into political influence, may well be the one thing the chief executive can supply that no other political agent can. A "neutral" avoider of initiative cannot be a chief executive in this sense, a point well illustrated by colorless mayors who do not exploit their potential.

There is an obvious temptation for a manager to assume a leadership role when other elements of the political system

[12] Charles R. Adrian, "A Study of Three Communities," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 18 (1958), p. 216.

[13] D. G. Weiford, "The Changing Role of the City Manager," *Public Management*, Vol. 36 (1954), p. 170; Carleton Sharpe, "What it Takes To Be a Good Administrator," *Public Management*, Vol. 35 (1953), p. 246.

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fail to provide it. Thus a manager recently said, in an off-the-record session with some students, that "when the carpet-bagging housing developers come in and begin to spoil your town, you don't fuss about what's policy and what's administration, you do something to stop them." If the manager more openly becomes the "politician" that Karl Bosworth rightly asserts he is in reality, then can he retain the aura of neutrality that affords him the opportunity to make the most of his managerial expertise? [14]

Perhaps the more appropriate way to put the question is this: Under what circumstances can the manager contribute enough leadership to cope with the existing problems and yet not get into difficulty by alienating elements in the community so as to spoil his effectiveness as an expert in management? The answer at least in major part would appear to be this: The difficult task of carrying off both these roles will be hardest where (1) the social divisions in the community are deepest and (2) the gravity (and therefore the divisiveness) of the issues are most serious. This is, of course, no new discovery. The difficulty of the manager system in getting a foothold in larger cities is in part a reflection of this fact, as well as a result of the blocking actions of city political machines. Moreover, the higher rate of abandonment of the manager system in large cities suggests the same conclusion: the deeper the social schisms the tougher the leadership role.[15]

Meyerson and Banfield claim that the efficiency-low cost-businesslike government themes of manager government are popular in "communities where middle and upper class people have an overwhelming preponderance of political power" and not so acceptable to the citizens of more urbanized and polyglot cities.[16] Possibly the distinction between

14 Karl Bosworth, "The Manager *Is* a Politician," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 18 (1958), p. 216.

15 From data in Arthur Bromage's study of manager plan abandonments one can calculate a rate of abandonment in cities under 100,000 population of about three or four per cent of those adopting. But in the case of the forty cities above that population figure, the rate of abandonment is about fifteen per cent. See his *Manager Plan Abandonments* (New York, 1954), pp. 6–9.

16 Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield, *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest* (Glencoe, 1955), p. 290.

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the types of cities reflects more the social divisions that make leadership so difficult in the larger cities than the appeal of the middle-class slogans and goals, but the point is moot since obviously both factors are involved.

The interesting question for the future of the manager plan is whether the trends of population migration will produce more homogeneous communities as a result of the splashing of population outward along the lines of transportation radiating from the metropolitan centers. If the homogeneity factor increases then perhaps manager government may grow even more rapidly than in the past and the strain posed by the neutrality-leadership conflict may not be the deterrent that in theory it appears to be. Surely the main tendency of suburbanization has so far been to produce greater homogeneity if for no other reason than that the poorest elements cannot afford to commute and the few Negroes who can afford it are systematically excluded. On the other hand, the arrival of southern Negroes and hill country whites and Puerto Ricans in northern cities, both large and small (Newburgh, New York, is a city of 31,000 and one of the smoldering fires in its welfare controversy is the animus toward incoming Negroes and Puerto Ricans) will surely work in the other direction. That is, communities will be caught on the rack of social tensions in the next generation as they have not been since the years when an earlier wave of migrants primarily from eastern and southern Europe produced social conflict and long lasting resentments with deep political consequences. The evidence of Newburgh's city manager leadership in its welfare fight is hardly valid since it is atypical behavior, and yet the divisions in that community, partly due to the racial factor, have apparently become serious.

The homogeneity factor can hardly be predicted with certainty. One may be reasonably sure, however, that there will be many communities with placid politics which will not often present the manager with fundamental choices that will bring one element or another of the community out for his scalp. But when other communities, both urban and suburban, face up to the problems of adjusting to life within a metropolitan area (for instance, rapid population growth and diminution of water supply), and begin also to feel the need to rebuild the slums that generations of unplanned expan-

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sion have endowed them with, will they respond to the siren call of strong "executive leadership" or not? Will manager cities, when faced with major and divisive problems, respond as other kinds of American government have increasingly done in this century, by turning toward the chief executive as a *representative, policy-initiating, policy-promoting* center of power? Diffusion of leadership is an endemic problem in manager cities, for the council commonly lacks a basis of power from which to lead and rarely do manager-city mayors succeed in establishing the leadership base that, for example, Cincinnati mayors have set for themselves. Will this fact of the common pattern of manager-system operation further encourage the manager to feel justified in becoming a stronger leader since he feels the "need" for policy innovation and "justification" in modern manager theory and current executive leadership trends elsewhere in American government? Quite apart from the customary question which comes alike from friend and foe of the manager system—whether the system is "democratic" when the manager's power grows—is it possible that currents in community development and changes in the internal political characteristics of the system now endanger its effectiveness?

The answer to such questions can only be speculative. One can be reasonably sure that the *logic* of the situation will not be the decisive influence, or else the system would have foundered long ago on the rocks of erroneous assumptions about the separation of politics and administration. But traditions and beliefs do affect the way a governmental system works. In formulating tentative answers to the operational problems of the system for the future it would be well to keep in mind these beliefs and common tendencies: (1) the favorable reputation that the manager system undeniably has for efficiency and honesty, and which will sustain managers when they are hard-pressed; (2) the increasing deference to expertise and experts in matters of economics, industry, personal life and in government as well; (3) the patently strong trend toward emphasizing executive leadership over legislative power, reserving to the former the initiative and to the latter a veto role; and, (4) the significant traditional attachment of the American people to the elective process as a means

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to popular control over leaders.[17] In any given community the dynamics of its political system (interests, personalities, particular problems, local traditions) will define the limits of leadership effectiveness, and yet these local factors will operate within the context of changing conceptions of the manager system and the currents of popular belief about government and politics.

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[17] It has been contended that the manager system suffers no particular handicap from the lack of direct elective relationship with the voters—or at least none attributable to the fact that a traditional American desire exists for the direct election of executives. There is, it is claimed, also an American tradition of appointed executives that is in its way equally deep, as the superintendent of schools serving an elective school board. (See, for example, Sommers, *op. cit.*, on this point.) The superintendent is, however, probably conceived as more strictly a subordinate official than is a city manager, and this is likely to be more and more true if the managerial leadership role continues to grow. An appointive and apparently subordinate executive is consistent with American practices and beliefs, but an appointive executive who is not evidently a subordinate may be less acceptable. Is there not a significant difference between European deference toward professional municipal executives and American attitudes toward executives that is certainly not always deferential? A German burgomeister subject to recall election is hard to imagine. An American appointive political leader is not inconceivable—witness the manager himself—but the best evidence of the inconsistency of such an office with tradition is the ardent effort devoted to keeping the manager from being identified as a politician.

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COMMUNISM, A SELF-LIMITING POLITICAL ORDER

I

IF the peoples of the two great powers will now but agree to hold to an attitude of mind which Senator Fulbright has labeled "mature"—and thus neutralize the contingency that they may destroy the world—the stage will be set for a drama of extraordinary magnitude and importance.

The stage will be worldwide, the dramatis personae will number well over half the human race, and, though the plot of the drama is suppositionary, its outcome will shape history for perhaps centuries to come. To rephrase this in Marxist terminology, the action will be dialectical, involving as thesis the communist ideology and as antithesis the proliferation of wealth, while as outcome or synthesis, liberalism will arise as a universal political principle.

To cast the communist ideology in this losing role is, of course, wholly at variance with Marxist dogma. This, however, need occasion no surprise since Marxist dogma has consistently failed to tally with experience. We shall discover that the liberal state, just because it is rather random in its organization and responses, is better adapted to meet and satisfy the demands of progressive industrialization and the problems of distribution that issue from it.

That at this advanced epoch in this age of enlightenment the fate of the world should hang on the outcome of a single ideological schism is incredibly fantastic. Save for its vast extent this ideological conflict suggests the creedal disputes of a bygone day and the sanguinary struggles they provoked. To note this parallel need not raise apprehension, however, rather the reverse, for there is sound evidence that today's political dispute will, in the perspective of time, prove to be as pointless as were the religious clashes of our ancestors.

The views of Marx and Engels, as now embodied in Communism, represent what might be termed a single act of political invention. This fact will assist our argument a little later. Marxism is perhaps the world's only example of an operating system of government that sprang virtually full-

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blown as a contrived formula. The promises which it makes are yet to be balanced against its performance (it is but slightly over forty years old) and its continuing capacity to meet and overcome countervailing exigencies is unknown. Its successes to date, though notable, are in a restricted area and represent, it would seem, a natural consequence of the Messianic fervor which its glowing promises and its claim to exhibit inviolable natural law can excite among a people who hunger for a higher material standard of living.

In a search for ways to reconcile political liberalism with communism, Marxism's blunders in forecasting [1] will play a useful role, though because of the slipperiness of words, especially as handled by an adroit communist, not as telling a role as might offhand have been expected. The final test, hinted at above, will be the pragmatic failure of communism to adapt to the political problems which a nation must face when it enters an era most simply described as an era of mass production. Then the fallacies and shortcomings of Marxist holy writ will no longer be confined to the realm of thoughts and language but will become very positive obstacles and irritations along the road to the coveted goal of material plenty. As many of these obstacles and irritations can now be accurately anticipated on the basis of western experience, they might quite properly be used to spearhead western propaganda that is now directed at the communist peoples. The logic underlying them is simple; hence, as will become apparent directly, such a policy might appropriately replace the attitudes of fear which we so frequently exhibit toward communism and communists.

II

Were space to permit, it would be revealing to reconstruct enough of the intellectual atmosphere of the period in which Marx and Engels did their work for us to appreciate why they failed so completely to gauge the trend of future industrial developments and why time has proved them to have

[1] Much has been written upon Marx' shortcomings as a prophet and I know of no briefer summing up than the following from Bertram D. Wolfe's *The Prophet and His Prophecies* (New York, 1958): "With a zeal, a fanfare and an explicitness that no fortune teller would risk, Marx was forever climbing out on a limb of prophecy, and forever falling from the dead branch. No other serious thinker of the nineteenth century was so frequently, egregiously, and totally wrong in his predictions."

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been very unreliable prophets. But at the moment it is more to the point to recognize the single constructive role which communism is now able to play, and also to note wherein we may look for its shortcomings to appear as the worldwide sweep of industrialization attains truly significant proportions.

All evidence points to a universal craving for a higher material standard of living, and it is in this regard that communism seems able to render a significant service. At the top of every needy nation's shopping list can be found modern medical facilities and schools, together with an ample source of power and the host of industrial undertakings which it makes possible. Following the example of the western nations, all underdeveloped peoples are yearning to link their lives and futures with material creation. In the relatively near future virtually the entire human race will, through the universality of science and technology, be launched upon very similar lines of endeavor, adopting much the same criteria to judge their progress, achievements and social values, and employing common types of organization to attain their ends. In a word, there would appear to be a universal culture in the making which will more and more give substance to the brotherhood of man. The consequences, we may be sure, will be many and significant but what is of present concern is the effect it will have upon the relations of communism and liberalism.

The degree to which the neo-utilitarian philosophy has captured imaginations in even the most remote areas was impressively expressed recently by Dr. Absolom Vilakazi of one of the newer African states when, in effect, he said that his people's future would be conditioned by the personal revolution now taking place in the concept of self, including new conceptions of work and freedom to move, urban living, private property and emerging political rights and responsibilities, all of which are creating the most profound changes in ideological values.

III

To the new and, to them, revolutionary thinking of such emerging peoples, communism comes as a political system of great promise. It seems to tell them what they can do and, what is equally important, how to do it quickly; they are familiar with the concept of leadership and of following

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orders. But as for the concepts of private initiative and private capital, they know virtually nothing of either. And those Americans who are inclined to be critical of the world's awakening peoples when they lean toward communism would do well to imagine how our own nation would act were we lacking in basic industries, yet stood within easy reach of a good understanding of how to set up and operate them. Then our national policy, we may be sure, would show little patience with the slow results of venture capital and private initiative. Our federal government would not be slow to move, showing as little reluctance to take control as it did with respect to unemployment and social security during the depression of the 1930's. Indeed, our recent record provides numerous instances, ranging from housing to hydroelectric development, of private initiative being by-passed; and if some of the requests that Mr. Kennedy is making of Congress are granted we shall have other instances of the federal government shouldering itself ahead of private enterprise.

As measured by any utilitarian test, communism is currently giving a good account of itself. The price which it demands in regimentation of the individual may not seem too high in view of the acceleration which it imparts to industrial development. A wonderful Russian-coined simile to express this compliant frame of mind says: "When you are climbing a mountain for the first time, you expect to be tied together." [2]

But there are limits beyond which curtailment of freedom cannot well be pushed; such limits are set in part by human nature and in part by the nature of the problems which arise in the industrial state as it expands. Both are very significant, and we shall see that each limit manifests itself when commodities begin to flow freely from assembly lines and distribution, not production, becomes a society's foremost problem. Busy channels of trade connote an increasing flow of wealth into labor's hands, and recent history illustrates that such wealth and political liberty go hand in hand. In sharp contrast, in the lands—China, India, the Arab states will serve as examples—where human labor is least productive, and therefore worth the least, one finds the least regard for human life as well as deeply rooted social discrimination.

[2] Quoted by James H. Billington, *New York Times Magazine*, October 29, 1961.

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The trend in the west in response to technological advances has been rapidly upward, in which respect it has been exactly contrary to the downward drift prescribed by Marxism. The middle classes have grown stronger, and have not dwindled; the proportion of white-collar workers has grown larger, not smaller; education and training have become more and more the order of the day, a far cry from what Marx envisaged as ranks of regimented serfs denied any of the amenities of life.

The uplifting influence which the greater productivity of labor brings to the social and political status of the individual worker is further augmented by the fact that a society, once it reaches a fair degree of industrialization, needs a vigorous and growing market. Mass production is pointless without mass consumption; in fact, it seems to be the easier goal to attain. Mass markets and mass consumption require participation of a whole people; they cannot be built effectively upon any scheme of social repression and discrimination. Social stratification or a caste system is wholly incongrous in a state whose industries are eager to—nay, must—puff up every individual's self-esteem and pride of possession to the end that he will become the best possible consumer.

As industries become more productive in terms of human labor and yield significantly more per capita, status differences between the white race and the black, between Moslem and Christian, Brahmin and untouchable must tend to disappear. All individuals can be equally valuable economically, wherefore their commensurate emoluments will work to erode away traditional social inequalities. Labor's growing economic leverage in the western nations has become manifest in safety and accident prevention programs, medical services, workmen's compensation, social security and the like. Child labor has all but disappeared from the technologically advanced nations, and slum clearance is making notable progress. The reason chiefly is that labor-saving machinery has made human labor valuable enough to compensate for its being thus conserved. Such technical advances have also promoted working and living conditions that are consistent with efficient production. Through them the margin of profit in the economy as a whole reaches such a level that the entrepreneurs, together with society, are able to afford the humanitarian benefits which the moral sense has all along hinted at.

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There is, to be sure, a long tradition in the Western World, extending back at least to early Greek and Jewish peoples, and preserved by Christian teaching, that speaks for the integrity and dignity of the individual; but as we recall the long centuries in which oppression, serfdom and persecution were rife, it would seem that this doctrine, until technology could give it substance, was much more honored in the breach than the observance. Even during the first hundred years of the industrial revolution, labor was little better than a commodity. But the second hundred years is proving very different, and chiefly because labor's economic leverage has become so effective.

IV

That economic and social forces could interact so propitiously and constructively was not foreseen by Marx. His vision saw only a destructive interplay leading ultimately to revolution. And recent industrial trends also belie Marxist claims (so confidently reiterated by his present-day disciples) that as communism spreads it will liberate the workers from the thralldom of capitalism. Actually, the reverse trend which has marked the past several decades is destined, by the nature of things, to continue into the future, it being capitalism (or something akin to it) that will come to the relief of workers regimented under communism. The worker's initial lot as a serf under the Party in no sense fixes his permanent status. Instead, as factories multiply and industries expand, filling shelves with consumer goods, the erstwhile regimented worker must be released and encouraged to play the part of the ready spender and consumer. And finally, as the tide runs toward a wide distribution of wealth, the state experiences the necessity of assuring full and steady employment. This entails a widening diversity in most lines of production together with such stimulus to sales as can be derived from changing styles and fashions. All varieties of taste and preference need to be encouraged to play their part, and regimentation (once so helpful as an aid to rapid industrialization) must give way to a political climate that is conducive to the flowering of individual tastes and talents.

Moreover, a modern, industrial, growing nation needs all the intelligence, ingenuity and foresight it can muster. Any system of state planning and control which holds a goodly portion of a people's abilities inert and unused, or guides

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them into unproductive or harmful channels, cannot long be tolerated. It becomes more and more anachronistic to look to a central bureaucratic device to do the important thinking and planning and to make the important decisions that the affairs of a vigorous people entail. Imagine the stultification that would ensue were a central political agency to devise and direct the programs of scientific research which appropriately find a place in the modern nation; or if such a bureau were to fix and guide the multifarious lines of industrial research and development that we recognize as being a vital part of the progressive nation's life; or if the government undertook to control the countless manufacturing specifications, an arrangement that proved crippling even in the old days of mercantilism; or for the government to ordain the kind and location of factories and adjust them to the preordained array of capital and consumption of goods; or to determine what diseases were to be treated and how.

The ensuing confusion, loss of time, energy and satisfaction would be utterly ruinous. As the field of knowledge grows, as a nation's life gains in complexity and the diversity of its manufacturies and trade swells, the dangers attendant upon a centralized bureaucracy mount even faster. Its essential store of wealth resides more and more in the native genius and intelligence of its people, and any public policy which tends to imprison these indispensable endowments becomes inimical to national efficiency and progress. Such bondage of the mind would be more ill-advised, more disastrous, than the deliberate destruction of productive physical wealth. The role of government is no longer to dictate national operations, move by move, but by broad supervision to encourage individual effort and maintain a general equity and balance. Hence the monolithic type of state is a transient affair; its paraphernalia of regimentation, though helpful (as we have seen) in the early stage of industrialization, are certain to become encumbrances to be abandoned piece by piece as production and trade quicken.

And it becomes essential to safeguard the right of dissent. Illustrations abound in which Science has advanced by virtue of its sacredly guarded privilege of differing from and attacking authority. Politics advances the same way. There is no political revelation (least of all Marxism) which will enable the rigid state to preserve its adaptation to a changing

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environment or changing obligations, requirements, duties, and conditions vital to survival. Just as a caveman ethos would be wholly incompatible with modern society, so the rigid, autocratic political ethos would kill the modern industrial state. Survival depends upon adaptability, and adaptability is virtually synonymous with liberty.

News reports from Russia indicate increasingly that its productive capacity has already advanced to such a degree that the Soviet hierarchy is much more mindful of its subjects as creative individuals and indispensable consumers to whom a growing freedom of choice must be accorded. In fact, we may suppose that herein lies one cogent reason for the recent break with the Stalin regime and the "cult of the individual."

Expanding industry therefore acts naturally as a liberalizing influence. We shall see directly that it also serves as a mainstay of liberal and democratic institutions. Any regime which aims to promote rapid industrialization and thereby lead its people to a higher standard of living with as little delay as possible is much concerned with the welfare of the individual. Every new industrial goal achieved, every economic advance made, reaffirms its implicit democratic concept that the state is made for man, not man for the state. And every such program must, because of the natural forces which it releases, carry its own guarantee that, as higher levels of industrial development are reached, the state's political policy must embrace a greater degree of freedom. Hence, as we view the social and political benefits which technology has already granted the workers in the highly industrialized nations, we may conclude that in its global sweep it will demonstrate beyond all doubt that communism is a political expedient which carries the seeds of its own dissolution.

V

No slightest basis can be found in fact for Marx's claim, or for Lenin's claim, or for Khrushchev's claim, that communism is to rule the world. The idea of the unified, the inexorable, the monolithic political order ordained by Nature is a dream which cannot long sustain contact with reality. It will show itself to be too much at variance with the needs of technology as they expand and control the political

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life of the communist countries. The Marxist system which Lenin compared to "a solid block of steel" might more accurately be likened to a sort of launching pad which can insure to the industrial rocket a good chance of successful takeoff. What makes communism seem formidable is, of course, the great assurance of its disciples, but, in this respect we, as its enemies, and in seeking to "contain" it, have short-sightedly aided its militant leaders by aping their fanatical methods.

We have treated communism as though it were a sort of contagious plague, not as an overboastful doctrine that will be humbled in due course by the world order now emerging. We have tried to buy nations from accepting it, somewhat as one might bribe a child to wash his face. We have outlawed the communist party; we have gone to such irrational excesses as the Smith Act and the House Un-American Activities Committee. And now schools are to drill their pupils in the dangers of communism as they once imparted early religious instruction by drill in the catechism. To top it all, the unimaginative policy of the federal government has forbidden all trade with Red China and greatly curtailed the exchange of goods with Russia.

Indeed, China poses an especially threatening problem. That vast land appears to have but a slim chance, except under the most favorable conditions, of being able to advance its standard of living significantly against its rapid population growth. This raises the gloomy alternative of some 700 million frustrated and angry people compressed into a land area too small to assure even subsistence. Here, clearly, is a contingency that augurs ill for peace; and the present United States policy of refusing to trade with China but makes it worse. Since it is a clear certainty that trouble lies along the road we are now pursuing, a reversal of our policy is called for, whereby we would enter into trade in all ways that are feasible and overlook no opportunity to assist that ancient and vastly talented people in their technological build-up.

Our fear complex, despite certain inconveniences which it undoubtedly visits upon the leaders of the communist nations, must have given them great assurance—assurance not unlike what they would have derived had one of the western nations actually turned Marxist. Their ships of state must

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have been helped over many a troublesome shoal by the agitated fashion in which we show our fears; for such displays cannot help but induce a matching certainty in the Russian or Chinese mind that theirs is in truth a virile system. However, the unfortunate reaction does not stop there; our alarm must also arouse in the communist peoples a mistrust of our intentions toward them, even to the point of their believing that what we fear so much we will attempt to destroy. It avails us nothing to reciprocate the official aggressiveness of the Communist Party. It is no doubt equally true that their truculence gains the party nothing. This, however, is another story.

Our position among the nations would be more realistic, and hence our attempts at leadership would be more effective, were we to capitalize on the fact that, of all political doctrines, communism is probably the most vulnerable to logical attack. This follows from its contrived and artificial origin. It lacks the strength that comes to a government from long struggle to preserve its fit and adjustment to the exigencies of industrial and social growth. The roots of communism have not sunk deep; it rests secure only so long as it holds a favorable public opinion, and how strongly even the Russian public is attracted by dreams of a lighter political yoke can be measured by the extravagant lengths to which their leaders go to hold them incommunicado.

The rise of good will and mutual trust between the liberal and communist peoples can come about only slowly under the best of conditions. It would seem essential that the liberal group take the initiative in working for a reformation, if for no other reason than that, at the moment, they are unregimented and free to act. To make the existing United States policy more rational (the policy of most western nations is already much more rational) in ways which the foregoing analysis shows to be sound would have the advantage of not excluding other measures to encourage the much-needed rapprochment.

The timeliness of such a change of policy is made especially evident by the urgency of pursuing disarmament negotiations with all possible dispatch. As has often been pointed out, the mere existence of two vast nuclear arsenals, with the consequent danger of an international accident, constitutes by itself an intolerable menace to the safety of the

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world; yet this menace is certain to be made even greater as other nations—and China in particular—acquire stocks of nuclear bombs. The only possible basis that would permit of liquidating the present arsenals, to say nothing of those which undoubtedly soon will exist, is to reduce the existing ideological tension by a good measure of mutual trust and confidence concerning one another's motives and intentions. Here, as we have seen, technology offers unique and positive assistance.

The function of government in the technological state is increasingly to encourage industrialization, facilitate the training of skilled technicians and insure the uninterrupted distribution of the fruits of mass production. Just as, nowadays, business concerns with their departments and divisions, their staff and line, exhibit very similar organizational features, so governments are certain, under the molding influences of technology, to come to look and act very much alike. After age-long excursions over what for so long was an uncharted sea of political method and practice, the diverse peoples of the world are at last drawing together to embark upon a common voyage for concerted exploration and development. Though some nations are at present in the lead, the rest are certain to follow and at a quickening pace.

As remarked earlier, this creates a new and very promising state of affairs. Never before has the world seen anything to approach it. Conflicting cultures and ideologies have, from the dawn of history, been a source of conflict; now they seem destined to recede into the past, leaving a common basis for agreement and understanding between peoples. Without question the time is at hand for the United States to join the rest of the western world in cooperating with both Russia and China in matters that would hasten their industrial development while missing no opportunity to point out to both peoples the free future that awaits them.

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AN APPROACH TO INDIAN FEDERALISM

ACCORDING to an oft-quoted statement, attributed to an eminent authority,[1] the Constitution of India—the present Constitution enacted in November 1949—is designed to be federal in normal times and unitary in emergencies. This early estimate of the Constitution—of federalism in particular—by one of the "fathers" seems to have colored the judgment of commentators in general since then. The common practice, now, is to dispose of the question by describing the Constitution as "quasi-federal."[2] But the problem deserves deeper consideration.

Apparently, there are in the Constitution all the elements of a federal polity—a written constitution, dual government, a supreme court, and a distribution of powers which cannot be altered by either the Union or State governments acting alone. Undoubtedly, these are the familiar traits of a federal constitution. And yet a federal polity is more than a mere combination of these traits. Indeed, the essential feature of a federation is that in it the two types of governments—the central and the regional—should be both independent in their spheres and coordinate. None of them should be able to dictate to the other in the latter's sphere or exercise control over it either directly or otherwise. It is this kind of polity that the Constitution of the United States envisages and which is regarded nowadays as the best example of federal government. Hence the fundamental point is to see

[1] The late Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Law Minister in the first Central Ministry of independent India, and Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee.

[2] Probably, the first notable writer to use this expression, with regard to the Indian Constitution, is Professor K. C. Wheare. Professor Wheare, however, is far from clear as to the exact meaning of the term "quasi-federal" as applied to the Indian Constitution. All he has to say is this: ". . . the central government is given powers of intervention in the conduct of the state governments which modifies the federal principle . . . but the federal principle has been introduced into its terms to such an extent that it is justifiable to describe it as a quasi-federal constitution." *Federal Government* (London and New York, 1953), p. 28. Professor Wheare admits that in reaching this conclusion he has taken particular note of articles 249, 352–60 and 371. I wish he had also taken into account articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution. But, in fact, I have argued in the following pages that a fuller examination even of articles 249 and 352–60 reveals that the fundamental principle of the Indian Constitution is not federalism but unitarism, though it is unitarism with a high degree of decentralization of powers.

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whether in India the two types of governments—the Union government on the one hand and the governments of the States on the other—are coordinate and independent of each other in their respective spheres.

The Constitution does make provision for a clear-cut distribution of powers between the Union government and the State governments (see the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution). Hence it is generally taken for granted (perhaps following the line of least resistance) that in normal times the Constitution will work along federal lines and that only in emergencies (see articles 352–60) is its federal character liable to be impaired. However, while maintaining the distinction between the normal and emergency character of the Constitution, it is not adequately realized that a declaration of emergency can always be made by the Union government acting alone—indeed by the Union executive in the first instance. Hence, it is possible that the Union government may proclaim an emergency (no matter what situation actually obtains in one or more States) whenever it finds that to do so is to its own advantage; and it may then proceed to take over the powers of the State (or States) and to put an end to the federal government. In this connection, it is significant that the only non-Congress State Government so far (the Communist government in Kerala, April, 1957–July, 1959) could not, for good or ill, escape the application of the emergency provisions (articles 356–58). When a Congress-led agitation had succeeded in disrupting, to a certain extent, the normal life of the State, the Union government, by a proclamation of emergency, dismissed the State ministry and took over the administration of the State. In taking this drastic step the Union government was acting on the authority of article 356 of the Constitution which says, *inter alia,* that the President will have the authority to take over the administration of a State if, upon the report of the Governor of the State,[3] or otherwise, he is "satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution." But it is noteworthy that at the moment of the proclamation of the aforesaid emergency (July, 1959), the State ministry in Kerala was still in full enjoyment of the confidence of the major-

[3] It may be noted that the State Governor himself is appointed by the Union President and holds office in the latter's pleasure.

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ity in the State Legislature! Thus, what happened in the case of Kerala can possibly happen again, for there is no constitutional check on the Union government's power to supersede or take over a State government. As a matter of fact, in seeking to take over the government of a State, the Union government need not always wait for an actual emergency to arise. Instead, it can, by a clever use of the fiction of emergency, suppress or take over a State government whenever it regards it as expedient or politically advantageous. On the whole, therefore, it is scarcely possible to see in this arrangement of the Constitution any such elements as to justify its characterization as "quasi-federal," let alone federal.

There are some other provisions, too, which merit analysis. Thus, there is article 249. According to this article, the Council of States (Upper House of the Union Parliament) can, by means of a resolution passed by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, transfer a subject or group of subjects from the State List to the Union List—for one year in the first instance, but renewable indefinitely. Thenceforward, the Union Parliament becomes competent to legislate on the subjects thus transferred from the State List. And this is a provision which can be invoked and given effect to at any time—even in absolutely normal times. Obviously, this provision in article 249 has far-reaching implications for federalism in India. It means, unmistakably, that at any moment just one house of the Union legislature (without any reference to the States) can, acting by a two-thirds majority of the "members present and voting," transfer one or more subjects from the State List to the Union List. The quorum in the Council of States (with a maximum membership of 250) is only one-tenth of the total membership. Thus. at a thinly-attended sitting of the house (and sittings of upper houses are generally notorious for poor attendance), a bare vote of some twenty members can have the effect of depriving the States of at least a part of the powers granted them by the Constitution. It is evident that with a little resourcefulness and political ingenuity this provision can be effectively used by the Union government to curb the powers of the States. Thus, while there is an apparent division of powers in the Constitution, potentially all powers belong to the Union government.

Lastly, attention must be directed to articles 200 and 201. Under the provisions of these articles, the Governor of a

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state is empowered to reserve for the consideration of the Union President any bill passed by the State legislature, and it is in the President's power to withhold assent to a bill so reserved. And since there is no limit to the Governor's power for thus reserving bills for the President's consideration, the power can, in an extremity, be stretched to the extent of bringing the entire State legislation (and through it the whole government of the State) under the review or even control of the Union government—and all this without even the semblance of an emergency.

From the above analysis it follows that the division of powers between the Union government and the States in the Indian Constitution (and that is the crux of federation) is more apparent than real, for it is within the power of the Union government both in emergencies (articles 352–60) and in normal times (articles 200, 201 and 249) to bring the entire administration of the country under its unitary control. Thus, the basic principle of the Constitution is not federalism but decentralized unitarism or, in other words, unitarism with a high degree of decentralization of powers in favor of the States. But, it must be observed, while a constitution is unitary, the government in practice may not necessarily be so. Indeed, the Canadian federal government is a living example of this sort of divergence between the theory and practice of a constitution. Hence, it is essential in order to complete this study to inquire into the actual working—as distinguished from the theory—of federation in India. Let us, therefore, have a look at the practice of the Constitution.

It has already been observed, in the course of the preceding analysis, that in the State of Kerala, in July, 1959, the emergency powers of the Union government were exercised in a manner not wholly consistent with the spirit of federal government, for the breakdown of constitutional government in the State was presumed while apparently the government (the State Ministry) still retained the confidence of the legislature of the State; and on this questionable presumption the Union government dismissed the State Ministry and took over the entire government of the State.

Kerala, of course, was a Communist State. But the practice in the Congress-governed States too has not differed greatly. In the Congress-ruled States, a favorite and powerful method of central intervention has been for the Union government

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(acting through the fiction of the Congress Central Parliamentary Board) to choose State Chief Ministers and to thrust them upon the States. The most flagrant example of this sort of central intervention is provided by the State of Madhya Pradesh. The present Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, Dr. Kailashnath Katju,[4] hails from Allahabad (where he had settled as a lawyer at the High Court in 1914) in the State of Uttar Pradesh. And as early as 1937, he was a Minister in the U. P. government. Thus, far from being a State leader of long standing, Dr. Katju, for all his ability and sincerity, was practically a stranger to the State of Madhya Pradesh. But in January, 1957, after the death of Pandit Ravi Shanker Shukla, Dr. Katju, then Union Defence Minister, was ushered in as the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh under central direction. Almost parallel developments have taken place, from time to time, in the States of Uttar Pradesh and Punjab; and, not infrequently, the charge of effective central intervention in the selection of State Chief Ministers has been advanced by responsible State Congress leaders themselves.

These are but few instances of a deep-seated trend. The fact of the matter is that all state governments tend to look increasingly to the Union government for leadership and direction. And, of late, the directives of the Union government and those of Mr. Nehru in particular have been rarely disregarded.

The trend towards the increasing centralization of the government has been further accentuated in recent years by the extraordinary powers and influence exercised by the Planning Commission. Established in 1950, with the Prime Minister as its Chairman, the Planning Commission has very wide and vague terms of reference. The Commission has the power to approve all development schemes and projects of the Union government and of the governments of the States alike. Thus, the States cannot undertake any developmental activities if the Planning Commission (a creature of the Union government) disapproves of them. And the decisions of the Commission are enforced immediately by the supply

[4] As these pages went to press, Dr. Katju's term as Chief Minister expired—in March, 1962. He also lost his seat in the State legislature in the recent General Election. However, he is apparently staging a come back, for he is contesting a by-election (due to be held in May) reportedly on the advice of the Central Parliamentary Board of the Congress.

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or refusal of funds. In fact, so unrelenting and pervasive is the control of the Planning Commission that a project or scheme disapproved by the Commission can be pursued by a State government only "if it (the State government) is prepared to face the consequences of refusal of central assistance not only for that particular project but for other approved projects as well." [5] Needless to say that no State government in India can afford to take such a risk.

The accent in India today is on planning and socialism. But planning and socialism invariably make for increasing centralization of the functions and structure of government. It is, therefore, reasonably certain that in the years to come the trend towards unitarism will continue or even gain in intensity. And this will be in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution—maybe in accordance with its letter too—for the Constitution does not at all claim to establish a federal polity.

S. C. GANGAL

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[5] K. Santhanam, "The Unwritten Parts of the Indian Constitution," *Hindustan Times* (Republic Day Supplement), New Delhi, January 26, 1961.

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AN AGE OF REVOLUTION *

WITH some exaggeration it is possible to say that the four titles below represent a significant shift, amounting almost to a kind of revolution, in modern English historiography. They are the end products of that controversy which has for so long and so acrimoniously divided the scholarly interpreters of the English Civil Wars. For those who may have doubts as to whether the results of empirical research can ever change scholarly presumptions the four titles should stand as proof to the contrary. Three of the works are by younger scholars whose interest in the civil wars was stimulated during graduate or undergraduate study by three of the leading participants in the controversy: Mr. Christopher Hill of Balliol College, Oxford; Professor R. H. Tawney who, until his recent death, was doyen of English scholars of the civil war period; and Professor H. R. Trevor-Roper, for long the lively antagonist of Mr. Hill and Professor Tawney.

The historiographical controversy involving these three latter is of such long standing and is so well known to those who work in English history that it needs no recapitulation for the specialist. To those unfamiliar with it, however, I should like to point out briefly that what is involved is the validity of an interpretation, largely espoused by Mr. Hill, Mr. Lawrence Stone and Professor Tawney, which, with a number of modifications, has been used to describe the English Civil Wars in quasi-Marxian terms as a class struggle in which a "capitalist gentry" overturned the Stuart monarchy and the feudal aristocracy whose instrument, so it is alleged, the kingship was.

* This review article is based on the following books:

The King's Servants: The Civil Service of Charles I, 1625–42, by G. E. Aylmer. New York, Columbia University Press, 1961. xii, 521 pp. $8.75.

The Crown and the Money Market, 1603–1640, by Robert Ashton. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1960. xvi, 223 pp. $4.00.

London and the Outbreak of the Puritan Revolution: City and Government in National Politics, 1625–1643, by Valerie Pearl. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961. xii, 364 pp. $6.75.

Reappraisals in History, by J. H. Hexter. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1961. xxi, 214 pp.

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Needless to say, the matter at issue has had ramifications that reach far beyond the arena of scholarly controversy. At stake has been the truth of the Marxian *Anschauung,* at least indirectly, and thus it was that those who entered the lists were often motivated by purposes that can be called at least partially polemical. Fortunately, the good manners of English academic tradition kept the whole conflict within the bounds of decency, though more than once the breaking of the bounds was a near thing indeed. Fortunately also, the effect on English historical writing has been significant, for each of the above works is a direct consequence of the interest generated by the controversy and the desire to test hypothesis against evidence—perhaps not always consciously but, nonetheless, explicitly in the end. By this time the whole matter has about it the air of a family squabble as exemplified by the not insignificant fact that three of the above authors have an acknowledgement or a word of thanks for one or more of the major participants in the controversy.

What general conclusions have the above drawn from their findings? On the whole, it is safe to say with some qualification in each individual case, that the verdict has generally gone against the view that the rising-gentry-cum-bourgeoisie brought on the civil wars and destroyed the Stuart monarchy. For accuracy, of course, it should be recalled that Professor Tawney appeared to have modified his own position to some degree as a result of his work on the career of the Jacobean Lord Treasurer, Lionel Cranfield, Earl of Middlesex. In truth, the evidence has mounted, and with the appearance of these new works it will require an extraordinary amount of unregeneracy to resist the conclusions set forth therein.

How has each of the above gone about his task and how well has the job been done? Since Mr. Aylmer's was the first book published, though it did not appear in the United States until 1961, let us begin by looking at it. His work is a pioneering effort to apply to the early Stuart period the techniques of research in administrative history employed with such success by medievalists like the late T. F. Tout and more recently by Dr. G. R. Elton in his study of the Tudor administration. On the whole, it is admirably done; Mr. Aylmer has read widely in the secondary literature of the field and has pondered what he has read. As a result, the very extensive research he has undertaken is intelligently,

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even brilliantly in places, employed to recreate an aspect of Stuart government that has never been examined in the same light before. But while he has a clearer conception and deeper knowledge, he is still the empirical historian whose conclusions are more tentative than most social scientists, and particularly sociologists (for whom Mr. Aylmer appears to have some antipathy), would like. After telling us, and then documenting his statements with a quite extensive sampling from the lists of crown officials in the period from 1625 to 1642, that one can find no pattern of clear choice even in royal officialdom when it came to choosing sides during the civil wars, he then goes on to say in his concluding chapter that he, in effect, will not substitute one monistic theory of causation for another in attempting to explain the coming of the Great Rebellion. If he has helped indirectly to overturn one theory, he will not substitute for it a theory of the "rising state" and its bureaucracy as the prime movers of change in the history of England or Europe. His judgment in this matter savors, perhaps a little too strongly, of another kind of dogma, particularly when he writes as he does on page 468:

> It is surely beyond debate, that the growth of government and the rise of bureaucracy are major themes in modern history. But to contend that a particular phase in this process, or the political and social tensions which arose from it, provided the key to English seventeenth-century history would be to make oneself the victim of sociological theory. And to maintain such a view would in the last resort be to go in the face of both the evidence and common sense.

Is this really the proper note on which to end a work that is the product of so much research and such admirable preliminary judgment? Having come so far and done so well, might not Mr. Aylmer have taken us a bit farther into his confidence and indicated rather explicitly what his reasons are for so concluding? If there is no clear, simple pattern of history, is it still wrong to think of the growth of human numbers, the increase of human self-consciousness, and the growing complexity of human and material interrelationships as parts of a broad, albeit inchoate, pattern not of historical development perhaps but of historical sequence? The very fact that population has increased steadily for some centuries and that man has speculated more and more about him-

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self and his relationships with his surroundings must surely have influenced the course of history, and often significantly, at particular moments. One need not accept the precise theoretical or statistical models of economics or sociology to think in these terms. Surely they are categories broad enough to comprehend the most tentative judgments of the most cautious empiricists. And yet, make no mistake, this is an important work. If Mr. Aylmer is perhaps too much the historian's historian, it is a shortcoming for which this reviewer must confess a very strong sympathy.

Though they deal with different aspects of the same problem, Mr. Ashton and Mrs. Pearl admirably complement each other in proving what has long been suspected, namely, that the commercial community of England (at least in London) was not universally hostile to the crown when the issues of civil war were sharpening between 1640 and 1642. Here again, much of the pioneering work was done by Professor Tawney in his study of Cranfield, but now it is documented for us in a most thorough way. Of the two works, Mr. Ashton's is by far the more specialized in its examination of the purely economic and financial problems of the crown that helped to bring on the civil wars. In stressing their importance he is not saying anything remarkably new, but he does throw new light into some dark corners and in so doing corrects some ancient misconceptions. Several of his more specific findings are worth noting. The crown, he tells us, was afflicted by wastefulness as well as rising prices and made its own position worse by resorting to the practice of borrowing massively not for emergencies but for ordinary expenses. Contrary to longstanding belief given currency by S. R. Gardiner and more recently by Professor F. C. Dietz, Mr. Ashton argues that the crown did not improve its finances very markedly through the use of Ship Money and other questionable devices of the 1630's but was, in fact, very much worse off when the Long Parliament was finally summoned in 1640. And, finally, his findings corroborate and parallel those of Mrs. Pearl by showing that the borrowing practices of the first two Stuarts created a kind of vested interest group among the nonprofessional moneylenders and customs farmers who thus became powerful supporters of the old regime. Surely, such a discovery might have been suspected by any but the most doctrinaire of historians, but here is fullest

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proof of such significance that Mr. Ashton is certainly correct in saying as he does at the very end of the book:

> In the creation of that minority [that is, of royal creditors], royal borrowing and the network of intimate business connexions between the Crown and certain forms of private enterprise, arising out of the royal relations with the money market, are factors which no historian of the Great Rebellion can afford to neglect.

It is Mrs. Pearl, however, who really lays to rest the longest-lived of all misconceptions about the origins of the civil wars. If one thing had seemed certain beyond all cavil or any need of proof it was the solidarity of the City of London, and especially its municipal government, in the cause of parliament. Generation after generation of historians had accepted this belief, at least implicitly, and even Gardiner was scarcely free of the presupposition. Alone among nineteenth century historians a foreigner, albeit one of genius, Leopold von Ranke, raised explicit doubts about the role of the most influential men in the City and suggested that this question "would be worth a further investigation." After nearly ninety years Mrs. Pearl has acted upon Ranke's suggestion.

What she has found bears out the suspicion that clearly lay at the back of the great German scholar's mind and shows how curiously difficult it sometimes is to shake the foundations of assumption in historical thinking. Mrs. Pearl, like Mr. Ashton, has discovered that the richest and most powerful men in the City corporation were strongly for the crown and had to be displaced before the city's government could be carried into the revolutionary camp. Indeed, the real revolutionaries in this connection were those whom she describes as "parliamentary puritans," a group who, because its members enjoyed a large popular support, was finally able to drive the entrenched royalist financiers from office by 1642. Not only does she bear out what Mr. Ashton says about the support given by a substantial body of finance capitalists to the crown, but her findings startlingly recapitulate this reviewer's own discoveries concerning the state of municipal politics in Edinburgh on the eve of the Covenanting Rebellion in Scotland in 1637. One may ask if this was a fairly common pattern throughout the municipalities of

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Britain. Perhaps we shall never have a clear answer, but certainly enough evidence is now in to indicate that the crown was not simply "foreclosed" by its "bourgeois" creditors. Indeed, the latter dared not do so for the very obvious reason that foreclosure of the monarchy would have spelt their own ruin—as it ultimately did in a great many individual cases once parliament joined in war with the king. What is also revealed here, if it needed revelation, is the fact that rebellion was a consequence of a large measure of popular discontent cast in "puritan" terms, which is pretty much what historical orthodoxy has been saying for generations. Could it be that the good, old-fashioned Whig theory that the civil wars were fought as a result of a general belief that the civil and religious liberties of the subject were in danger comes closer to the truth after all? *Plus ça change!*

J. H. Hexter's book is the last only in terms of its date of publication, for Professor Hexter has labored longer in the vineyard of Tudor and Stuart historiography than any of the other authors. Indeed, this book, which consists of articles published over a period of almost twenty-five years (one of them in this journal), covers more than the rather specialized aspect of historical interpretation which we have been discussing so far. It deals sharply, incisively, often destructively, but always perceptively, with a whole range of historiographical conceptions—or misconceptions—which Professor Hexter feels have unfortunately dominated historical scholarship in the present century. The catalogue is a long one: historical relativism, present-mindedness, "tunnel" history (the practice of dividing historical study into "tunnels" labeled political, social, economic, religious, constitutional and so on, each of which is sealed off completely from the others at every point of possible contact), "factor" analysis (the use of an imprecise terminological device called a "factor" which purports to explain history in virtually any way that happens to match the interests of a particular historian), and, finally, the "economic interpretation" by which Professor Hexter appears to mean the Marxian or crypto-Marxian assumption that all of western history is to be explained in terms of a "rising middle class."

Four of the essays markedly demonstrate the author's skill in evoking dialogue, for he is an excellent example of that all too rare scholarly phenomenon, a man who is continually

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engaged in thinking about his methods and materials. By way of illustration, this reviewer can remember a term once spent in a graduate seminar where every member tested his own previously untried research effort against the hypothesis put forward by Professor Hexter in "The Problem of the Presbyterian Independents." If other graduate schools have not yet gone so far, still most would benefit if their courses in methodology included in their reading lists "The Historian and His Day." And who in the field of Tudor or Stuart historical study—if he be seriously devoted to his calling—can have failed to read the two essays which have become minor classics of their kind, namely, "The Education of the Aristocracy in the Renaissance" and "Storm over the Gentry"?

If the reader in making his way through this volume stumbles across the seemingly familiar or, by now, the almost commonplace, it is because many of the ideas herein have come to have a very wide currency. He may still ask, as this reviewer has heard it asked more than once, whether this is not a dangerous game played by Professor Hexter. If coherence, order, explanation go from history, what remains but intellectual nihilism? Those who ask this anguished question must always remind us of the western gambler in the ancient joke who resorted night after night to a crooked card game because it was the only one in town. Theories, models, hypotheses are acceptable, the author would seem to say, if they correspond, insofar as the scholar can possibly determine, to that empirical test which can best be made by a total absorption in historical sources and the climate of a particular historical period. Thus we are offered not a counsel of despair but an invitation to the enthusiastic adventuring that true scholarship provides.

As a scholarly controversialist, however, Professor Hexter will surely be longest remembered for his assaults upon the class interpretation of history; and it is undoubtedly in this connection that some of his most thought provoking and what is probably his most influential writing has been done. As he sees it, the class analysis commonly applied to historical study creates a dilemma of which most who use it seem to be completely unaware. The whole nature of class is, if not beyond comprehension, almost beyond analysis in empirical terms; thus, though it may be employed by scholars, it is

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hardly ever defined. This enables the historian to play a sleight of hand game. He assumes the empirical validity of an undefined concept and then proceeds to "hypostatize" it so that it applies to any given historical situation without chronological limit. As a consequence, though Professor Hexter scarcely says it in so many words, historical scholarship in these circumstances becomes not explication or exposition of research but a mental exercise in which evidence often gathered at random is used to fill the interstices of a preconceived historiographical framework. In weighing the merits of the Tawney and Trevor-Roper explanations of the causes of the civil wars he has criticisms to make of both, but the weight of his disapproval falls far more heavily on the views of Professor Tawney and Mr. Lawrence Stone.

If there has indeed been a sort of "revolution" in the historiography of the Stuart period, Professor Hexter has had more than a little to do with bringing it off. Its total effect is perhaps less complicated and at the same time more profound than so large a term might suggest, for what he asks us to do is to give over the juggling of not very precise formulae and return to the historian's prime task which is simply the writing of history as accurately, as honestly, as fully as time and talent permit. It is strange that such a suggestion should be thought of as revolutionary, but fortunate that scholars in English historical studies seem to be heeding it once more.

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REVIEWS

Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare. Translated and with an Introduction by BRIGADIER GENERAL SAMUEL B. GRIFFITH. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.—114 pp. Appendix, 7 pp. $4.50.

Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare. With an Introduction by MAJOR HARRIES-CLICHY PETERSON. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.—xxxiii, 85 pp. $3.95.

Guerrilla Warfare. By CHE GUEVARA. Translated by JOSEPH P. MORRAY. New York, Monthly Review Press, 1961.—127 pp. $3.50.

Guerrillas in the 1960's. By PETER PARET and JOHN W. SHY. Princeton Studies in World Politics, Number 1. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.—82 pp. $3.50.

Communist Revolutionary Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina. By GEORGE K. TANHAM. A RAND Corporation Research Study. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.—x, 166 pp. $5.00.

Affronted by the "revolutionary" character of the struggle in places like Laos and Cuba where American power or forces are directly concerned, public interest has turned belatedly to the phenomenon known variously as "subversive" or "irregular" or "guerrilla" war. No less belatedly perhaps, the military scholars and translators have rushed to assuage this appetite: the feast has followed the famine. Journalism of events is being succeeded by attempts to classify the principal features of irregular war, its revolutionary and external political relationships, and its meaning for our national policy and military response. We see a repetition of roughly the same evolution that occupied French military thinking in the late 1950's, with conceivably the addition of valuable hindsight based on the errors of our ally.

It is of great use to have the texts of Mao and Guevara readily available. Sober meditation on some of the lessons and cautions they teach, so long as the approach is flexible rather than dogmatic—a sin of the French—can reveal much of value to those who fight our wars and those who must plan for them. General Griffith, who has long been a voice crying in the wilderness, is

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eminently qualified to guide us through the perplexities of revolutionary war; his introduction furnishes a succinct and sophisticated review of the subject. One might take issue with the artificiality of his numerical system for assessing the strength of guerrilla movements (pp. 29–30), since the factors he depends on are apt to be in flux and some others have been left out. There is also a perceptible tendency in his essay to "universalize" Mao's observations into a general theory of war, when in fact—despite broad relevances to other situations—most of the Chinese leader's writings were occasional, designed to correct or define concerns of the here and now. Mao himself quotes Clausewitz approvingly: "Wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war" (p. 49). But this is peripheral caviling about a fine essay.

It would have been suitably magnanimous if the publisher had warned the purchaser that the translation of Che Guevara's *La Guerra de Guerrillas,* issued by Praeger, is condensed and somewhat distorted. The essential is there, but the deviations from the Spanish script are numerous and the excisions glaring. Both scholar and interested layman are strongly advised to obtain the competing version put out by the Monthly Review Press slightly ahead of the Praeger edition. It has no introduction (Major Peterson's is, in any case, superficial and guilty of such statements as: "Mao . . . successfully employed guerrilla warfare to pluck North Vietnam from Western hands"), but it faithfully and, one must say, lovingly reproduces the intermittent ardor of Che's prose, thereby restoring an important dimension to the understanding of revolutionary literature.

Guerrillas in the 1960's by Paret and Shy is an excellent little monograph which manages to compress much terrain into a brief distance. Of necessity its illustrations are somewhat cursory and mechanical and often fail to evoke the complexity of the events described. But the merits of the book are many: the balanced analysis of political reform as a counter-agent to subversion; the proper insistence that guerrilla warfare and counter-guerrilla warfare are not mirror images; and, the laudable instinct that warns against expecting easy solutions to the guerrilla war problem in Southeast Asia and elsewhere: it cannot be exorcised by simply being recognized. The authors conclude with a thoughtful chapter discussing, *inter alia,* the American employment of guerrillas.

George K. Tanham contributes a specific case study to this catalogue. The Indochina conflict is an exceptionally fruitful area for research, especially in the analysis of the alternating em-

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pirical and doctrinal demands made on General Giap's army, because the tensions between the rival claimants of ideology and necessity were very great in this instance. Dr. Tanham deals well with this aspect of the war descriptively, but only partly penetrates the workings of the politico-military mechanism. We get only a surface, or veiled, view of the pressures which the new state in embryo had to experience while its regular and local forces were fatiguing the French in protracted struggle. Some of this loss of depth is due to the extremely sketchy nature of the introduction that launches the military study proper (for example, the background of the Ho-Sainteny agreements; or discussion of the role of the Nationalist Chinese, later somewhat clarified by a note on p. 67).

One wishes that Dr. Tanham had mentioned his sources of information in certain instances. For example, it would have been useful to know by whose estimate it was deduced that many Vietnamese held aloof from the revolt in the early years of the war (when it wore a National Front disguise) and then joined it later (when its Communist character was clear to all). The point is not so easily settled; the experience of the Catholics in Tonkin is at least one case to the contrary.

There is also a bibliographical quibble: a number of the French military essays cited in mimeograph are surely more readily accessible (somewhat revised) in the pages of the leading military journals.

The foregoing criticisms do not mean that Dr. Tanham's book is not valuable and valid in most respects. It delineates the Viet Minh's military organization with clarity as well as the techniques of warfare applied in the various phases of the conflict. It also adds pertinent, if rather general, information about the evolution of this army since 1955 and some material about the Laotian civil war. It does not, however, supplant or significantly challenge Bernard Fall's voluminous *Le Viet-Minh, 1945–1960* for the serious student of this revolutionary state and its war against France.

From now on, the texts and analyses of revolutionary struggle seem destined to multiply in English, illuminating this area of warfare for both the military thinker and general reader. The temptation will be to codify, to discover general principles and counter-principles of guerrilla and subversive action across time and space, as ex-Colonel Charles Lacheroy and his team sought to do in the February 1957, *Revue Militaire d'Information.* There will be a real value in prudent synthesis, so long as it does not arbitrarily obscure the many facets of ingenious particularity revealed in these conflicts.

Certain to be of interest to specialists in irregular war is the

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recently published collection of essays by General Vo Nguyen Giap, the Viet Minh leader who defeated the French in Indochina (*Guerre du Peuple, Armée du Peuple,* Hanoi: Editions en langues etrangères, 1961; an English translation will be published by Praeger in September). The book, of which the present reviewer has read only abstracts, is characteristically more of an ideological tract than a human military document.

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The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology. By FRITZ STERN. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1961.—xxx, 367 pp. $8.00.

Through an analysis of the careers and influence of three cultural critics—Paul de Lagarde, Julius Langbehn, and Arthur Moeller van den Bruck—Fritz Stern has traced the rise of what he calls "the Germanic ideology." This ideology, he explains (p. xiii) had as "its principal goals . . . the revival of a mythical *Deutschtum* and the creation of political institutions that would embody and preserve" the "peculiar character of the Germans." It "propounded all manner of reforms, ruthless and idealistic, nationalistic and utopian," leaping "from despair to utopia across all existing reality" (p. xi). As Lagarde expressed it, "The Germany that we love and that we yearn to see has never existed and perhaps never will exist" (p. 27).

Lagarde was a frustrated philologian and "Praeceptor Germaniae" of the Bismarckian era; Langbehn and Moeller van den Bruck the self-taught authors of immensely popular books which crystallized the latent discontents of transition eras in Germany's history: Langbehn's *Rembrandt as Educator* became the runaway best-seller of the 1890's; Moeller's *The Third Reich* epitomized in its very title the aspirations of nationalists in the 1920's. Born almost exactly a quarter of a century apart—their birth dates extend from 1827 to 1876—the three writers had in common a hatred of modernity, liberalism, science, and the Jews; a yearning for a Führer who would give their people spiritual unity; and, incongruously enough, a substantial dose of Social Darwinism. They were lonely, deeply troubled men: Langbehn, who dramatized himself as the mysterious "Rembrandt-German," was clearly a psychopath, and Moeller committed suicide in despair at Germany's turn toward stability in 1924. Thus they were themselves "symptoms and victims" of the cultural crisis they lamented; their longing for a folk-community was a projection of their own inner desperation. As Mr. Stern pertinently observes:

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> Unable to endure the ills which they had diagnosed and which they had experienced in their own lives, they sought to become prophets who would point the way to a national rebirth. . . . Feeling alone and discontented in their culture, these zealots wanted war and conquest to bring peace and purification at home (pp. xi, 70).

Mr. Stern has a sharp mind and it cuts deftly through a murky subject. One has only to compare his book with Klemens von Klemperer's *Germany's New Conservatism* (1957), which deals with similar material in a more confused fashion, to appreciate the job of intellectual clarification he has performed. He carries impressive learning lightly; he has wit and spirit; his approach is totally free from the cultural parochialism that has marred so much scholarship on modern Germany.

At the same time, his book has structural peculiarities that I find puzzling. It reads as though it had been written in two separate forms, and then these versions had been incompletely fused. The introduction and conclusion—which total more than fifty pages—analyze the works of the three protagonists together; in the body of the book, each has a more detailed section to himself. The result is considerable repetition—a difficulty which is compounded by the use of two separate systems of footnotes: source citations are found at the end of the volume, while the bottoms of the pages are cluttered with "content" footnotes that might well have gone into the text itself. My own preference would be for an analytic, comparative treatment throughout. Summarizing the writings of each author in turn makes for long arid stretches—more particularly in the case of Langbehn, who is intellectually the feeblest of the three.

I also have a more philosophical criticism. Mr. Stern obviously detests his protagonists. That is his privilege: all true history is written from the standpoint of a personal value-system. But need it be as explicit as this? I agree that most of what Lagarde and Langbehn and Moeller wrote was intellectually shoddy and pernicious; its eventual effect was catastrophic. Yet I think this emerges quite clearly from their own words. They damn themselves; the historian scarcely has to intervene. So I wish Mr. Stern had refrained from such questionable devices as throwing in an "alas" (p. 256) at the triumph of Hitler. I wish there had been some trace of ambiguity in the historian's mind, the lingering, regretful sympathy for an enemy which, since Ranke, has characterized the best of cultural history in the German tradition.

"Tout commence en mystique et tout finit en politique": Péguy's most celebrated dictum appropriately figures as the motto of Mr. Stern's book. For the tragedy of the German edu-

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cated classes in the half-century preceding the advent of Nazism was the way they allowed themselves to be seduced by the vacuous prophets of a spurious *Deutschtum*. Even refined, cosmopolitan minds like that of the early Thomas Mann succumbed to their blandishments. What Lagarde and Langbehn and Moeller sowed, Hitler finally harvested. What had started as innocent mystifications ended in political terror. It is in tracing this connection that Mr. Stern is at his best, and it is here that his book will have its widest appeal. He does not hold the Germanic ideologists responsible for Nazism—he is too discriminating for that. Rather, he demonstrates convincingly that Hitler picked from them only what fitted his own purposes and eventually repudiated the author of *The Third Reich* entirely. But in the final question Mr. Stern leaves with his readers the verdict is unmistakable: "Can one abjure reason, glorify force, prophesy the age of the imperial dictator, . . . without preparing the triumph of irresponsibility?" (p. 298).

H. STUART HUGHES

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Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends. By OTTO KIRCHHEIMER. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—xiv, 452 pp. $8.50.

The literature of the law has frequently dealt with the use of the judicial process in the struggle to maintain or achieve political power. But it has been largely concerned with a description of events or a technical analysis of the legal doctrines involved. There has been little or no effort to give a theoretical cast to this mass of raw material. We have had no comprehensive analysis of the role of the judicial institution when employed directly "to bolster or create new power positions." Dr. Kirchheimer's book, which essays this task, is a notable contribution.

It makes, in fact, several contributions. On a more abstract level, it is a masterly analysis of the operation of the judicial process when used for political purposes—the ends it serves, the circumstances under which it is invoked, the manner in which it reflects and responds to political pressures. Dr. Kirchheimer classifies the political trial according to three main categories: the trial of a common crime committed for political purposes, in which the proceeding is conducted with a view to the political benefits accruing from a successful prosecution; the "classic political trial," in which the government attempts to apply legal sanctions to the political activity of its foes; and the "derivative trial," where the issue is framed in the form of a suit for defamation or a prosecution for perjury or contempt. He gives specific

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examples of each type of proceeding and appraises the techniques and results under varying kinds of political structure. The functions of the political trial from the government's viewpoint are analyzed and the efforts of modern regimes to use the judicial process, not only for legitimizing the application of sanctions against a political enemy, but for manipulating public opinion and rallying mass support for the regime, are discussed. Similarly, the risks to the government and the opportunity for the defense to use the judicial process for its own ends are considered. In two of his best chapters Dr. Kirchheimer deals with the roles of the various participants in the political trial. Here he treats with great insight the function of the judge, the jury, the police, the prosecutor, the defendant, the defendant's lawyer and the witnesses, and shows how they play their respective parts. The analysis is instructive and provocative throughout.

Political Justice makes an equally important contribution on a somewhat different level. It is an excellent treatise on the maintenance of political liberty in a modern mass society through methods of constitutionalism. One chapter is devoted to a historical survey of the area of protection allowed by various regimes at different times to political opposition. Another, also one of the best, deals with legal repression of hostile political organizations, including the basic problem of the treatment of antidemocratic groups in a democratic society. There is an insightful discussion of the function of an independent judiciary in a constitutional order, and an intriguing chapter on the contrasting role of a party-directed judiciary in a totalitarian state as exemplified by the judicial institutions of East Germany. At various points throughout the book Dr. Kirchheimer throws light on a much neglected aspect of the judicial process in a constitutional state—the dynamics of political repression. There are perceptive discussions of the use of informers; the significance of insisting upon naming collaborators in political trials; the function of the security police; the treatment of defectors—including American insistence upon repentance; and public attitudes toward political deviants. Very little is available today that illuminates more sharply the problems of a modern democratic society seeking order, liberty and change under a rule of law.

Added to this, or related to it, the book contains informative chapters upon the trial of ousted leaders by a successor regime, dealing principally with the Nuremberg trials, on the practice of political asylum, and on the granting of clemency in political cases.

Dr. Kirchheimer's approach is a wide-ranging one. He considers political justice in many different periods of history, under a great variety of regimes, as illustrated by numerous cases. His

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scholarship is impressive. So are his political and psychological insights, and the depth of his understanding. He writes with cosmic objectivity but with a feeling for the human beings involved—both the judges and the judged (to whom his book is dedicated). Unfortunately, the style is obscure at times, at least for this reviewer, but as one proceeds it gains in clarity and eloquence. There is certainly room for disagreement with some of Dr. Kirchheimer's interpretations and with the treatment of some details. But his study is always enlightening and stimulating—all in all a brilliant performance.

THOMAS I. EMERSON

YALE LAW SCHOOL

Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. By ROBERT A. DAHL. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1961. —xii, 355 pp. $7.50.

What John Locke did to Filmer, Professor Dahl has done for Floyd Hunter. Or has he? Anyone seriously concerned with current systematic political theory or with urban politics should read *Who Governs?* and answer this question for himself. Residents of New Haven, the city which serves as Dahl's convenient test case, and followers of the burgeoning literature of "community power" have doubtlessly already done so.

Until recently local government and politics were receiving relatively little serious academic attention. From 1933 on, other matters seemed more pressing. But in 1953, Floyd Hunter's controversial *Community Power Structure,* based on his analysis of Atlanta, made a very large splash in the academic "backwater" of local politics. By the end of the decade everyone from the Ford Foundation to John Kenneth Galbraith was hailing the importance of local government, the urgency of "metropolitan problems," and the difficulty of determining who—if anyone—governs our cities.

Hunter may well be the most influential social worker since Harry Hopkins. His book provided both a simple (even simplistic) methodology—"reputational analysis" to identify "community influentials"—and a provocative thesis: local politics is largely controlled, directly or indirectly, by the dominant economic interests. Many sociologists hailed Hunter's method and accepted his findings, but most political scientists were dubious. In a series of brilliant articles Dahl launched a powerful critique of both Hunter's method and his conclusions, and provided some exciting glimpses of his own study of New Haven.

Who Governs? is no mere collection of Dahl's previous papers, but a major new work. The empirical study of New Haven is

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organized into three parts. Part I traces the history of New Haven from its incorporation as a city in 1784 to the present. Dahl describes this in terms of a gradual dispersal of political resources leading to a shift from cumulative inequalities (the early Congregational-Federalist elite combined economic, social, and political advantages) to dispersed or non-cumulative inequalities. Taking the mayoralty as an index Dahl shows how the old elite was displaced around 1840 by the rising entrepreneurs. Around the turn of the century these in turn were displaced by what Dahl terms the "ex-plebes," men from lower-middle class and often immigrant backgrounds.

In Part II Dahl analyzes the different sets of leaders and subleaders who participated in decisions in three major subject areas in recent years. These are: 1) urban redevelopment, in which New Haven has had one of the country's most ambitious programs; 2) public education; and 3) party nominations. He finds relatively little overlap, especially among the social or economic notables, that is to say, no simple "power elite." Indeed, the most active and influential figure appears to be Mayor Richard Lee, an "ex-plebe" (who emerges as a bit more of the "hero" than really seems necessary). The three decision areas, incidentally, are located entirely within the single jurisdiction of the city of New Haven; hence they involve none of the complex bickering among jurisdictions which is the hallmark of much decision-making in most major metropolitan areas. Finally, in Part III some alternative patterns of influence are suggested.

The second half of *Who Governs?* shifts from the details of New Haven politics to some very high level—and high quality—theorizing about "pluralistic democracy." Here Dahl expands on some of the earlier writings of Harold Lasswell relating to the "bases" and effective "scopes" of power. The "bases" or potential resources are such things as social standing; cash, credit, and wealth; legality; popularity; control over jobs; and, control over information. All of these, however, are only *potential* power factors; they become effective levers only when skillfully mobilized. Thus political "skill" plays a role comparable to that which Hans Morgenthau assigns to "diplomacy" in his classic analysis of the bases of national power. Dahl concludes with some thoughtful comments on the uses of political resources and on the sources of stability and change in democratic regimes.

Clearly Dahl has written a definitive account of power in New Haven. But has he refuted Hunter as decisively as Locke did Filmer? On the issue of methodology, this reviewer would say yes—"reputational analysis" is, or should be, dead. But on the substantive question of the influence of the business community, the answer is not so clear. New Haven, while typical of eco-

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nomically stagnant New England, is a far cry from the booming regional centers of Atlanta, Denver, Houston or Dallas, Miami, and so forth. Hunter may have "muddled through" to overstate a thesis not without relevance to those cities where rapid economic growth—which generally can come only through the businessman—is the be-all and end-all for most segments of the population, including the politicians. There remains an urgent need for "middle range theory" to relate what we are learning about different kinds of cities and different styles of politics.

HUGH DOUGLAS PRICE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781–88. By JACKSON TURNER MAIN. For the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1961.—xv, 308 pp. $7.50.

This is a curious and convoluted book. Professor Main's central thesis is that the Antifederalists actually were the spokesmen for a majority of the American people in the 1780's, but in some dark fashion they were pushed aside and a small group of nationalist plotters imposed the Constitution on the helpless masses. In short, the Antifederalists were robbed, and as I read the book my memory took me back to election night in 1952 and I recalled a distinguished student of American politics explaining the disaster to some mourning Democrats: "The country is Democratic, the people disapprove of the Republican program, Eisenhower isn't even a Republican—it's obvious! The American people are the victims of a conspiracy."

This is the *leitmotif* of Main's book; over and over again he registers the same complaint in different formulations: "the Antifederalists did not have a fair chance" (p. 198). The Federalists were just plain nasty: they got the state legislatures to pack the Constitutional Convention with their partisans, they rushed ratification through without giving their opponents time properly to organize, their newspapers were positively unfair, and, worse, their candidates for the conventions ignored or misstated the Antifederalist position. From Main's peculiarly nonpolitical vantagepoint, the Federalists should have had better manners than to oppose and defeat the (alleged) representatives of the popular will.

But, of course, the Federalists won. And, since he starts with the premise that a majority of the people opposed the Constitution, Professor Main has to explain the shambles of Antifederalism in 1787–88 as a defeat for the popular will. Moreover, there

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is no evidence to indicate that the elections to the state conventions were any less democratic than other contemporary elections; thus the conniving Federalists cannot be indicted for election rigging. The state legislatures which sustained Professor Main's (and his mentor, Professor Merrill Jensen's) beloved Confederation were chosen by roughly the same electorate. What went wrong?

There are two answers: either the Antifederalists were political incompetents who lost whatever majority they may have had among the population to a brilliantly organized nationalist opposition, or Antifederalism was the victim of a conspiracy. While Professor Main does a fine job of documenting the first alternative, he never lets go of the conspiracy theme. He goes a long way, for example, towards suggesting that the Antifederalist leadership—an upper-class group allegedly motivated by sympathy with their Federalist upper-class opponents—unconsciously sold the pass. Since he never defines "class" except in circular terms (the upper class is the class above the middle class, and so on) and assumes what has to be demonstrated if his terminology is to have analytical value (that, for example, big debtors like Robert Morris and James Wilson had the same "class interest" as wealthy creditors rather than sharing a "class" bed with small debtors), this argument simply leaves me mystified. But however faulty the logic, the conclusion emerges intact: the vibrantly democratic and egalitarian Antifederalist masses were sacrificed on the altar of their leaders' ambitions.

This story of the ravishing of the democratic innocents by self-interested elites is most touching. Unfortunately, it rests on divination rather than on any empirical base. Main has provided an enormous amount of documentation, but regrettably it is evidence for a different thesis, namely, that the Antifederalists *thought* they were the spokesmen for the popular will; that they were politically outplayed at every turn by Madison and his colleagues; and that when they were overwhelmed in the state conventions, they took refuge from reality (as many politicians have over the years) in the comforting myth that they had been swindled. To assert that the elected delegates to the ratifying conventions betrayed the will of the people is simply unverifiable. In fact, any assertion about the will of the people is based on the anterior premise that when the electorate chose delegates, it was confronted with a clear ideological choice between pro- and anti-Constitutional positions. In certain districts, notably in Virginia and Massachusetts, this seems to have occurred, but Professor Main puts his finger on the key consideration when he notes, almost parenthetically, that "Only in New York was there an Antifederal 'party' in the sense connoted by that word—that

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is, an organization with a central committee of sorts which raised money, distributed propaganda, and corresponded with leaders within the state and in other states" (p. 233). In other words, the Antifederalists failed dismally to present to the voters their view that the Constitution was a dangerous innovation and, in the absence of this ideological polarization, the choice of delegates was generally based on traditional considerations, that is, trusted local figures were sent to the conventions to do what they thought best.

The Federalists, in a superbly organized campaign which I have examined in the *American Political Science Review,* Vol. LV, No. 4, 1961, convinced these various assemblages of notables that the "national interest" required a new, more centralized, form of government. The Antifederalists, spokesmen for parochialism, were beaten in a fair fight, and wandered off into the limbo reserved for the defeated. While their history is worth analysis, they hardly merit the sympathy which Professor Main has so generously bestowed upon them.

JOHN P. ROCHE

BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY

Antislavery: The Crusade for Freedom in America. By DWIGHT LOWELL DUMOND. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1961.—x, 422 pp. $20.00.

A Bibliography of Antislavery in America. By DWIGHT LOWELL DUMOND. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1961.—119 pp. $10.00.

For more than twenty-five years American historians have been aware that Mr. Dwight L. Dumond, of the University of Michigan, was preparing an exhaustive history of the abolition movement in the United States. His editing of the letters of Theodore Dwight Weld (in collaboration with Gilbert H. Barnes, 1934) and of James G. Birney (1938), his sponsorship of many useful dissertations on antislavery in the Old Northwest, and the publication of his lectures on *The Antislavery Origins of the Civil War* (1939), have served from time to time to remind us both of his continuously active researches and of the formidable task before him. Now his labor is complete, and, published in sumptuous, profusely illustrated form by the University of Michigan Press, with an accompanying bibliographical volume listing the vast store of printed antislavery literature on which it rests, his work must stand as the most complete, detailed, and accurate narrative of what Professor Dumond rightly calls "this country's greatest victory for democracy."

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Invaluable as a reference tool, *Antislavery* is a great deal more than an encyclopedia of the abolition movement, for it provides many new and provocative interpretations of the antislavery crusade. Perhaps the most striking of Professor Dumond's theses is his overwhelming refutation of the myth that abolitionism was essentially a movement which began in the 1830's. With massive detail he traces the slow growth of the antislavery cause from colonial days and proves that by the time of the American revolution abolitionist leaders had anticipated both the ideas and the language of later and more familiar spokesmen like Weld and William Lloyd Garrison. Lincoln's 1858 "house divided" utterance takes on new meaning when Professor Dumond shows us that Benjamin Rush had declared in 1794 that "Freedom and slavery cannot long exist together," that Joseph Parrish in 1806 had written in his *Remarks on the Slavery of the Black People, "A house divided against itself cannot stand,"* and that James G. Birney had predicted in 1835, "There will be no cessation of the strife until Slavery shall be exterminated, or liberty destroyed."

Equally impressive is Mr. Dumond's contention that the methods, as well as the ideas, of the antislavery movement had continuity. From the beginning, he demonstrates, "*The movement . . . was as much political as it was religious, even more so.*" The idea of colonizing the Negroes in Africa or elsewhere, he shows, was "a disrupting influence in a well-established and progressive trend for emancipation." Equally so was the argument of Garrison, "a Johnny-come-lately in the business of abolishing slavery," that antislavery reformers should eschew politics. Instead, he reminds us, the real leaders of the American Antislavery Society, Weld, Birney, and Henry B. Stanton, deliberately steered the movement into "its earlier, normal channels of political action," and they moved easily and logically into the Liberty party. Less convincing is Mr. Dumond's argument that the Free Soil movement and the Republican party were simply expansions of the abolitionist crusade; too much is here overlooked in the way of other contributing forces, such as economic interests, nativism, political vendettas, and the like.

As in his earlier writings, Professor Dumond continues to emphasize the importance of the Western wing of the antislavery movement, at the expense of the more familiar Eastern group of crusaders. The Westerners easily accepted women "as coworkers, not subordinates," in the good cause; they were the effective supporters of the underground railroad; and they backed the Liberty party. Easterners, on the other hand, were distracted by the vagaries of Garrison, "*a man of distinctly narrow limitations,*" which included "ignorance of American history, constitutional law, and previous antislavery tradition and literature."

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One of Mr. Dumond's most original insights is his explanation of why the abolitionists persisted in attempting to move the slaveholders through moral suasion, rather than working out some practical plan of emancipation. As Angelina Grimké pointed out, such legal and political action might free the slaves, but "A sense of guilt and repentance on the part of the slaveholder was absolutely essential because emancipation could not take the Negroes out of the power of the slaveholders." The experience of Reconstruction is ample evidence of the abolitionists' wisdom.

Antislavery is, then, a work at once useful and insightful, an impressive capstone to Professor Dumond's distinguished career. But because it is sure to become the standard work on the abolitionist drive, it is important to point out that this study has certain important limitations. This is, first of all, a book of curious proportions. Almost too detailed on the early antislavery movement, it becomes curiously thin toward the end. Only sixteen pages are devoted to the history of the movement after 1844; only four pages are given to all the exciting happenings of the 1850's; only two pages describe the antislavery activities of the Civil War. This is, thus, a history only of the origins of the antislavery movement, not of its triumph.

The book is also weakened by the author's frank and explicit pro-abolitionist bias. When one reads that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, a measure consistently upheld by all Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, "unquestionably stands alone as the most flagrantly unconstitutional act of Congress ever enforced by the courts," he finds it hard to remember that he is reading, not Garrison or Weld, but Dumond. No one, of course, can censure the author for being hostile to slavery, but one expects from a present day historian both more understanding and more sophistication than the antislavery zealots exhibited. Professor Dumond's view of slavery appears to rest only upon an examination of abolitionist tracts; he dismisses plantation records and Southern journals as "largely worthless" and shows no acquaintance with the work of such scholars as Clement Eaton, Frank L. Owsley, and Kenneth M. Stampp. It is scarcely surprising, therefore, that his analysis of the evils of slavery follows in outline, and sometimes in language, Charles Sumner's intemperate "Barbarism of Slavery" oration of 1860. Without adducing any evidence at all, Mr. Dumond announces that "cruelty was the rule, not the exception," in the treatment of slaves, that "Thirty-nine lashes with a cowhide whip was moderate punishment," that "Methods of torture were as numerous as sadism could spawn," and that the desire to exploit Negro women sexually was the basis of "much of the defense of the institution."

If Mr. Dumond hates with fervor, he also loves with passion.

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He sees no evil in any abolitionist (except the much berated Garrisonians), and he indignantly rejects as defamatory any attempt to fathom their motives. In his eyes Denmark Vesey, the unsuccessful leader of a South Carolina slave plot, is not merely a hero but a savant; "few men were better informed than he in the history of race relations." Stanton and Weld were not just skilful, devoted organizers and propagandists; they "would today stand high in the ranks of scholars in the field of constitutional history." Weld's collection of Southern atrocity tales, *American Slavery As It Is,* is to Professor Dumond not the extraordinarily persuasive tract it was designed to be; "It is as close as history can come to the facts" of slavery.

Most of these defects stem from the nature of Professor Dumond's research. He has clearly spent so much time with the writings of the antislavery apostles that he has identified wholly with them. His *Bibliography of Antislavery in America* (an unannotated list of titles, with no indication of the libraries in which they may be found) consists solely of printed antislavery tracts and periodicals. No manuscript collections are listed, and few are cited in *Antislavery* itself. No scholarly studies of the South or of slavery or of the free Negro are included. No secondary works on the antislavery movement appear in the bibliography, and (except for a few published theses directed by Dr. Dumond) few books published since 1940 are mentioned in the footnotes. One misses, for example, any reference to Louis Filler's *The Crusade Against Slavery,* a recent comprehensive work covering much the same ground as Mr. Dumond's; to the biographies of antislavery leaders published in the last twenty-five years; to the monographs of Charles C. Cole, Jr., Timothy Smith, and John R. Bodo on evangelism and reform; and, to the studies of Allan Nevins, Roy F. Nichols, Avery O. Craven, and J. G. Randall on the 1850's.

In short, Mr. Dumond's *Antislavery* is a history of the abolitionist movement written exclusively from abolitionist sources and from an abolitionist point of view. Long on moral judgment, short on historical understanding, this is a massive brief rather than an objective analysis. In addition, it is mostly tedious reading, for Professor Dumond has preferred to list names, laws, and dates and to give long, repetitious extracts from antislavery documents rather than to recapture the spirit of one of the most stirring and devoted movements in our history. The true history of the antislavery movement, therefore, remains to be written.

DAVID DONALD

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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The La Guardia Years: Machine and Reform Politics in New York City. By CHARLES GARRETT. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1961.—ix, 423 pp. $8.50.

This excellent book focuses on the La Guardia administration, but as part of the whole history of reform in New York City. The first hundred pages trace the reform and machine traditions from the pre-Civil War period through the 1920's and explain the immediate background of La Guardia's election in 1933. The last thirty-five pages sketch in the political developments since his retirement in December, 1945. The heart of the book covers the twelve exciting La Guardia years when New York City enjoyed a reform administration unlike anything it has ever seen before or since. With emphasis on the times rather more than on the man, the book supplements the biography of La Guardia which Arthur Mann is bringing out in a series of volumes.

Mr. Garrett's admiration for the peppery Mayor stops well short of hero worship. He recognizes his faults—"a definitely unpleasant, if not nasty, side" to his character, "autocratic, belligerent, overbearing, stubborn, and opinionated" (p. 120)—which made him very difficult to work with. He had an "almost psychopathic inability to take criticism" (p. 123). He was too willing to use questionable means for worthy ends. As an administrator he was unable to delegate responsibility effectively, tried to do too much himself, and became bogged down in trivia. But with all this he had courage, sympathy, limitless energy, genuine idealism, the ability to attract and the wisdom to select first-class subordinates, and a real vision of what a well-governed city could be like. He was that unique phenomenon in New York City history: a reform mayor who was as good a practical politician as any boss, and he proved it by twice breaking the rule that no reform administration could ever be re-elected.

What were the principal achievements of the La Guardia years? At the top of the list Mr. Garrett places the creation of the "welfare city": the physical improvement of New York and the increase in social benefits enjoyed by its people. City reformers of earlier times had too often defined reform narrowly, as honest but limited government and balanced budgets; La Guardia, in keeping with the welfare climate of New Deal America, defined it as positive programs in the interest of the masses. His administration was concerned as well with improved governmental structure, and threw its support behind badly needed city charter revision, the abolition of obsolete county offices, and the controversial plan for proportional representation in City Council elections. Joint efforts of the administration and special

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prosecutor Thomas E. Dewey showed that a city does not have to acquiesce supinely in vicious racketeering. Throughout, La Guardia's flair for publicity made government exciting again for the average citizen. All in all, Mr. Garrett concludes, it was the greatest reform movement in the history of American municipal government.

Mr. Garrett's account of these events is lively and thorough. He accepts the responsibility to judge men and measures and exercises it judiciously. His book is a solid contribution to our understanding of the history and practice of city government.

RANSOM E. NOBLE

PRATT INSTITUTE

The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy. By BRYCE WOOD. New York, Columbia University Press, 1961.—viii, 438 pp. $7.50.

Bryce Wood has written a book which should be read and pondered by every official in Washington who deals with Latin American policy. A recurrent theme in his study is the pragmatic, day-to-day way in which the State Department habitually made foreign policy, reacting to events rather than analyzing and controlling them. Whatever lessons were painfully learned from experience at the policy making level seem to have been lost at each changeover of administration (pp. 61, 133, 347). For instance, the Kennedy Administration could have profited from a scrutiny of the startling analogies between the revolutionary overturns in Cuba in 1933 and 1959. By contrast with the latter inbroglio, President Roosevelt and his "simpatico" Ambassador, Josephus Daniels, successfully weathered the 1938 oil expropriation crisis with Mexico during a time of social revolution. One is tempted to speculate if the same treatment wouldn't have worked with Castro.

Wood specifically disavows that he has written a history of the Good Neighbor Policy. Instead it is an "essay about politics" focusing on the development of ideas about the policy. He accomplishes this by means of case studies on American policy toward Nicaragua, Cuba, Bolivia, Mexico and Venezuela. He emphasizes that the somewhat casually proclaimed new policy of Roosevelt had to be worked out in practice. Step by step, Secretary of State Hull and Assistant Secretary Welles retreated from the assertion of the property rights of American citizens in Latin America which previous administrations had doggedly defended at the cost of much ill will. By appropriate subheadings,

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Wood traces the would-be "Good Neighbor's" successive renunciations of the usual techniques by which a Great Power coerces lesser states: military force ("intervention"), threats of force ("ultimata"), non-recognition of revolutionary governments, diplomatic "interference" in domestic affairs, economic reprisals and boycotts, and even international arbitration of claims. Only the discriminatory denial of loans, technical aid and other forms of economic assistance were left to the United States, although Wood correctly points out that a Great Power by its very existence in the neighborhood is bound to influence the weak (p. 360).

Why this unparalleled self-abnegation by a Great Power? Wood makes it clear that the primary motive was a new conception of the national interest as different from and superior to the private interests of American business in Latin America whose protection had been heretofore the chief concern of the State Department. The anticipated reciprocity from Latin American governments did not eventuate in any concrete way. In fact, some states undoubtedly took advantage of our new forbearance to expropriate or bully American business interests which they wouldn't have dared touch before. But the Good Neighbor Policy earned the United States an intangible good will which predisposed most of Latin America to accept North American leadership in World War II (p. 313).

For the historian, the book is valuable for new material on and interpretations of our Latin American policy in the 1930's drawn from intensive research in the United States Archives. It is regrettable that nobody was able to persuade Sumner Welles before his death to settle several questions about his motives about which Wood can only speculate (pp. 68, 94, 96, 279).

For the political scientist, there is bound to be some disappointment that Wood did not attempt to generalize more about "Great Power–Lesser Power Relations" which he gives in the Preface and Introduction as the broader framework of his study. We are left wondering what light these historical episodes throw on "how far, among sovereign states that differ greatly in culture and in power, it may be possible to engender certain neighborly attitudes, often found among individuals" (p. 9). Does the amount of mutual trust and cooperation achieved by the United States surrender of military power in Latin America refute the Realist school of International Relations or was it possible only because of the rise of greater threats outside the hemisphere?

THEODORE P. WRIGHT, JR.

BATES COLLEGE

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Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1960. Edited by RICHARD P. STEBBINS. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1961.—xi, 583 pp. $6.95.

The United States in World Affairs, 1960. Edited by RICHARD P. STEBBINS. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1961.—xii, 436 pp. $6.00.

American Diplomacy in a New Era. Edited by STEPHEN D. KERTESZ. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1961. —viii, 601 pp. $10.00.

The first two of these books are the most recent issues in two series long known and respected by students of American foreign policy. For those unfamiliar with these collections, they supply valuable materials annually on the unfolding drama of American foreign relations.

As always, official expressions of American foreign policy predominate in the *Documents,* where relevant excerpts from presidential messages, statements by leading officials, diplomatic notes, communiqués, memoranda, and reports are reproduced. Reflecting tense East-West relations during 1960, the volume devotes more than half of its pages to various aspects of that continuing struggle. Africa's emerging role on the world scene is highlighted by the fact that more space is devoted to it than to problems within the Western Community. That hemispheric problems have intruded themselves sharply, sometimes painfully, into the American consciousness is underscored by the numerous documents dealing with that problem. By contrast, the relatively quiescent Middle East receives scant space. This most recent addition to a distinguished series is altogether helpful and meritorious—both for the documentary sources it conveniently provides and as a guide to those who may wish to read important materials in full.

Launched in 1931, the companion series, *The United States in World Affairs,* affords a secondary account of American foreign policy as objective, well-balanced, and interestingly written as is likely to be found anywhere. As expressed in the most recent issue, the aim is to "present a concise record and interpretation of the international activities of the United States" for the year covered. In this, the volume succeeds admirably and, it must be said, disturbingly. For there is little consolation to be found in the résumé of the nation's foreign policy activities during 1960. "Ten more years like 1960," the writers conclude, "would leave America and the free world in a critical if not hopeless

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position." The diverse and multitudinous crises confronting the nation are discussed by reference to such major topics as the East-West conflict, the Western Community, Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia, and the Inter-American system. The narrative is generally chronological. Interpretations and judgments (one wishes they were more frequent) are candid and incisive. On many issues, such as the foreign aid program, it is apparent that the sympathies of the authors are with the Executive branch. Yet this is in no sense merely an *apologia* for current policy. For example, the U-2 incident "unquestionably damaged the United States in the eyes of allied and neutral countries. . . ." Regarding events in Asia, the study affirms cogently that "In Japan, as in Taiwan and Korea, the government supported the United States but there was room for uncertainty as to just how far the nation supported the government." A current of understatement shows through the discussion of Inter-American relations. Concerning Washington's roseate interpretation of the San José Declaration as an indictment of Castro, the writers conclude that "the deeper problems of the Americas were not going to be resolved by political declarations." On balance, this volume joins its predecessors as a helpful survey, useful to both laymen and scholars.

American Diplomacy in a New Era is a symposium devoted to clarifying "the course of American diplomacy since 1945—its major objectives, and problems of formulating and implementing them." Twenty authors have contributed essays centered around two broad themes: the foreign policy of the United States toward important regions and global issues, and appraisals of the policy-making process and machinery. Treatments of the former theme are almost invariably organized chronologically. The factual material is set forth clearly and in abundant detail. The several chapters devoted to policy formulation and execution are more analytical and specialized. Predictably, there are treatments of how foreign policy is made, of the role of Congress, of the organization and re-organization of the State Department, and of the expanding influence of the military upon foreign relations. In addition, there are chapters on the role of specialists, and on the development of informational activities, in foreign relations.

If the obvious virtue of any symposium lies in bringing together diverse viewpoints and expertise in selected fields, its chief drawbacks normally are found in the wide qualitative range of the contributions and in the varying extent to which the authors understand the purpose of the volume and adapt their essays to it. This collection does not escape such limitations. The essays vary in quality from mediocre—in which the treatment seldom rises above the level of a mere factual summary, to excellent—in

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which the evaluation combines a résumé of the factual record with penetrating insight into events. In approach and tone, an assorted menu is offered. Hans J. Morgenthau's appraisal of containment reflects what we have now come to expect of his writings: original and penetrating analysis, reflecting a sound grasp of historical materials (particularly those supporting his thesis), and often exceedingly dogmatic. Quite different is Lindsay Rogers' whimsical and anecdotal examination of "Who Determines Our Foreign Policy?" Complete with quotations from the *Rubaiyat* and Shakespeare, it is entertaining, if not equally illuminating. Philip E. Mosely's brief concluding chapter on "American Policy: Dangers and Prospects" is confined chiefly to an assessment of "deterrence" and the decline of "bipolarity." Ironically, it is perhaps the one foreign contributor, the French scholar J. B. Duroselle, who best senses what is lacking in existing studies of the recent diplomatic record. His provocative weighing of the strengths and weaknesses of postwar American foreign policy should stimulate reflection by students of world affairs and officials alike. One might wish that the other contributors had exhibited his capacity to combine a presentation of the facts with a search for the meaning of America's response to unfolding global events. Had they done so, the challenges still confronting the nation "in a new era" would have been more clearly delineated.

CECIL V. CRABB, JR.

VASSAR COLLEGE

America in Britain's Place: The Leadership of the West and Anglo-American Unity. By LIONEL GELBER. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961.—x, 356 pp. $5.00.

This book, by an able political scientist who has recently become Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Canada, is a tough-minded investigation of the conditions surrounding contemporary Anglo-American cooperation. Beginning with a description of the shift from Britain to the United States in the primacy of the West, it proceeds to an analysis of policy-making in both countries and takes up among other subjects the special contribution of the Commonwealth to Western defense and the major crises which tested the unity of the English-speaking allies.

Emphasizing the enormous responsibility which has fallen to the United States, Gelber questions whether the American political system is geared for coalition leadership. Compared to the British parliamentary system, he argues, the American constitutional pattern makes for executive-legislative division which

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jeopardizes effective action and often makes it impossible for friend and foe alike to know who speaks for America. Rooted in the parliamentary tradition, he appears to overstate the polarities of Presidential-Congressional relations, perhaps neglecting unduly the very intangibles in the case of traditional American political behavior which he so rightly sees to be at the heart of the evolving Commonwealth. Many of his strictures are valid, from his criticism of what he terms institutional wastage of accumulated experience to his regret that nowhere in the American system is there the equivalent of the permanent Under-Secretary who represents continuity in the transition from one administration to another. Yet the analysis tends to stress elements of inflexibility and irresponsibility without sufficiently weighing the day-to-day techniques by which over the years they have been mitigated and overcome.

Moving on from this study of American institutions, Gelber makes a persuasive case for the importance of Britain's connection with the widespread Commonwealth to the Anglo-American partnership. He describes the transformation of the first—British—Commonwealth into a second in which Asian and African states assumed parity with the older members of the group. Taking up each member in turn, he attempts to assess its position and the unique character of its relations with the Anglo-American combination. He is frank to recognize the problems posed by such issues as South African racism or Afro-Asian neutralism, but emphasizes that Britain's close connection with the Commonwealth complex is equally vital to the interests of the United States. Rejecting projects which would draw Britain closer to the continent, he concludes that as the central pivot of the Commonwealth she can play a much greater part in bolstering the West than as an outer province of a federalized Europe.

In some ways the most interesting chapter is that entitled "The Great Divergence." Relying heavily on Anthony Eden's memoirs, Gelber makes a much more tenable case for the Anglo-French attack on Suez in 1956 than Sir Anthony managed to do on his own behalf. Scathing in his denunciation of American policy, he is convincing in his contention that Washington's intervention served Western—and American—interests badly. He sees the 1958 action of America in Lebanon as a recognition of error in the Suez case and as a successful, thought somewhat belated, defense of Western interests in the Middle East. At times he minimizes the force of various indigenous nationalisms in the area and overemphasizes the extent of Soviet penetration, but on the whole his blunt commentary is a refreshing antidote to the orthodox vacuities—of "anticolonialism" and the like—which

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have so clouded American thinking on the Suez issue.

Gelber is refreshing also on Germany's role in the Western alliance. His thesis is that both Britain and the United States have a stake in the preservation of the German status quo. Reunification, although it may constantly be talked about, is not in the cards. Given the servile status of the East German regime, its union with Bonn could come about only on Russian terms. Warning against too great an emphasis on a single Germany, he argues that if the time comes when West Germans want unification more than other things, the defense of the West will suffer. Thus the existing equilibrium is the one viable alternative. His comments on German incertitude, as on French instability, serve finally to support Gelber's demonstration of the advantages of the Anglo-American connection. For while most of his book is an analysis of its nature and its problems, in the final reckoning it is an urgent plea for the closest possible unity if the West is to be defended successfully. Didactic though it is, Gelber's study is a carefully argued and valuable contribution to our evaluation of the contemporary world scene.

HENRY R. WINKLER

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

The United Nations: Constitutional Developments, Growth and Possibilities. By BENJAMIN V. COHEN. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961.—106 pp. $2.50.

This is a small book in number of pages, but large in understanding and wisdom. In April 1961, the author gave the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School. This book contains the lectures as given, with footnotes and possibly some editing (the author does not say).

Benjamin Cohen is exceptionally well qualified by experience to discuss the subject that he chose for these lectures, having served successively over a period of ten years as Counsellor to the State Department, United States representative at General Assembly meetings, and member of the United Nations' Disarmament Commission. He has maintained an active and constructive interest in the work of the Organization. In addition, as a lawyer in the Holmesian tradition, he sees the necessity of relating law to politics and views the Charter not as a limiting document but rather as a framework of generally accepted purposes and principles within which the Organization must develop to meet changing needs and conditions.

His basic approach to the Charter is clearly and concisely expressed at the very beginning. "The Charter of the United Na-

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tions is a treaty, but not an ordinary treaty" (p. 2). It "looks forward, if it does not establish, a world wide community of nations, dedicated to the purposes and principles of the Charter" (p. 3). To the suggestion that the Charter was in a sense obsolete before it was adopted, since the framers did not know of atomic energy and nuclear power, Mr. Cohen counters that, like the Constitution, it was made flexible enough to be adapted to exigencies, which in Justice Holmes words, "could not have been completely foreseen by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or hope that they had created an organism."

Proceeding from the assumption that the Charter is a constitution and not an ordinary treaty, the author holds that the liberal principle of interpretation should be followed. The Charter, he argues, "sets forth a few basic principles and leaves to those who will live under it the responsibility of finding suitable means of carrying out those principles" (p. 6). He denies what would appear to be the contention implicit in various Soviet positions, notably on the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, that means specified in the Charter are necessarily exclusive. He quotes with approval, as applicable to Charter interpretation, the well-known words of Chief Justice Marshall in *McCulloch* v. *Maryland*.

As illustrative of his contention that the liberal principle has in fact been followed, he cites the practice of the Security Council with regard to abstentions, the narrowing in practice of the "double veto," the development of the General Assembly's power under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, and the restrictive interpretation of the limitation of Article 2, paragraph 7 (domestic jurisdiction). The author's interpretation of the domestic jurisdiction principle is worth quoting as it not only explains United Nations practice, but also reflects very vividly his view of the Charter and his approach to questions of Charter interpretation.

> I would not ascribe a meaning to paragraph 7 of Article 2 that would substantially derogate from the authority of the United Nations to carry out the essential purposes and principles of the Charter, and would in practice render largely nugatory and illusory many other provisions of the Charter such as those on human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is my view that paragraph 7 of Article 2 was not intended to take away powers granted to the United Nations by the Charter, but to provide a guide for their construction (p. 21).

Mr. Cohen fully recognizes that the United Nations is an association of states and not a government. Consequently, "how the United Nations develops and grows depends not so much on the words of the Charter as on the way Member States exercise their rights and privileges and meet their responsibilities under

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the Charter" (p. 32). He emphasizes the need of caution and restraint on the part of members when the Organization is dealing with a situation where it does not have the power "to compel corrective action." Nevertheless, he does not believe that the political organs should forego exercising their limited powers of peaceful settlement and adjustment simply because they are faced with recalcitrant attitudes. In fact, he takes the view, which some would regard as extreme, that when a state refuses to consider any procedure for the settlement of a dispute which another seriously contends affects its vital interests, the organs of the United Nations should not hesitate to regard such a situation as a threat to the peace without requiring the aggrieved state to resort to a show of force.

This brings the author to the question of the limits placed by the Charter upon the use of force by members. He does not accept the view of Julius Stone that the Charter permits a member to use force to remedy an injustice. After reviewing the unfortunate experience of the British and French in 1956 when they undertook the use of force unilaterally to uphold their rights, he wonders whether our policy with respect to the defense of Taiwan does not risk involving us in a similar plight. To avoid being placed in the position of appearing to intervene in a civil war, he proposes that we should do what we can to establish Taiwan as an independent state entitled under the Charter to protection from external attack from the mainland.

In his concluding chapter, the author looks to the future. Mr. Cohen's view of future prospects is not likely to arouse great enthusiasm on the part of those looking for clear-cut answers to our present problems. He is too sophisticated a person and too understanding to believe that there is any clear and easy path to follow or that virtue is only on one side. "Our task," as he sees it, "is to find the means to make effective the fundamental law of the Charter" (p. 70). Faced with the likely results of nuclear war, we must "strengthen the consensus among all nations, and among the Great Powers in particular, that force must not be used as an arbiter of international differences" (p. 72). To this end, we must "rely more upon an appeal to reason and common interest and less upon the power to vote" (p. 73). He wants "serious and meaningful communication between the Great Powers," preferably within the framework of the United Nations, with a view to stopping the arms race, discovering and maintaining the essential rules and conditions of peaceful coexistence, and keeping disputes in which the Great Powers are in profound conflict within manageable limits. The author's concluding thought is that in spite of the differences that separate them, both the United States and the Soviet Union are faced with the challenge

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of finding the economic and political organization best suited to bring to mankind the benefits of modern science and technology, and both should recognize a common interest in using the United Nations to that end.

We hear much about the inadequacies of the United Nations and the need to make it more effective. For any one who is seriously interested in the strengthening of the Organization, this little book should be required reading. It combines idealism with a healthy regard for the facts in a manner typical of its author.

LELAND M. GOODRICH

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Making of the President, 1960. By THEODORE H. WHITE. New York, Atheneum Publishers, 1961.—viii, 400 pp. $6.95.

Theodore H. White applies his skills as a political reporter, informed by the sensitivity of a novelist, to tell "part of the story of how the Americans chose their President in 1960" (p. vii). What emerges is more than an account, excellent in itself, of the activities of the principal campaigners from late 1959 through the 1960 election. The feel and flavor of that campaign is wondrously recreated in episodes and vignettes that stimulate the senses. And White offers a running commentary, judicious in its use of "insider" information, on men and events, strategies and institutions, and on contemporary and enduring strands of American politics. The result is a vivid and instructive chronicle of presidential politics, one addressed to the general reader but of use to the political scientist and historian as well.

The first half of the study, discussing mostly the maneuverings of Democratic candidates for the nomination, skillfully relates the needs of the aspirants to the requirements of the nominating process. White demonstrates that the nominating strategies adopted by all of the Democratic hopefuls derived more from necessity than choice. The utility of the primaries to Kennedy is sharply underscored: they provided him with the only opportunities to demonstrate that his religion was no bar to electoral success in states markedly different in religious composition from his native Massachusetts. Some second thoughts might be in order for those persuaded that presidential primaries are only "hogwash" or "candidate-destroying."

The latter half of the book, treating post-convention events through the election itself, is somewhat marred by White's obvious antipathy to Nixon and his attraction to Kennedy. In White's judgment, Nixon was inept in his handling of press re-

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lations, his own lieutenants, the national party apparatus, and of the involvement of President Eisenhower in the campaign on his behalf. Instead of adopting an aggressive posture, one wedding a "minimum sense of future" to the solid Eisenhower base of peace and prosperity, Nixon "locked himself on issues thrust at him by his rival, defending and retaliating when he should have been leading" (p. 357). At bottom, concludes White, Nixon committed his many and serious errors because "there was no whole philosophy of politics to instruct him" (p. 315).

White's pro-Kennedy bias leads him to strained judgments at variance with some of his other observations. Kennedy's victory was due, "above all," urges White, to his communicating "a sense of purpose, in a year of malaise; a sense of confidence, in a future that darkened" (p. 359). But White earlier notes that "rarely in American history has there been a political campaign that discussed issues less or clarified them less" (p. 291). And throughout his study the emphasis is on strategy and tactics, on the manipulation of appearances—"in 1960 television had won the nation away from sound to images, and that was that" (p. 290). White's own words permit a somewhat different verdict on Kennedy's campaign performance:

> Kennedy spoke to a peaceful and prosperous people in the year 1960, a people for whom the crises of swelling problems lay still unclear years ahead. He insisted that they must move to meet those obscure crises—which he did not define—and urged them to give into his untested hands the greatest of all crises, war and peace, without ever telling them how he meant to meet it (p. 359).

Kennedy's campaign strategy—carrying the industrial Northeast in combination with the Old South—was validated by election victory, but such a strategy better suggests political realism of the old school than new perspectives on political problems by a new generation of political leaders. Nor, in the light of the geographic distribution of his slim majority strength, can the importance to the outcome of minority-group backing of Kennedy be downgraded by stressing, as White does, that more than half of Kennedy's vote came from Protestants. Of such minority groups (often called "tribal communities" by White), White asks pointedly: "How many Americans are so tied to their past that they cannot be summoned to face the American future?" (p. 227). Finally, the admittedly conservative complexion of the Congress returned with Kennedy does little to support White's interpretation of the appeal of Kennedy and of the meaning of his victory.

White's biases, doubtless congenial to many others in addition

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to this reviewer, are important enough not to be overlooked but they constitute no fatal flaw in the handling of his materials. This is one study of politics that clearly deserves the mass sales it has enjoyed.

ALLAN P. SINDLER

DUKE UNIVERSITY

Rebel in Paradise: A Biography of Emma Goldman. By RICHARD DRINNON. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1961.—xv, 349 pp. $5.95.

In the late nineteenth century and the first half of the present century, no woman in America was subjected to more bitter attacks on the part of the nation's press than was the leading American anarchist, Emma Goldman. In city after city, accused by the local newspapers of stirring up violence on the labor front, of undermining respect for the government, the family and the church, and even of involvement in the assassination of President McKinley, she was denied the use of public halls and, in many instances, run out of town by organized groups of citizens and the officers of the law.

In the belief that Miss Goldman's teachings and activities had been greatly misunderstood; that she was a woman of unusual powers; and that she had contributed importantly to the social thinking and action of her times, Richard Drinnon, formerly Associate Professor of History of the University of California, undertook several years ago to find out the truth about her life and works. He investigated every known source of information he could find about her here and abroad, and documented this information in the present authoritative, enlightening and immensely readable volume, *Rebel in Paradise.*

The book describes Miss Goldman's turbulent childhood days in Russia; her migration to America in the hope of finding an earthly "Paradise"; her early struggles to earn a living; her introduction into the anarchist movement; her close associations with American anarchists and progressives; her free speech fights; her pioneering activities in the fields of social reform, feminism and the modern drama; her arrest and imprisonment for opposing World War I; her exile to Russia; her denunciation of the Communist dictatorship; her concepts of anarchism as a means and as an end; and, her final last days as an exile in Canada in early 1940, still active in the struggle for civil rights.

The picture given of Miss Goldman by the author is, on the whole, a sympathetic one. In his Preface, he writes regarding his attitude toward her, "I may as well record here at the outset,

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I like and trust her." While critical of many of her activities and personal idiosyncrasies, he regards her as a woman of charm, ability, integrity and courage. Having, as he writes, "a basic sympathy for the radical type of politics," he is in essential agreement with her indictments of the governmental restrictions and social injustices of her times. He is critical with her of the "naive faith of liberals and Socialists in the omnicompetent state and the sufficiency of social reforms," while at the same time seeming to see little that is naive in the anarchist conception of the functions of modern government and of the utter impracticability of the stateless society as envisaged by Miss Goldman and her fellow anarchists. In his endeavor to defend the social philosophy of Miss Goldman, he often underrates the accomplishments of other reform movements of the day and misinterprets their activities and ideals.

Despite these defects, the author is to be congratulated on the thoroughness of his research, the organization of his material, and the light his biography throws on the "Rebel in Utopia," on the anarchist movement and on many social struggles of the past. The biography will long remain the most important source of information on this important, controversial figure in the American libertarian movement.

HARRY W. LAIDLER

LEAGUE FOR INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY
NEW YORK CITY

Pressure Group: The Campaign for Commercial Television in England. By H. H. WILSON. New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1961.—232 pp. $4.00.

Professor Wilson tempts us with a most piquant subject: the breaking of the monopoly of the British Broadcasting Company by a Conservative government that one would have expected to side with the voice of the "Establishment," not against it. His thesis is that the Television Act of 1954, which created the Independent Television Authority, was a compromise forced upon a reluctant government by strong pressure from its own backbenchers.

During years of controversy about continuation of its monopoly, the odds consistently appeared to be with the B.B.C. Its Charter had expired in 1946. It was then temporarily renewed by the Labour government, pending the report of a Committee of Inquiry headed by Lord Beveridge. After a painstaking inquiry, the Beveridge Committee had reported in January, 1951, in favor of continued B.B.C. monopoly; but the Labour govern-

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ment lost office in October, 1951, without acting to renew the Charter. In May, 1952, the new Conservative government, headed by Sir Winston Churchill, produced a White Paper in which the Cabinet accepted most of the Beveridge report and supported continued B.B.C. monopoly in radio. However, it had been induced to add a few vague words in favor of some element of competition in television at a future time. Then in November, 1953, these words mushroomed into a second White Paper, the *Memorandum on Television Policy,* which endorsed commercial television under certain restrictions and led directly to the creation of I.T.A.

The tide turned against the B.B.C. despite firm support for its position within the Churchill Cabinet and the efforts of a National Television Council that enlisted some of Britain's most prestigious names on its behalf. Professor Wilson tries to tell us how this was accomplished. He admits frankly that he cannot explain why the Labour government did not renew the B.B.C. Charter, with the monopoly intact, between January and October, 1951 (p. 206). But for the course of subsequent events he credits a small group of men: a handful of Members of Parliament, spearheaded by John D. Profumo, Charles Orr-Ewing and John Rodgers; a triumvirate of men of influence in the world of advertising and electronics, Norman Collins, Sir Robert Renwick and C. O. Stanley; and the chairman of the Conservative Party organization and Lord President of the Council, Lord Woolton. The M.P.'s, all but one of them directly connected with broadcasting and/or advertising interests, constituted a Broadcasting Group that brought steady pressure to bear on both the Cabinet and the 1922 Committee. They were supported by Lord Woolton, who was in charge of formulating the government's broadcasting policy and who emerges—alas, not too clearly—as the *eminence grise* of the whole operation. At his behest, they and their allies outside Parliament set up the Popular Television Association, which flooded Britain late in 1953 with propaganda against the B.B.C. monopoly and created a climate of acceptance for commercial television.

The unfolding story of scheme and maneuver is one of dazzling complexity. More then is the pity that Professor Wilson has managed only to suggest its outlines. Throughout his narrative, nothing comes clearly into focus. As an alien and a nonparticipant in the actual events, Dr. Wilson had to rely on published materials buttressed by interviews. Crucial details have eluded him. To give him credit, one has the feeling throughout that his political intuition is acute, and that he has got the right hang of things. But how one longs for the real facts! What really motivated Lord Woolton? How much money did the Popular

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Television Association spend, and where did its funds come from? What was the reputation of the Broadcasting Group inside the Conservative party in Parliament, and on what did this reputation rest? These and a myriad other questions are unanswered. Worse, all too often the attempt is made to disguise the absence of factual evidence by the use of quotations from contemporary journalism that prove nothing and are sometimes scarcely relevant. In summary, Professor Wilson has failed to master the intricacies of the campaign under analysis. However, even his failure illuminates the heart of the British political process, and it whets the appetite for the full story of this successful political coup—an inside story that may never be told.

STEVEN MULLER

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising. By PAUL KECSKEMETI. For the RAND Corporation. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1961.—vi, 178 pp. $4.75.

As Dr. Kecskemeti points out in the preface to this concise but very illuminating study, he is concerned "with the genesis of a revolutionary situation in Hungary [in 1956] rather than with the revolutionary events themselves." The dramatic and tragic October days have been narrated in other works, and the author has largely limited himself to exploring a political crisis that took several years to mature before it exploded. Dr. Kecskemeti is singularly well-equipped for the task. A Senior Research Associate of the Rand Corporation, a man with unusual talents for political analysis (as demonstrated in his earlier work on *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat*), he is fluent in Hungarian and had the occasion to interview numerous Hungarian refugees following the suppression of the revolution.

Put most briefly, his general thesis is that "there were two separate processes contributing to political instability before the revolution, one confined to strata within, or close to, the center of the Communist power apparatus itself, the other spreading throughout the broad anonymous masses."

In advancing this thesis, Dr. Kecskemeti is in company with those students of other revolutions who have found a crisis or split within the ruling order to be a principal symptom of a "revolutionary situation." Incidentally, this reviewer would entirely agree with the author's choice of the term "revolution" rather than "revolt" to describe the uprising. As he observes, "the Communist regime would have been eliminated for good if it had not been for Soviet military intervention."

The "elite" process within the party, while having its back-

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ground in intra-party conflicts and purges in the years 1945–1952, really began to take shape in the period after Stalin's death: during the Ministry of Imre Nagy and the inauguration of the "New Course" in 1953. The rift right at the apex of the system, between Rakosi and Nagy, in turn fostered dissonances farther down the party ladder, especially among some of the Communist writers and intellectuals, whose integrity and consciences had been badly mauled in the preceding years. Criticism in these circumstances ultimately led to active insubordination, to Rakosi's second fall in 1956, and to the disastrous political wobbling that set in motion the "mass" process.

The mass of the people, alienated but cowed, now began, late in the day but massively, to enter the picture. In Dr. Kecskemeti's view, the student demonstration on October 23 provided "the point of juncture between the 'elite pattern' and the 'mass pattern.'" It may be suggested that the linkage between the two patterns was rather more extensive than Dr. Kecskemeti's analysis indicates.

After concluding his analysis of the Hungarian events, Dr. Kecskemeti turns to other post-Stalin upheavals in the satellites —the Plzen uprising, the East German revolt, and the power struggle in Poland—to see what light a comparison might cast on the general question of political stability under a Communist regime. On the whole, he is inclined to believe that only another succession crisis, combined with acute economic difficulties, is likely to be productive of open mass protests, and he doubts whether the satellite area in the future is likely to be the main center of political disturbance in the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, throughout the bloc "moral conflicts causing rifts within the political elites" are seen as a continuing and important threat.

HENRY L. ROBERTS

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Strategy and Arms Control. By THOMAS C. SCHELLING and MORTON H. HALPERIN. New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961.—148 pp., $2.50; paperback, $1.50.

"Arms control," according to Messrs. Schelling and Halperin of Harvard's Center of International Affairs, consists of all "forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it." The objective of their study is not, however, to present any concrete arms control proposal but to analyze the very wide variety of problems that might arise in negotiating an effective agreement.

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The potential benefits of arms control, as the authors see it, are many. Measures are discussed that can be taken in collaboration, either explicitly or implicitly, with our opponents: to reduce the incentive for pre-emptive or premeditated nuclear attacks; to forestall decisions that might lead to nuclear war as a result of accident, false alarm, or "mischief" by a third power; to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons; and to reduce "collateral damage" in case of actual attack. It should be noted that the authors stoutly reject the idea that total disarmament would necessarily maximize stability in international relations and argue very convincingly that although the likelihood of nuclear war can be decreased by substantial reductions in the current size of military forces, further reduction beyond a certain point might increase that risk once again. The authors also argue surprisingly that an effective arms control agreement might well lead to an *increase* in total military expenditures because of the high costs of rendering nuclear weapons less liable to destruction by surprise attack, of maintaining warning and inspection facilities, and of expanding conventional forces for fighting limited wars (that the reduced probability of nuclear war might render more likely than at present).

A major part of this study is devoted to the problems of making an arms control agreement work. The authors point out that effective agreements need not necessarily be embodied in formally negotiated treaties but may tacitly take the form of mutual self-restraint from actions whose advantage would be canceled if both sides engaged in them. The authors also argue that the whole problem of inspection has been overemphasized, stressing that absolute guarantees are impossible and that the practical criterion should be to devise safeguards adequate enough to prevent "enormous irreversible gains" from occasional undetected violations. They emphasize that the basic sanction against violation must be the mutual interest in keeping the agreement in operation.

The authors do not discuss the possibilities of reaching an effective agreement with the Soviet Union but do indicate their belief that at least some forms of arms control are possible without prior settlement of major outstanding political issues. They also remind us that even a far-reaching arms control agreement would not constitute a once-and-for-all solution to all problems of war and peace and that, given the probability that conflict of interests as a social phenomenon will not suddenly disappear, "something like eternal vigilance and determination would be required to keep peace in the world at any stage of disarmament, even total disarmament."

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It is somewhat frustrating to a reviewer to have to admit that there is absolutely nothing in a book under review with which he could take issue, but such is the case here. This is a first-rate analysis, essential to any understanding of the problem of arms control. It is highly likely that our own arms control negotiators have already read the study; one hopes their partners in negotiation have also done so.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

BARNARD COLLEGE

Appeasement: A Study in Political Decline 1933–1939. By A. L. ROWSE. New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1961.—123 pp. $3.00.

In his preface Mr. Rowse states: "I am not writing history." With this one can agree. He adds: "I am offering evidence to the historians." Of this one must be skeptical.

The book, in part, relates a few conversations, some recorded at the time in his diary, some merely recollected as he wrote. The bulk of the book consists of quotations from published works and of the opinions of the author. The quotations come mostly from T. Jones, *A Diary with Letters; The History of The Times,* Part II; L. S. Amery, *My Political Life,* III; and J. E. Wrench, *Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times.* The opinions, with most of which I do and did in the thirties agree, are repeated, to put it mildly, several times and are occasionally unconvincing: "France that *we* had broken" (p. 84). None of this, of course, is new "evidence." It might be noted that the opinions are justified by quotations from Feiling, Halifax, and Simon but not checked by any from *Nine Troubled Years* by Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), perhaps the most intelligent—if not a completely satisfying—explanation of the policy of appeasement.

The author concludes his little book by explaining that appeasement was the policy of a small group of leaders—Baldwin, Chamberlin, Dawson, Halifax, Hoare, and Simon—and that they adopted this policy because they were "middle class" (p. 117) and members of "a class in decadence" (p. 118). The divergent views of men such as Amery, Churchill, Cranborne, Eden, and Macmillan are explained by somewhat arbitrarily labeling them "aristocrats" (p. 117). This may do for Churchill (forgetting his mother's family) and Cranborne, but seems somewhat forced for the others. Non-middle-class appeasers are, for the purposes of his explanation ignored (to be just, George Lansbury is condemned but not explained), even though he admits that the Labour Party was "dedicated to the lunacy of collective security

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without rearming" (p. 52). He writes that he tried "in vain to open the eyes of my own people in Cornwall" (p. 41). One of his villains, one of many judgments with which I agree, is Thomas Jones. He emphasizes Jones's friendship with Baldwin but omits to mention that Jones did not come from the same class as Halifax or Chamberlain and remained all his life attached to the Labour Party. He twice (pp. 52 and 53) praises Dalton for having "by far the best record over the fundamental issue of Germany" of the Labour Party leaders but it was Dalton (Rowse does not report this) who, in the debate on the remilitarization of the Rhineland, said:

> It is only right to say bluntly and frankly that public opinion in this country would not support, and certainly the Labour party would not support, the taking of military sanctions or even economic sanctions against Germany at this time, in order to put German troops out of the German Rhineland. Public opinion would not support that. (Great Britain, *Parliamentary Debates, Commons*, 5th Series, 310, March 26, 1936, col. 1454).

Mr. Rowse's class theory explains neither the deviation of his "good men" nor the wide-spread acceptance and approval given to the policy of appeasement by people in general of all classes.

The policy was wrong—I completely agree—but it was a popular not a class policy. It seems important in the present world that this be realized. Easy explanations in terms of a few misguided men belonging to a decadent class are both wrong and dangerous. Why people—just people—in the face of overwhelming and obvious evidence of approaching danger still insist on a policy of appeasement is a serious question that deserves serious consideration. This the vigorously (and entertainingly) written diatribe of Mr. Rowse does not supply.

GEORGE WOODBRIDGE

BARNARD COLLEGE

Unconditional Surrender: The Impact of the Casablanca Policy Upon World War II. By ANNE ARMSTRONG. New Brunswick, N. J., Rutgers University Press, 1961.—xiv, 304 pp. $6.50.

Revisionism in the interpretation of the Nazi era got off to a slow start—perhaps because of the magnitude of the task—but such works as A. J. P. Taylor's recent study of Hitler as a statesman may signal that the dike has been breached and the flood about to descend. The stated objective of the author of this recent Columbia dissertation was to discover "the probable effects on Germany of the Casablanca demand for unconditional surrender" (p. xi). No doubt, a reassessment of Western policy to-

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ward Germany during the Second World War is warranted by the publication of new data and, possibly, too, because the passage of time may provide new perspectives—though time can just as well distort. The author is to be commended for attempting to make a contribution to such a reassessment, but in the opinion of this reviewer Miss Armstrong not only failed to achieve her stated purpose, but may have done future revisionists a disservice by the weakness of her arguments and supporting evidence.

Relying mostly on interviews with, and communications from, a number of former *Wehrmacht* officers and on largely highly tendentious secondary sources, Miss Armstrong has endeavored to make a case for the thesis that an Allied policy of "refusal to compromise, of rejecting a negotiated solution," lengthened the War (p. 253). This may be a valid argument, but far more than the evidence presented here is necessary to substantiate it. The author reduces complex war-time problems to a simple choice between a policy of vengeance and a "policy less sentimental, less categorical, and less emotional" (p. 262). If this reviewer read the study with an increasing sense of irritation, it was not so much because of the nature of the thesis, but because of the manner in which it was argued. It is, after all, a basic tenet of historical and social science research that factual data bearing upon a hypothesis must be examined carefully and objectively before any conclusions may be drawn. This study convéys the impression that Miss Anderson conceived her task as that of a lawyer pleading a case and presenting supporting evidence, rather than that of a political scientist or historian.

To plead that "an exhaustive study of even the available documents and interviews with all the still-living men who participated in the formulation of wartime policy for all belligerents would require the facilities of a research foundation" (p. x), is no excuse for failing to take account of some of the major issues and some of the major studies bearing upon her subject. Not only has a good deal of material concerning the formulation of wartime policy toward Germany become available, but the very problem of Germany's "unconditional surrender" has been examined by a number of scholars in recent years. Several of these studies are listed in the bibliography of this volume, but there is no indication that they were used in the analysis. Thus, Professor John L. Snell's argument that Roosevelt sought to postpone more definite commitments over Germany's future until the postwar era by adopting the unconditional surrender formula is entirely ignored. So is the fact that many of his advisors felt that a future German democracy should not be encumbered again by the legend that an undefeated army had been "stabbed in the back" and that the acceptance of complete defeat by the political and

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military leaders of Germany was an essential prerequisite for a new democratic state. Nowhere does the author consider the findings of studies such as those of Professors Janowitz and Shils and the United States Strategic Bombing Survey that the unconditional surrender formula had little or no effect on German morale. Instead, Miss Anderson simply claims that the effect on the general public cannot even be estimated and relies upon Nazi propaganda statements and *ex post facto* rationalizations of German ex-generals to argue that another policy might have resulted in "the saving of lives, the sparing of cities from complete devastation, the preservation of valuable human and cultural and economic resources important to all Europe and to the West, as well as to Germany" (p. 256).

From her statement that "it does not appear . . . that the German General Staff welcomed the outbreak of war [in 1914] with any fervor of enthusiasm, certainly not that they urged it" (p. 24), through her argument that a powerful voting bloc of Socialists and Pacifists in the Reichstag of the Weimar Republic prevented rearmament, to her insistence that "even before the war" the center of anti-Nazi resistance was the General Staff of the Wehrmacht (p. 27), Miss Armstrong blissfully ignores not only the findings of German studies, such as those of Professor Fischer of Hamburg University and his students, but of Professors Wheeler-Bennett and Gordon Craig. Her case rests on demonstrating that an alternative policy to that ostensibly followed by the Western Allies would have been practicable and possible. In the opinion of this reviewer, she failed to do so. The subtitle of the book promises an examination of the impact of the Casablanca policy upon the course of the entire war, but the study in fact treats the question of a German surrender in a curious vacuum, as if there was no war in the Pacific, as if there was no tremendous pressure upon the Western Allies for the establishment of a Second Front and an invasion of Germany, as if the Allied leaders were free to ignore the need for unity among heterogeneous partners. At the same time, the author presents no evidence that, had the plot to overthrow Hitler in 1944 succeeded and a totally new situation arisen in Germany, the Casablanca formula would have prevented negotiations. To place most of the blame for last ditch German resistance upon the demand for "Unconditional Surrender" is simply too pat an explanation.

The unconditional surrender demand may not have been as important to the outcome of the Second World War and its aftermath as Miss Armstrong implies, but now that this book has appeared, it is to be hoped that someone else will undertake the task which she has performed all too poorly. The policy may

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have been shortsighted, immoral, poor politics—this book adds nothing new to previous arguments that Roosevelt sabotaged the German resistance movement and prolonged the war by his Casablanca statement. Whether this was indeed the case, whether it was actually unalterable American policy, remains to be shown. Much as this reviewer dislikes using a much abused phrase, in this instance one must indeed say that the definitive volume remains to be written.

LEWIS J. EDINGER

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Principles of Economics. By ALFRED MARSHALL. Vol. I: Text; Vol. II: Notes. Ninth (Variorum) Edition with Annotations by C. W. Guillebaud. Published for the Royal Economic Society. New York and London, Macmillan Company, 1961. —xxxiv, 585 pp.;—ix, 886 pp. Each volume $8.00.

Economic facts are transitory phenomena. Although economic theories are considerably more durable, they tend at best to have a run of a generation or so before they are either replaced, or amended and refined out of recognition. In contemporary economics, the versions of Keynesian doctrine which now hold the field are considerably more complex than the original and, in a number of important regards, at variance with Keynes' assumptions and conclusions. Yet Keynes' *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* is a comparatively youthful twenty-six years old.

The first edition of Alfred Marshall's *Principles of Economics* appeared in 1890. Thus it is over seventy. But even the publication date underestimates the actual age of Marshall's ideas. In 1890 Marshall himself was nearly fifty. As Keynes described the production of the *Principles,* its author devoted the nine years between 1881 and 1890 to the actual writing of his treatise and he had preceded the writing by almost a decade of lectures to Cambridge undergraduates on the same set of themes. Thus it does not claim too much for the *Principles* to say that in conception the book goes back nearly a century and belongs to the great marginalist decade of Jevons, Menger, and Walras.

The somewhat awe-inspiring aspect of this elderly book is that even in 1962 it is considerably more than a venerable landmark in the history of economic doctrine. It is perfectly possible to use it without apology as a text in the teaching of a large portion of the theory of markets. The analytical machine which Marshall constructed still grinds out useful conclusions when contemporary data are fed into it. Indeed, Marshall's conceptions of time and market equilibrium have so thoroughly permeated the

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structure of contemporary Anglo-Saxon theory that most textbook presentations of price theory contain numerous echoes of Marshall.

During Marshall's own lifetime—he was one of that powerful breed of English hypochondriacs who survived into their eighties—eight editions of the *Principles,* the last of them dated 1920, were issued. In 1934, ten years after Marshall's death, Keynes suggested to C. W. Guillebaud, Marshall's nephew and himself an economist of note, that he prepare a variorum edition of the *Principles.* As in other aspects of Marshall's career, no unseemly haste was exercised, and it was not until late last year that Guillebaud's edition finally appeared.

What can be said of it? It is a magnificent production which was well worth waiting for. To note initially an important detail, Macmillan has entirely reset the eighth edition in a larger type face. The publisher has nevertheless preserved the pagination of the eighth edition, so that students and scholars who are accustomed to it can shift with no inconvenience to the ninth edition. The notes, four fifths of them Marshall's own words, trace every significant change in wording or organization which Marshall made from the first to the eighth edition. Mr. Guillebaud's notations are easy to follow and the usefulness of both volumes has been enhanced by the inclusion of a much improved index.

What this edition demonstrates anew is how little Marshall changed his mind between 1890 and 1920. The 1907 edition, the fifth, is the last which contains more than merely verbal alteration. Even the second and the third editions, 1891 and 1895, betray little sign of important analytical reconsideration although the second edition does include a good deal of "rearrangement and rewriting." Thus, Mr. Guillebaud's faithful edition confirms with precision and detail the opinion of most students of Marshall that the master's revelation was complete in 1890.

Why should so original an analyst have given up original theorizing at the height of his powers? In answering this question, his editor offers a speculation: ". . . the most plausible answer I can find is that as he grew older his mind became increasingly absorbed with the more realistic side of economics . . . and with its ethical aspects; and that he was no longer interested in extending his ideas on the abstract and analytical side." Still, it is good to have at last the best portion of Marshall's analysis in this magnificent, scholarly shape.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

BARNARD COLLEGE

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The Steel Industry 1939–1959: A Study in Competition and Planning. By DUNCAN BURN. New York and Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1961.—xii, 728 pp. $14.50.

This book was first planned as a revision of the author's *The Economic History of Steelmaking, 1867–1939* published in 1940. The new venture, however, acquired a book-life of its own with results both good and bad. On the debit side, it lacks the unity of design of the earlier work which was a straightforward, definitive economic history of the British steel industry. In this book, the net is cast wider. Long chapters are devoted to the European Coal and Steel Community and the antitrust difficulties of American steel firms; and far too much space is given over to the administrative minutiae generated by the leisurely nationalization and denationalization of steel in the early 1950's. (Burn finds that the brief experiment in public ownership left no significant mark on the industry.) On the credit side, this book has the considerable virtues of erudition, enthusiasm, and undoubted competence. Possibly if the author knew less—or cared less—about steelmaking, he would have made more concessions to mere readers. (The number of industry officials mentioned in passing is staggering.) One can imagine a more satisfactory treatment of the subject—but not one that inspires or deserves more confidence.

Burn approaches the steel industry with the critical, and often exasperated, affection that the professional economist usually brings to an industry study. The warts are plainly seen. In appraising technological developments since 1939, his judgment is severe:

> The plain truth is that the relative lack of contribution to technical advance was not a new thing. The basic inventions which Britain contributed to steelmaking came from outside the iron and steel industry: already in the eighteen-sixties innovations came fast from the Continent and America and resistances to change, often based on scientific arguments and cost assessments which proved wrong, were legion (p. 684).

Again, the industry's well-known aversion to the more extreme manifestations of competition (notably price cutting) is repeatedly emphasized and, by implication, rebuked. Not that Burn has any good opinion of socialist proposals to shake up the industry through nationalization or strict investment controls. The "philosophers" of the Labour Party do not know enough about steel and its problems to command his respect; and when in power, the practical men of the Left seem rapidly to absorb the steelmen's preference for a cozy, tidy industry in which every established interest is decently accommodated. The judgment

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of Burn on the central planning briefly attempted after World War II is really his verdict on British steelmakers, past and present. "The obstacles to more radical change in the last analysis were emotional and temperamental, not a careful judgement of gains and losses" (p. 290).

In matters of steel, the author is clearly a Yankophile. The aggressive non-price competition and chiseling on announced prices of our firms seem to him distinctly preferable to the main alternatives—cartels, government monopoly, or the multitude of small units of the trust buster's dream. Burn conveys that, in his opinion, American steel firms have deserved better from federal policy than continual harassment by antitrust agencies and Congressional investigations. Where many domestic observers see only collusion, Burn sees undoubted competition.

While the author's prescriptions for the British steel industry are not explicitly spelled out, they would seem to include more attention to the systematic training of technologists and managers and a stronger response to acquisitive instincts. As noted above, he believes that American authorities have underestimated the achievements of their countrymen in steel. I would respectfully suggest that Burn suffers from the same myopia in his appraising of the British steel industry. Before 1930, it fought all comers in foreign and domestic markets without benefit of tariff protection or export bounties. In the last thirty years, it has honorably contended with a world-wide depression, World War II, nationalization, denationalization, and the emerging European Common Market. No doubt the industry would have been better served had its managers been better trained and more enterprising. Still, one ought not to sell the old firm short. The fruits of experience—an intimate knowledge of specialty markets, a healthy respect for the dangers of the export trade, and the ability to live with the business cycle—count for something. The many small steelmakers in Britain whose demise is regularly predicted and urged include some weak sisters who have been kept alive by government aid and the forebearance of more efficient rivals. But in view of the extent of concentration in other British industries (for example, chemicals and tobacco) it would be difficult to establish that a preference for small units and conservative management is a peculiarly British trait. Perhaps the industry apologists really are right. It has a structure well adapted to its problems. And since these problems are not those of the American and German steel industries, one ought not to expect it to resemble them in all important respects.

DONALD DEWEY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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The Kenyatta Election: Kenya 1960–1961. By GEORGE BENNETT and CARL G. ROSBERG. London, New York, Nairobi, Oxford University Press, 1961.—vi, 230 pp. $4.80.

The election of 1961 was another milestone in the constitutional advance of Kenya toward independence which has been in progress by gradual and often bitterly fought stages since 1955. The critical importance of this election lay, of course, in the fact that for the first time an African majority took control when the new government was announced on April 27. But of almost equal significance was the struggle between the two contending African parties and the light which this struggle threw on the internal political problems of Kenya which must be solved before independence.

The authors of this study of the Kenya election of 1961 made a detailed personal study of the campaign in all but one of the constituencies. The result is the clearest picture yet to emerge of the complexity of Kenyan African politics. Out of the discussion of the race in the African constituencies emerges not only a picture of the major African personalities in both parties, but of the basis upon which the candidates appealed to the African voters.

In the analysis of the voting it becomes clear that, as the authors comment, "the individual interests and loyalties of the vast majority of Africans have . . . remained with the tribe." Twenty-four distinct tribal groupings were represented among the eighty-eight candidates contesting the open seats but fifty-two came from four major tribes. In the rural constituencies, and even in the majority of urban constituencies, voting rested very largely on tribal allegiance. The two major parties, the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union, were divided not by issue but by tribe.

The result, viewed from the standpoint of the future political stability of an African-controlled government in Kenya, was disappointing. No party received a clear majority and the new government, when it was eventually formed, represented a minority of the voters. Over the whole election—from the beginning of the campaign—was cast the long shadow of Jomo Kenyatta. The candidates in both African parties campaigned on the issue of Kenyatta's release, but because the British administration refused to bow before the overwhelming demand of the electorate, the immediate post-election period became one of uncertainty and hesitation because the largest of the African parties, the KANU, refused to take part in the government. Kenyatta's release some months later failed to solve the political crisis deriving from the election and the new constitutional talks opened in February, 1962, against a background of deep division in the

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views of the two major parties regarding the future structure of Kenyan internal administration.

While the authors of the present study devote greater attention to the African parties, their description of the electoral campaign is well-balanced by an account of the political activity of the European and Indian groups. It becomes increasingly evident in the course of the chapter on European representation that the European minority in Kenya can no longer claim any real political power. In the face of organized African nationalism, multi-racialism forms no realistic basis for any continuing political role for the European. As the authors comment, "In this new political environment, the fragile and limited politics of the Blundell multi-racial group . . . simply disintegrated. By the time of the election it was no more than a European faction commanding only the barest support in that community."

The *Kenyatta Election* is the best study of a single African election to be done thus far, and it is to be hoped that it may serve as a model for future studies of this kind. The authors back up their own observations with statistical analysis and with the use, in moderation, of opinion polls. They have successfully presented a thoroughly objective account of the electoral machinery, the parties and the individuals involved in the election, but at the same time, they have not hesitated to criticize when they have felt criticism was due. This is, to some degree, a book for the specialist since it assumes at least a modicum of knowledge of Kenya politics, but a student of African political development anywhere on the continent will find it valuable.

L. GRAY COWAN

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism. By DAVID E. APTER. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—xvi, 498 pp. $10.00.

Tanganyika and International Trusteeship. By B. T. G. CHIDZERO. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1961.—xii, 286 pp. $6.10; 38 sh.

The kingdom of Buganda appears to be an anachronism, a quaint heritage of the Africa which existed before the arrival of European colonials, and its survival into modern times represents one of the most interesting political developments in modern Africa. Its resilient politicians have stood fast against the high tide of nationalism, and now, on the eve of the independence of the more inclusive territory of Uganda, the position of the Buganda kingdom is entrenched in the constitution and the legislative body (the Lukiko) can determine how Baganda representa-

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tives to the national Parliament will be selected.

In Professor Apter's most recent study, the description of the extraordinary qualities of survival shown by the Baganda people in a succession of political crises during the twentieth century is no less fascinating than the theories of the place of traditionalism in modern Africa, and both strands of the topic have been treated with skill and imagination. The theoretical treatment of political change and the retention of older institutions makes the Buganda study a logical sequel to Professor Apter's earlier work, *The Gold Coast in Transition,* and the subject matter complements the work of D. A. Low and R. Cranford Pratt, *Buganda and British Overrule, 1900–1955.*

Buganda is described by Professor Apter as a "modern autocracy," a political arrangement in which "modernization and change have become traditionalized, and innovation is regarded as a characteristic of the traditional system." The analysis of the Buganda system leads to comparisons with other political arrangements for approaching change, such as those found in Guinea and Ghana ("mobilizational") and in Nigeria ("consociational"). Professor Apter offers a number of acute observations on the nature and appeal of secular nationalism in Africa, on the conditions under which traditional systems can survive, and on the possibility of the development of an African civilization.

With dogged persistency, the Baganda have met the various crises which threatened to undermine their institutions, and they have deflected the appeals of pan-Africanism and of representative government by canalizing change within the traditional setting. The protagonist in many of these crises has been the powerful British Government. Through a series of skillful moves, and with some distortion of history, the Baganda have laid claims to new privileges and to greater internal autonomy, and they have successfully resisted the numerous attempts to create a unitary state in Uganda. Parochialism can go no further than in the belief expressed by some Baganda that self-government will be achieved when the central government disappears and the district councils are supreme. The denouement was reached in 1953 when the Kabaka of Buganda was removed by Sir Andrew Cohen, the liberal-minded Governor who has sponsored many constitutional reforms in Africa. The story of the removal of the Kabaka and his eventual return to power is fully and sympathetically treated.

Other threats to Buganda autonomy have been the development of political parties and the introduction of direct elections. For all of its traditionalism, Buganda has often been a restless country, and the tensions created in the system have resulted since the war in two major riots, the murder of the Katikero

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(Prime Minister), and a boycott against Indian traders. The nationalist political parties have not found it easy to develop mass political support in the peculiar environment of Buganda. Things are in a constant state of flux, leading one observer to conclude that "as soon as you think you understand the political parties, the situation changes." Professor Apter has written an illuminating guide to the political parties of Uganda (and to those limited to Buganda only), but, as one might have anticipated from his remarks, the kaleidoscope has turned again during the period since the book went into production, and new combinations have emerged.

Dr. Chidzero's volume on Tanganyika is a study of international trusteeship which happily is cast in a framework large enough to encompass the political and constitutional development of the territory. The author, a Rhodesian of African descent, with a doctorate from McGill University, writes from the point of view of one who is sympathetic with the work of the United Nations Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly and he shows some impatience with the obstacles faced by the nationalists in their quick rise to power. (The book ends before full independence is achieved; the elections of 1958 and 1959 are described in an Appendix.) Such an impressive quantity of research has gone into the preparation of this book, with relevant documents culled and annotated, that one hesitates to point out omissions. However, it would have been useful to have had a more extended account of the use of petitions, an innovation in the Trusteeship Agreements. The humble petitions, it seems to me, have served to supplement the slender representative process which operated in Tanganyika and they also reveal a good deal about the nature of political conflict in rural Africa.

Dr. Chidzero does not discuss in any detail the problem of tradition and change, the main concern of Professor Apter in his study of Buganda, but he would appear to oppose traditionalism because it blocks national development. "There is no doubt," he says, "that indirect rule tended to perpetuate tribalism and to arrest development, whereas the point in developing a mandated territory should have been to emphasize the emergence of efficient institutions transcending tribal division; to promote a national consciousness." Fuller field work, or the citation of examples, would have provided support for some of Dr. Chidzero's assertions, and it would be interesting to know if he would have reached the same conclusions had he been studying Uganda, for instance.

The Tanganyika solution has been to suppress tribal distinctions and to prevent the formation of political parties on an ethnic, religious, or regional basis; the Uganda solution has been

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to permit the political expression of tribal aspirations through traditional but modernized institutions. In Kenya at the present time the conflict over these two approaches to independence continues to be debated, and, one suspects, the conflict will appear in various forms in African politics (such as in proposals for the uniformity of customary law) for a long time to come.

ROLAND YOUNG

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Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century. By JEROME BLUM, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.—x, 656 pp. $12.50.

The overwhelmingly agrarian character of Russia's economic and social development has never been questioned; even in the 1850's a Western traveler could write that the empire "taken as a whole is just one vast village" (quoted p. 281). It thus may perhaps be a matter of surprise to most students of Russian history that the literature on the key social class, the peasantry, is very scant and quite inadequate. Some very fine studies (in English and other Western languages) on the fate of the peasantry after its emancipation from serfdom have appeared in the last quarter of a century; but there has not been a comprehensive survey of the history of the Russian peasant prior to his emancipation. The situation is hardly better for books written in Russian. The ponderous and ideology-laden studies of the nineteenth century are quite out of date; more recent works—even if one overlooks their ideological bias—have, in the main, studied in detail only limited problems and periods. The most ambitious historical survey, that of B. D. Grekov, for all intents and purposes stops with the seventeenth century. However, an impressive amount of source materials has been published in the twentieth century, permitting works of analysis and synthesis. Professor Blum's study, therefore, fills a very genuine need, and by its scope, stylistic elegance, clarity and judiciousness it holds out the promise, on first reading at least, of becoming the standard book on the question.

For the first time in English we have a full chronological description of the transformations which the peasantry underwent from the beginnings of the Kievan state in the ninth century to the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Mr. Blum's account of these transformations and his description of the manifold types and categories of peasant status and obligations, are a model of clarity and balanced judgment. He has made a genuine effort to find out exactly what the various social and legal categories into which the peasants were classified really meant, how they originated, how they were related to those of other classes, and what their function might have been in a given economic-technological

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setting. The careful reader will become aware of two obvious, but often forgotten facts: at any given period, the peasant's status was the outcome of an historical evolution directly related to other significant aspects of Russian life; there was a great deal of variety and change (beneath an apparent rigidity) in the status of various peasant groups. Even after 1833, when Speransky's codification wiped out a large number of peasant categories that had become mere historical curiosities, the peasantry was far from a uniform class (chapter 23 gives an excellent, concise, and clear description of the major types of peasant status in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). The most striking and influential aspect of peasant life in Russia in modern times, serfdom, was itself the result of a slow and complex evolution which affected various groups of peasants in different ways. Professor Blum is a sure guide through the intricacies of this development. It is no fault of his, but that of our documentation, if some aspects of the story remain shadowy. For example, the history of the slaves is almost impossible to track down at every moment of Russian mediaeval history. This is particularly unfortunate since the existence of slaves played no mean role in the enserfment of the entire peasantry in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (ch. 11, and pp. 272–275).

Besides a description of the legal and social evolution of the peasantry, the author has set himself three additional goals. In the first place, Mr. Blum tries to view the history of the peasantry in relation to the general economic development of Russia, the implication being that the legal and social forms of peasant life were a reflection, or consequence, of the general state of the Russian economy. For instance, the development of serfdom is related to a long period of general economic decline or contraction (largely due to political circumstances). If for the first half of his story, the emergence of serfdom, Mr. Blum's argument is quite convincing, his account strikes me as somewhat less than satisfactory for the second half, the consolidation of serfdom and its fate on the eve of emancipation. Quite correctly, Mr. Blum disputes the Soviet view of the economic decline of serfdom at the beginning of the nineteenth century. He shows that the deterioration of serf conditions was arrested in the early part of that century (pp. 468–472). But does this mean a strengthening of the economic and social value of serfdom? He further argues, perhaps not quite convincingly, that serfdom was not a barrier to Russia's general economic growth at the end of the eighteenth and in the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. As his argument relates mainly to the condition of the peasants attached to factories and those allowed to engage in nonagricultural pursuits rather freely, it is a pity that he has weakened his case by a failure to take ade-

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quate account of chronology and to make use of recent Soviet and Western work on peasant entrepreneurship (ch. 16). But he does provide a useful corrective to Soviet claims by his calculation of the proportion of free to unfree labor in industry (pp. 323–325).

Whatever the truth of Blum's contention that the abolition of serfdom was not primarily caused by its proven economic disadvantages, his account and analysis of seignorial economy in the second half of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries are somewhat disappointing. While he repeats the often cited instances of brutality, lawlessness, and caprice on the part of the owners (without, however, drawing the obvious conclusions with regard to the psychological pressure they generated in favor of emancipation), he does not make quite clear how this economy actually worked. True enough, basing himself on statistical evidence, he quite rightly stresses the greater variations that existed in the economic status of both owners and serfs. But recent Soviet and French studies also help us to understand the techniques of estate management and their impact on the economic condition of landowners and serfs. Blum has made use of older monographs, some statistical material, and observations by foreign travelers. But he has not analyzed the very extensive and highly revealing literature of memoirs, autobiographies, and letters, as well as contemporary instructions to managers, economic discussions, and didactic works.

A second aim of Professor Blum's was to relate the history of the Russian peasantry to political problems and conditions. Quite frankly, I do not feel that he has well succeeded in this. Apparently, Mr. Blum's grasp of Russian political and institutional history is not too sure and not quite adequate for the ambitious goal he has set himself. He relies on standard textbook interpretations and accounts (and, even more surprisingly, very outdated monographs), and then uncritically relates their generalizations to his analysis of Russian economic history. This is not the place for what would be a rather technical debate on Russian political and institutional history. In one reader's opinion, at least, Blum's analysis is vitiated by his belief in the paramount influence of the nobility and his underplaying of the role of the needs and policies of the autocracy. There is no denying the role played by the nobility—rather its own special type of institutional pattern—in the rise of serfdom. But I feel it is insufficient to account for the particular forms taken by agrarian relations in Russia and serfdom's harsh and long life. Perhaps Mr. Blum's view of the relationships between peasants, noblemen, and autocracy is a bit too simple; as he well knows from his studies of Central European history, it is the institutional

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framework within which each one of these elements operated that really matters. And his views of the nobility's institutions, for example, are most questionable, indeed.

Professor Blum deals with his third avowed aim, that of relating the history of the Russian peasantry to its all-European context, only very briefly and in passing. While he is quite right in stressing the "European" character of the Russian story, his specific analogies are sometimes questionable. Indeed, they all rest on the premise criticized earlier, that of the predominance of the nobility (pp. 606–611).

The preceding remarks should have made clear the value and richness of the book. Its very shortcomings will, let us hope, stimulate further research on the vital problems of Russia's economic development, its relationship to political conditions, and the fate of the overwhelming majority of the Russian people. The volume may be a disappointment to the scholar in the field, but it will be most eagerly and gratefully read by all students of Russian history.

MARC RAEFF

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Fifteenth Century 1399–1485 (*The Oxford History of England,* Volume VI). By ERNEST F. JACOB. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961.—xvi, 775 pp. $9.00.

Students of English history have waited a quarter of a century for this book. It is the last volume of the fourteen volume Oxford History of England to be published, the first having made its appearance in 1936. For this apparent tardiness the author may be forgiven: his was the very difficult task of surveying that century of English history on which the least specialized research has been done, and whose manuscript sources in many cases have not yet been even examined, let alone intensively studied. Jacob's task has been a difficult and lonely one and he deserves the plaudits of the academic world for bringing it to a conclusion.

It might be thought that a quarter-century of world upheaval and transmutation of many values would mean that Jacob's historiographical approach would differ markedly from that of G. N. Clark's volume on the later Stuarts, which was the first volume in the series to appear. But Jacob's book might just as well have been published in 1936, or for that matter, in 1906. We are given ten chapters of very detailed, confusing, political narrative which challenge the most interested reader to remain awake and four chapters of more general studies. Of these, the surveys of government and the church in the fifteenth century have the value of providing useful summaries which will be

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cribbed by hardpressed college teachers ignorant of more specialized works. The long chapter on social groups and classes is slack and tedious and lacking in any kind of sociological analysis. Finally, we are presented in the last chapter, as is the rule in this series, with a survey of 'the peaceful arts,' that is, intellectual and cultural history, stuck on the end like the tail on a pig, and unrelated to what Jacob considers to be the substance of history, the details of squabbles over succession to the throne. The fifteenth century has sometimes been known as the Renaissance, but it would not be easy to tell so from Jacob's book.

The value of this volume consists in its detailed account of the twists and turns of the Wars of the Roses, its discussion (although not resolution) of many controversial points of ecclesiastical, political, and economic history, and its spendid bibliography. Although he has made very little use of manuscript sources, the author makes reference to all the important published work on fifteenth century England, and the book is a necessary addition to any reference library on English history. Graduate students will have to stumble through it in preparing for their doctoral orals; scholars in the field will want to have the volume handy for bibliographical references.

As a work of history, however, as distinct from mere scholarship, it is uninspired, labored, and distinctly mediocre. The style is ponderous and often turgid, and the author's penchant for listing what seems like every lord in fifteenth century England, and for frequently neglecting to identify them further, does not help the bewildered reader. There is little in this book of the drama, the color, the ardor, the violence, the misery, the devotion of fifteenth century England. It is not until page 685 that Margery Kempe is discussed; and yet the mystical literature of fifteenth century England is one of the few aspects of the civilization of that era which any longer has anything to teach us. Jacob's book has no structure, no general thesis, no pattern of ideas, no relevance to any other time or place. In his hands, fifteenth century England becomes a series of exercises in narrative source problems as dispassionately analyzed by an industrious, even-tempered Oxford don. His contribution is neither the best nor the worst volume in the series, but it writes large the defects of contemporary Oxford historiography, which sneers at German *Geistesgeschichte;* contemns the quasi-sociological interests of French and American scholars; aims at a gentleman's no-nonsense-what-happened-next narrative; and ends in a strange species of historical nominalism: history without ideas, without insights, without wit, without charm, and even without usefulness.

NORMAN F. CANTOR

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Colonial Justice: The Unique Achievement of the Privy Council's Committee of Judges. By BARNETT HOLLANDER. London, Bowes & Bowes, 1961.—xx, 115 pp. 18s.

The author of this slight volume admits at the outset that "this is not a conventional law book or law treatise" and that it "may savour of propaganda" in its tribute "to the universal high opinion of British justice and British genius for government both *abroad* and at home" (p. ix). The book is designed to refute charges of "colonialism" in an invidious sense as applied to the work of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. This purpose is underscored in a foreword by Lord Shawcross, former Attorney General of Great Britain, noting that far too much is heard in denigration of the British colonial system and that many countries acquiring independence today would have remained in a state of anarchy and undevelopment had it not been for British colonial enterprise intended to lead dependent countries forward to self-government.

To accomplish his purpose, Mr. Hollander sets forth in abstracted form thirty-seven cases from the hundreds heard by the Judicial Committee since its establishment by act of Parliament in 1833. Included are appeals from the West Indies, Bermuda, Newfoundland, various African possessions, India and Ceylon, Gibraltar, Malta and Cyprus in the Mediterranean area, the Channel Islands, St. Helena and Mauritius, Australia and New Zealand, Hong Kong and a consular court in Japan, plus a few admiralty and ecclesiastical appeals arising within the United Kingdom. This sampling is contrived "to demonstrate the Crown's and Committee's protection of the little man in the smallest colonies" (p. ix) and "to illustrate the closest judicial consideration of local and tribal laws and customs, and even wholly different systems of law" (p. x). Lord Shawcross designates the collection as some of the opinions of the Judicial Committee which have "supported the rule of law and protected liberty" (p. v) in what were at the time possessions of the British crown.

The appeals abstracted are both criminal (largely murder cases) and civil (mainly contracts, torts and domestic relations cases). In some instances it is difficult to see how the cases lend support to any thesis advanced by the author. Some certainly have no interest for the general reader. In others, the abstracting makes difficult determination of the exact legal issues involved. Several cases deal with the extension of the laws of England to dominions of the crown outside the realm or the status of local laws in a possession gained by conquest or cession. This problem of "reception" has been the subject of many

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judicial decisions in England and in the United States commencing as far back as *Calvin's Case,* 7 Coke 2a (1609). Mr. Hollander exhibits no acquaintance with this body of law in his astonishing statements that the American plantations "when fashioned into the United States of America, by its Constitution adopted as its law the Common Law of England" and that "the numerous sovereign states (50) by their respective State Constitutions adopted similar provisions" (p. x).

Introductory to his abstracted cases the author has a chapter entitled "Colonization and Colonialism, Early and Now" which is poorly organized and entirely superficial; a chapter on the development of the Privy Council which attempts to treat on four pages a subject to which other authors have devoted hundreds of pages; and a chapter setting forth in brief compass the formation, jurisdiction and procedures of the Judicial Committee. The interested reader would be advised to consult Halsbury, Bentwich or Safford and Wheeler's definitive treatise. Some appendices on comparative French, German and American practice with respect to judicial control over colonial possessions have little value.

The reviewer has no doubts as to the valuable achievements of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. He doubts, however, that Mr. Hollander's presentation will convert many of those now in the "anti-colonialist" ranks.

JOSEPH H. SMITH

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Bertrand Barère: A Reluctant Terrorist. By LEO GERSHOY. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962.—xi, 459 pp. $8.50.

There was a time when historians worked at whitewashing the reputations of maligned characters who played major and controversial roles in the French Revolution and this was done by passionate arguments in defense of these characters and by passionate outbursts against their attackers. Mr. Gershoy believes that the time has come when the historian may redress former wrongs dispassionately and objectively and study the Revolution without taking sides. In his biography of Barère his aim is to prove wrong Macaulay's judgment of Barère as cowardly, cruel, mean, impudent, depraved, sensuous, barbaric, and base without engaging in "special pleading and insidiously transformed sympathy into apology." From his vantage point of long familiarity with the revolution, then, he has undertaken a cool and critical review of all that Barère said, did, and wrote, of what his contemporaries thought of him, and of how other historians have judged him.

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Largely through the use of Barère's letters and pamphlets, his speeches in the Constituent Assembly and the Convention, his newspapers and memoirs, Mr. Gershoy gives an account of a man changing his political views rapidly and radically from provincial royalism to bourgeois liberalism, then to ardent republicanism and to servile flattery of Napoleon; yet Mr. Gershoy says he is neither a chameleon nor a trimmer, and certainly not a betrayer. He is, instead, judged true to the revolutionary credo despite repeated and startling reversals which kept him on the winning side until 1794. Though Barère never fully identified with any of the partisan factions—despite his membership in most of the major clubs, beginning with the Breton group—Mr. Gershoy does not see him as a man trying to carry water on both shoulders. The author thinks of Barère as a moderate and sensible man ever anxious to prevent schism between Montagnards and Girondins, ever eager to further the revolution through unity of all republicans, ever willing to serve as the dispassionate statesman pouring oil on troubled waters. Despite these good intentions, Mr. Gershoy still leaves the impression that Barère was a man whose chief aim was survival at any price. Perhaps better than the term "reluctant terrorist" would be "cautious revolutionary," for Barère seems to have been caught up in the excitement of politics, swept away by the rapidity of changes in government, never quite able to define what this revolutionary credo involved. Although this is the over-all impression, there are two major points in favor of the author's thesis: the convincing account of Barère's switch from royalism after his arrival in Paris in 1788 and the significant fact that Barère, almost as able as Talleyrand in sensing change in direction, failed to realize the new climate of opinion after Robespierre's fall. The latter point alone is almost, but not quite, enough to convince the reader that Barère was a man of principle.

One could quibble with the author for repeating some old cliches. Who except the royalist historian expects to profit by the claim that the decision to execute the king was carried by a single vote? Objective scholarship demands that the vote be recounted as it was recorded—334 against and 387 for the death penalty. If twenty-six of the 387 added a plea for clemency to their votes, they still did not vote no. And the succeeding Girondist motion to defer the execution, perhaps a clearer index to the political passions of 1793, was defeated by a vote of 380–310, a certain majority of seventy in favor of execution. Is it dispassionate and objective to state that more victims of the Terror were exacted in the last seven weeks before 9 Thermidor than in the preceding fourteen months when Greer's *Incidence of the Terror* gives conclusive statistics to demonstrate the fallacy

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of comparing local Terror with national Terror? One could also ask for more specific references to source material than is offered in the "Notes" at the end. While the text often makes clear the source of Mr. Gershoy's information, there are places where footnotes would be helpful.

Though the picture of Barère as a man true to the revolutionary credo is not entirely convincing, there is value in this lucid and readable biography which offers the chance to live again the excitement of the revolution as it appeared to a major participant. Weak, unprincipled, and often cringing servant of the state as he was, Barère was still one of the key figures of the day. With Mr. Gershoy's account of this "reluctant terrorist," it is possible to see other participants as Barère saw them, to live through the violence of revolutionary issues and decisions with him, and to pity the anti-climactic years of one who survived.

LOUISE DALBY

SKIDMORE COLLEGE

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BOOK NOTES

Peter F. Drucker, Delbert C. Miller, and Robert A. Dahl contribute papers and participate in a joint discussion in *Power and Democracy in America,* edited by William V. D'Antonio and Howard J. Ehrlich (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1961; xviii, 181 pp. $4.50 hardbound; also in paperback). The main subject of this symposium, held at Notre Dame, turns out to be the currently fashionable one of "community power." This may not have been the intention of the local student government, which suggested the general topic, or of Mr. Drucker, who specializes in long-range punditry. But Drucker's rather offhand comments on the state of the world are soon lost in the conflict between sociologist Miller and political scientist Dahl over the methodology and substantive findings of community power studies. Indeed, the chief attraction of the book may be for the non-sociologist seeking a short summary and critique of recent sociological thinking on the subject. By far the longest selection—and the only one involving empirical data—is Miller's. He describes his approach, a modification of the Floyd Hunter method, and then goes on to present some contrasting empirical data from a sizeable British city (where he spent a year) and from a Pacific Northwest city (apparently Seattle—just why most sociologists continue the tradition of unnecessarily disguised, but easily identified, place names is one of the minor mysteries of current intellectual life). Dahl briefly outlines his by now familiar criticisms of the Hunter "reputational" approach, and argues that things do not work that way in New Haven (*cf* his *Who Governs?*). The editors join in the final discussion, making a strong case (pp. 96–97) for *comparative* research on "the characteristics of communities or nations that give rise to given power-arrangements." This seems to be the new frontier; will the sociologists again steal a march on their political science colleagues?—HUGH DOUGLAS PRICE, Columbia University.

Government and Politics in Africa, by T. O. Elias (New York, Asia Publishing House, 1961; xv, 228 pp., $6.50), is a series of lectures delivered by Dr. Elias, the first Minister of Justice of the Federation of Nigeria, at the University of Delhi in 1956. In them he covers broadly the field of African political development from traditional institutions through comparative native administrations, to the contemporary political patterns emerging

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in Africa. Inevitably, as the author himself points out, the treatment of so vast a subject makes for unevenness of coverage. Since Dr. Elias is a specialist on African law this topic, along with the problem of land tenure, gets disproportionately detailed chapters, while political parties and programs are dismissed in a little over ten pages. Most of the ideas presented are already current in the literature on African politics but it is of interest to have them presented from the viewpoint of an African trained in Western law. Ronald Segal's *Political Africa* (New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1961; ix, 475 pp., $12.50) is subtitled "A Who's Who of Personalities and Parties." It is an indispensable reference book for those who seek to keep abreast of political events on the continent. More than half the volume is devoted to short biographies of political leaders, while the remainder contains sketches of the major parties in each country. The coverage of political leaders is remarkably broad and much of the information is unobtainable elsewhere. The specialist will find that specific personalities from one or another country are unaccountably omitted, but the author and his collaborators are to be congratulated on securing biographies of many figures who are little known outside their own immediate political circles. The volume is usefully cross-indexed between parties and personalities.—L. GRAY COWAN, Columbia University.

The latest massive publication of the Twentieth Century Fund, *Europe's Needs and Resources: Trends and Prospects in Eighteen Countries,* by J. Frederic Dewhurst, John O. Coppock, P. Lamartin Yates, and Associates (New York, Twentieth Century Fund; London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1961; xxvi, 1198 pp., $12.00), may be described as an attempt at measuring, analyzing, and forecasting the economic growth and social changes in the integrated Europe-to-be. The area with which the survey deals is not "the geographer's Europe" but the territories of eighteen "noncommunist Western-oriented countries of Europe, the economies of which are largely responsive to the free play of the market forces rather than government fiat." The volume opens with a succinct statement of European recovery since 1945—"unprecedented in extent and duration," according to Dr. Dewhurst. The bulk of the study is given to a detailed statistical investigation of population, manpower, output and expenditure, consumption levels, housing, transport, education, health, social security, government finance, investment, agriculture, natural resources, power, foreign trade, currency, underdeveloped areas, productivity, and technology, as well as to an evaluation of capitalism and of the "dynamics of economic integration." The

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argument presented in the text is supported by a formidable array of tables which fill over 250 pages of the appendices. The material is arranged "in terms of Western Europe as a whole, and then in terms of special characteristics and divergences of particular regions and individual countries." It is clearly analyzed and as up-to-date as availability of data and the technical conditions of printing would allow. The survey, however, is not limited to past and present. It endeavors to project changes in every major field from the base year 1955 to 1970. The Introduction states candidly that even under the most favorable conditions "the future is always surrounded with uncertainty and no 'projection' can pretend to be more than a fallible human judgment based on the best available evidence." This is a disarming statement but it does not answer the question whether the great effort involved in making detailed forecasts is justified by the results obtained, especially since "the best available evidence" is usually far from being comprehensive and trustworthy. Those who treasure the traditional Western values will find *Europe's Needs and Resources* highly encouraging. The authors' optimistic evaluation of the present extends to the future. Professor Salvadori, for instance, holds that "the area within which Europe's limited capitalism can operate is more likely to expand than to shrink in the immediate future; in 1959 the outlook for free enterprise is probably brigher than it has been for some time." This is heartening. Let us hope that both figures and projections tell the true story.—MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY, Columbia University.

The Yearbook of World Affairs, 1961 (Published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs by Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1961; xviii, 435 pp., $12.50) includes a number of articles dealing for the most part with questions of quite contemporary interest, plus a series of bibliographical surveys reviewing books that have currently been published on major aspects of world affairs. Like its predecessors, it will be of considerable value to students of international affairs and will appeal to a wide range of interests. Quite understandably, the cold war, in some of its aspects, is a central concern of many of the articles. Frederick Schuman tells the story of ill-fated summitry at Paris. J. L. Richardson of Nuffield College analyzes and evaluates two theories of Western defense. Arthur L. Burns discusses military technology as a factor in international relations, essentially in a cold war context and in the light of recent events. And Georg Schwarzenberger examines the nature and scope of neutralism. Closely related to the Cold War is the con-

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cern with the nature of communism and communist policies and practices. Karl A. Wittfogel undertakes what he terms "a socio-historical comparison" of the Russian and Chinese revolutions. Lord Lindsay of Birker discusses recent developments in Chinese foreign policy. Other articles of a highly informative nature are devoted to Soviet views of international law and brainwashing as practiced by the Chinese Communists. The student of international organization will find Stephen S. Goodspeed's examination of "Political Considerations in the United Nations Economic and Social Council" highly perceptive and illuminating. Lord Gladwyn's piece on "Britain and Western Europe" is in substance a statement of Government policy on Britain's relation to the Common Market. In his "Social Structure and Foreign Policy of the United States," Neal Houghton analyzes the factors which have influenced American foreign policy. The author is of course entitled to his own views regarding the role of various interest groups. Nevertheless, the picture that he paints of a highly regimented society with special interests calling the tune on foreign policy, while it may have many elements of truth, seems to this reviewer to be greatly exaggerated and likely to have a highly misleading influence on the uninformed and perhaps receptive reader. For example, it would seem completely contrary to the facts to say, as the author does on page 96, that "by the end of the Second World War, it had become very difficult for research historians with well-established professional reputations even to publish their books unless they conformed reasonably well to the dominant attitudes of their colleagues." Unfortunately, there are other statements of an equally extreme character.—LELAND M. GOODRICH, Columbia University.

The United States and Latin America, by Dexter Perkins (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University, 1961; xi, 124 pp. $3.00), ranges with admirably succinct skill over the peaks, and at times the foothills, of many viable issues, some binding us to Latin America and some, not as many, that are troublesome. Communistic Castroism, sequels to Trujilloism, and the Alliance for Progress are not analyzed, for the Maximum Leader had not broadcast his faith, the Generalissimo was still ambulatory, and the Alliance was gestating when the study was written. Excepting parts of a few paragraphs, its knowledgeable quality is outstanding or extra good. *Outstanding* dominates, as could be surmised of a renowned Monroe Doctrine authority. He says that the Doctrine has been primarily a Caribbean policy; that European archives indicate Theodore Roosevelt indulged in

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some wishful Big Stick brandishing in the Venezuelan incident; that our 1894 sugar duty probably was a factor in Cuba's 1895 revolt (an aside: a probability our recent and current statesmen seem to ignore); that nuclear arms make Guantanamo of negligible value (an aside: we still paid less than $4,000 annual rental for 38,000 acres and a greater area of water for fifty years when they were much more valuable); that "pious" Washington declarations have often typified clarions for popular fervor when expediency lurked behind the handouts—too often, apparently; that the *grito* of "Braden ó Peron" was one snowball in a landslide in Argentina; that it was hard for "some of us to perceive" why Truman rearmed Latin America (an aside: it gave Castro a propaganda weapon). Abashedly, two minor things. First, *en passim* the literary merit of an otherwise splendid work is reminiscent of a consular despatch on United Fruit. This is probably due to the book being a reprint of three talks at Tulane University. Secondly, one stumbles on seeming oversimplifications, such as a "sensational comeback" of the Argentine economy since Peron, "injudicious conduct" of "hotheads" in Panama (it is too poor to grow many eggheads), and "Communist-dominated" Guatemala's "radical" land distribution. Alliance for Progress aides may do well to read two provocative books: Professor Perkins' and *Latin American Issues—Essays and Comments,* edited by Albert O. Hirschman (New York, 1961). They complement each other.—BYRON WHITE, University of Puerto Rico.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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